Two Studies Find Persistent Discrimination in Jury Selection in North and South Carolina
Two recent studies examining the effects of Batson v. Kentucky found that, despite the Supreme Court's ban on racial discrimination in jury selection, Black jurors continue to be disproportionately removed from jury pools in North and South Carolina. Batson, the case that banned the practice of striking jurors on the basis of race, has garnered recent attention because of a recent Supreme Court case, Foster v. Chatman. In Foster, the trial court denied a Black defendant's challenges to the prosecutor's removal of all Black jurors, saying the prosecution had offered race-neutral reasons for those strikes. Years later, through an open records request, Foster's lawyers obtained the prosecution's jury selection notes, which highlighted the names and race of all the prospective Black jurors, put all of the Black jurors on a list of jurors to "definitely strike," and the Black jurors against one another in case "it comes down to having to pick one of the black jurors." A study by Daniel R. Pollitt and Brittany P. Warren in the North Carolina Law Review found that discriminatory practices similar to those in Foster were widespread in North Carolina capital cases, but repeatedly ignored by the state's courts: "In the 114 cases decided on the merits by North Carolina appellate courts, the courts have never found a substantive Batson violation where a prosecutor has articulated a reason for the peremptory challenge of a minority juror." The authors found that the North Carolina Supreme Court had been called upon to decide jury discrimination issues in 74 cases since Batson was decided in 1986, and that "during that time, that court has never once found a substantive Batson violation." By contrast, they said, every other state appellate court located in the Fourth Circuit had found at least one substantive Batson violation during that period. The authors argue, "Thirty years after Batson, North Carolina defendants challenging racially discriminatory peremptory strikes still face a crippling burden of proof and prosecutors’ peremptory challenges are still effectively immune from constitutional scrutiny." A study of South Carolina capital juries by Assistant Professor Ann M. Eisenberg of the University of South Carolina School of Law found that prosecutors exercised peremptory strikes against 35% of otherwise eligible Black prospective jurors, nearly triple the rate (12%) at which they struck otherwise eligible White prospective jurors. Eisenberg also examined the death-qualification process, which excludes jurors who are opposed to capital punishment from serving on death penalty juries. Eisenberg says death-qualification removes "approximately one-third of the population, most of whom are women and African-Americans" from serving on death penalty juries and "functioned as a substantial impediment to jury service by African-Americans in this study." Eisenberg concluded that "removal of jurors for their opposition to the death penalty stands in tension with a defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights and Supreme Court jurisprudence." The combined effects of peremptory strikes and the death-qualification process was even starker. Prior to these strikes, Blacks comprised 21.5% of the prospective jury pool. However, 47% of all Black jurors were removed by one or the other of these strikes, as compared with only 16% of White jurors, reducing the percentage of African Americans in the jury pool to only 14.7%.
Read More 6,854 reads
LAW REVIEW: "The Death Penalty and the Fifth Amendment"
Some proponents of the death penalty—including the late Justice Antonin Scalia and the 2016 Republican Party platform—have asserted that the Supreme Court cannot declare the death penalty unconstitutional because the Framers included reference to the punishment in the text of the Fifth Amendment. An article by Duke Law School Professor Joseph Blocher, published in the Northwestern University Law Review, critically analyzes that argument and concludes that the Fifth Amendment's acknowledgment of the death penalty as an acceptable practice in the 1700s does not foreclose judicial review of the constitutionality of the practice under the Eighth Amendment or any other constitutional amendment. This, Blocher says, is because the Fifth Amendment contains restrictions on the exercise of government power, rather than affirmatively granting the government any constitutional power. The Fifth Amendment, Blocher writes, "contains three prohibitions on the use of capital punishment." The Grand Jury Clause prohibits the government from bringing charges against a person "for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury." The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits twice placing any person "in jeopardy of life or limb" for the same offense. The Due Process Clause prohibits depriving any person "of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." No one would argue that the mention of deprivation of limb in the Double Jeopardy Clause constitutionally legitimizes amputation as a criminal punishment. And by imposing constitutional limits on government conduct in attempting to take a defendant's life, Blocher says "there is no reason to suppose that [the Fifth Amendment] somehow nullifies other constitutional prohibitions—most importantly, the ban on cruel and unusual punishment." He notes that the Ninth Amendment reinforces this reading, "The Ninth Amendment indicates that the entire Bill of Rights—let alone any particular provision of it—cannot be read as an exclusive list. ...Compliance with the Fifth Amendment does not provide the death penalty a safe harbor against constitutional challenges, including those derived from the Eighth Amendment." Blocher concludes that to the extent reasons may exist not to abolish the death penalty, "the Fifth Amendment is not one of them."
Read More 9,667 reads