In an edi­to­r­i­al that fol­lowed a four-part news series review­ing death penal­ty-eli­gi­ble mur­der cas­es in Georgia between 1995 and 2004, the Atlanta Journal Constitution called on the state to aban­don cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment because death sen­tences are often unfair­ly influ­enced by geog­ra­phy, a pros­e­cu­tor’s per­son­al pol­i­tics, or the vic­tim’s race. The paper also said that Georgia fails to meet min­i­mum stan­dards to ensure an accu­rate and fair cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment sys­tem, noting:

For crim­i­nal cas­es involv­ing the most severe pun­ish­ment that soci­ety can inflict, jus­tice has nev­er been blind. As we’re learn­ing, it prob­a­bly nev­er can be.

But if soci­ety choos­es to inflict death, it has an oblig­a­tion to do so fair­ly. A death sen­tence should not be arbi­trary and capri­cious, imposed on some but not on oth­ers who are guilty of even more heinous crimes.

And because a death sen­tence is absolute, it should be imposed only in cas­es where the per­son­’s guilt is absolute­ly cer­tain, and it should be imposed based on clear stan­dards in the law, not on the human bias­es and prej­u­dices that afflict all of us.

The death penal­ty as it is imposed here in Georgia does not meet those minimum standards.

For exam­ple:

• District attor­neys in metro Atlanta coun­ties such as DeKalb and Fulton rou­tine­ly offer defen­dants in cap­i­tal crimes the option of plead­ing guilty and fac­ing life sen­tences with­out hope of parole.

But in sim­i­lar cas­es else­where in the state, pros­e­cu­tors seek and win death penal­ty sen­tences, mak­ing the punishment irrational.

It would make as much sense just to exe­cute every 10th or every 100th mur­der­er [as] it would be to fig­ure out the rhyme or rea­son for why we’re pick­ing the ones to get the death penal­ty,” as Atlanta defense attor­ney Jack Martin noted.

• Race has played a role in the admin­is­tra­tion of jus­tice in this coun­try since its found­ing. That ugly and intractable dynam­ic is still evi­dent today; accord­ing to a sta­tis­ti­cal analy­sis of more than a thou­sand cas­es, pros­e­cu­tors in Georgia were twice as like­ly to seek the death penal­ty if the vic­tim was white than if the vic­tim was black. In the more spe­cif­ic cat­e­go­ry of mur­ders car­ried out dur­ing an armed rob­bery, defen­dants were an aston­ish­ing six times as like­ly to face death sen­tences if the per­son they killed was white.

• The Georgia Supreme Court has the respon­si­bil­i­ty to scru­ti­nize death sen­tences to ensure the penal­ty is being applied uni­form­ly statewide, based on prece­dents set in ear­li­er cas­es. But for­mer and sit­ting jus­tices open­ly admit that their pro­por­tion­al­i­ty reviews” have often been woe­ful­ly slop­py and inaccurate.

In the vast major­i­ty of 159 such reviews under­tak­en since 1982, the jus­tices have cit­ed cas­es as prece­dent that had actu­al­ly been dis­missed, over­turned or reversed on appeal, includ­ing some that had been over­turned by the jus­tices them­selves. Only 14 of those 159 pro­por­tion­al­i­ty reviews cit­ed no cas­es that had been reversed.

In 1972, cit­ing evi­dence that the death penal­ty in Georgia was being applied in a sim­i­lar­ly arbi­trary man­ner, the U.S. Supreme Court threw out death-penal­ty laws here and in 39 oth­er states as well. Since then, laws have been rewrit­ten and process­es and safe­guards alleged­ly tight­ened, but to lit­tle apparent effect.

The dif­fi­cul­ties of fair­ly, accu­rate­ly and effi­cient­ly car­ry­ing out the death penal­ty in Georgia are fur­ther illus­trat­ed by two promi­nent cas­es in the news. The first involves Brian Nichols, charged in a sen­sa­tion­al 2005 killing spree that left four peo­ple dead, includ­ing a judge, his court reporter, a sher­if­f’s deputy and a fed­er­al agent. The pro­ceed­ings have been repeat­ed­ly delayed by con­tro­ver­sy over the cost of Nichols’ state-appoint­ed legal defense, which has now reached more than $1.8 million.

The mul­ti­ple crimes alleged to have been com­mit­ted by Nichols are at least as heinous as those that have put oth­er peo­ple on Death Row. But even if Nichols is found guilty, at this point the odds of a death sen­tence being imposed and car­ried out against him appear pret­ty slim. If that assess­ment proves valid, it would add to the already over­whelm­ing evi­dence of the arbi­trary nature of the death penal­ty in Georgia.

The sec­ond Georgia case involves the fate of Troy Anthony Davis, who was con­vict­ed in 1991 of killing a Savannah police offi­cer and has been sit­ting on death row ever since. Davis was con­vict­ed based exclu­sive­ly on eye­wit­ness tes­ti­mo­ny, which in oth­er cas­es has proved noto­ri­ous­ly unre­li­able, espe­cial­ly when no sup­port­ing phys­i­cal evi­dence exist­ed. For exam­ple, in cas­es in which DNA evi­dence has exon­er­at­ed felons of crimes they did not com­mit, faulty eye­wit­ness reports often turns out to have played a cen­tral role in the original conviction.

In the Davis case, the uncer­tain nature of eye­wit­ness tes­ti­mo­ny is com­pound­ed by the fact that most of the pros­e­cu­tion wit­ness­es have since recant­ed or con­tra­dict­ed their tes­ti­mo­ny nam­ing Davis as the killer. Yet Davis was one day from exe­cu­tion before state offi­cials agreed to a tem­po­rary stay to exam­ine his case more carefully.

Georgia’s death penal­ty law can and should be updat­ed to try to wring as much unfair­ness as pos­si­ble from the sys­tem, but reform can nev­er erad­i­cate the pos­si­bil­i­ty of error, and it can nev­er remove human bias and prej­u­dice from the process. Imposing the absolute penal­ty requires absolute jus­tice, and in the absence of that, the death penal­ty ought to be abolished.

(Atlanta Journal Constitution, September 27, 2007). See Editorials, Innocence, and Race.

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