In a recent Washington Post col­umn, Richard Cohen com­pared the deep objec­tions voiced by many Americans after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that com­mu­ni­ties can con­demn prop­er­ty in dis­tressed areas to make way for eco­nom­ic devel­op­ment to the tepid reac­tion to strong evi­dence that a Missouri man may have been wrong­ly exe­cut­ed for a crime he did not com­mit. Cohen, not­ing that it seems ​“far eas­i­er for the gov­ern­ment to wrong­ful­ly take a life than a par­cel of run-down real estate,” wrote:

The city of New London, Conn., nar­row­ly (5 to 4) won the right last month from the Supreme Court to con­demn a par­cel of land in a dis­tressed part of the town to make way for eco­nom­ic devel­op­ment. The rul­ing has gen­er­at­ed a tsuna­mi of objec­tion and an effort in many states and local­i­ties to have its effects undone .…

At the same time, in a far dif­fer­ent area of the law, author­i­ties are won­der­ing if two men long ago con­vict­ed of mur­der might be inno­cent. This has gen­er­at­ed almost no inter­est, no nation­wide protest move­ment, sug­gest­ing that in this coun­try it is far eas­i­er for the gov­ern­ment to wrong­ful­ly take a life than a par­cel of run-down real estate. Is this a great coun­try or what?

…

Since 1973, 119 peo­ple have walked off death row, exon­er­at­ed by DNA or evi­dence, accord­ing to the Death Penalty Information Center. Had the wheels of jus­tice turned as swift­ly as the hang ​‘em high crowd would have liked, some of those peo­ple would exist in mem­o­ry only and we would con­sole our­selves that they were prob­a­bly guilty of some­thing — or why else would the cops have been on to them. The log­ic is fiercely circular.

Now, though, we have two such cas­es and they are worth pon­der­ing for a num­ber of rea­sons. The first involves Olmado Hidalgo, a New York City man who was con­vict­ed 13 years ago of mur­der — on what the dis­trict attor­ney’s office now con­cedes was weak evi­dence. The author­i­ties are not say­ing that Hidalgo is inno­cent. But to their cred­it, they are now say­ing that some new evi­dence has sur­faced that gives every­one pause. Lucky for Hidalgo that he was not con­vict­ed in anoth­er state where jus­tice is swifter — if some­what less certain.

The oth­er case involves the late Larry Griffin, who was exe­cut­ed by Missouri in 1995 for a dri­ve-by shoot­ing. The main wit­ness against him, now dead, turns out to have had a pli­able mem­o­ry and an ugly résumé. He was a career crim­i­nal and drug addict who hap­pened to be fac­ing seri­ous felony charges at the time. After he use­ful­ly turned wit­ness to the mur­der, he got to walk. Lucky man.
…

Both the Griffin and Hidalgo cas­es are impor­tant for what they lack — DNA evi­dence. In this, they are typ­i­cal. The vic­tims were both shot at a dis­tance: no DNA evi­dence. This is often the case. In the aver­age crime, there is no exchange of body flu­ids (as in rape) and no tis­sue under the vic­tim’s fin­ger­nails or any­thing like that. DNA test­ing has done won­ders — both in get­ting con­vic­tions and in exon­er­at­ing the inno­cent. But it can­not be used where it is not a fac­tor. For that rea­son, cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment remains fraught with the pos­si­bil­i­ty of injustice.

(Washington Post, July 26, 2005). See Innocence.

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