Shafer v. South Carolina, 00 – 5250

In a 7 – 2 vote, the Court re-affirmed that defen­dants fac­ing the death penal­ty have the right to inform jurors when a life sen­tence would include no pos­si­bil­i­ty of parole. The Court found that Wesley A. Shafer’s right to due process was vio­lat­ed when a South Carolina tri­al judge refused to clar­i­fy for jurors that, if they sen­tenced Shafer to life, he would have no pos­si­bil­i­ty of parole. Justice Ginsburg, writ­ing for the major­i­ty, stat­ed that the jury was obvi­ous­ly con­fused about the mean­ing of a life sen­tence under South Carolina’s new law because they sent a note to the tri­al judge ask­ing if there was any remote chance” of parole. In response, the tri­al judge instruct­ed the jury that parole eli­gi­bil­i­ty or inel­i­gi­bil­i­ty is not for your con­sid­er­a­tion.” The jury then sen­tenced Shafer to death.

The deci­sion reit­er­ates the Court’s 1994 rul­ing in Simmons v. South Carolina, hold­ing that when­ev­er the pros­e­cu­tion makes an issue of the defen­dan­t’s future dan­ger­ous­ness, the defen­dant has the right to an accu­rate jury instruc­tion that a life sen­tence means no pos­si­bil­i­ty of release. (New York Times, 3/​21/​01) Shafer’s case was remand­ed back to South Carolina to deter­mine whether future dan­ger­ous­ness was, in fact, argued by the prosecution.

Texas v. Cobb, 99 – 1702 

In a 5 – 4 rul­ing, the U.S. Supreme Court held that police did not have to noti­fy Cobb’s lawyer when they ques­tioned him about one crime while he was under indict­ment for a relat­ed crime. In 1993, Raymond Cobb con­fessed to the bur­glary of his neigh­bor Maggie Owings, but denied involve­ment in the dis­ap­pear­ance of her and her daugh­ter. While await­ing tri­al, the police ques­tioned Cobb about the dis­ap­pear­ances with­out noti­fy­ing his lawyer. Cobb was sub­se­quent­ly con­vict­ed and sen­tenced to death. The con­vic­tion was over­turned by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals which held that the police should have noti­fied Cobb’s attor­ney before questioning him.

The U.S. Supreme Court, how­ev­er, reversed the Texas Court hold­ing that the bur­glary and the killings were sep­a­rate crimes and a lawyer work­ing on one case is not auto­mat­i­cal­ly the lawyer for the sec­ond case. The dis­sent­ing jus­tices argued that the police were required to noti­fy Cobb’s lawyer when inves­ti­gat­ing him in the killings and that the major­i­ty’s deci­sion under­mines Sixth Amendment pro­tec­tions while doing noth­ing to fur­ther effec­tive law enforce­ment.” (Associated Press, 4/​3/​01)

Penry v. Johnson, 00 – 6677

The U.S. Supreme Court held that a sen­tenc­ing jury con­sid­er­ing the death penal­ty must be giv­en prop­er instruc­tions about how to weigh men­tal retar­da­tion as a mit­i­gat­ing fac­tor. The deci­sion over­turned the death sen­tence of John Paul Penry, a Texas death row inmate suf­fer­ing from men­tal retar­da­tion, and sent the case back to the tri­al court for re-sen­tenc­ing. The Supreme Court first decid­ed Penry’s case in 1989, and held that, although exe­cut­ing those with men­tal retar­da­tion was not a vio­la­tion of the Eighth Amendment, Penry’s rights were nev­er­the­less vio­lat­ed because the sen­tenc­ing jury was not prop­er­ly allowed to take his men­tal capac­i­ty into account. At retri­al, Penry was again sen­tenced to death. (CNN​.com, 6/​4/​01)