On April 1, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Harbison v. Bell that fed­er­al­ly appoint­ed coun­sel can rep­re­sent indi­gent cap­i­tal clients in state clemen­cy pro­ce­dures. The case, which was argued before the Supreme Court in January 2009, asked whether a fed­er­al law that pro­vides lawyers to indi­gent state death row inmates for parts of their appeal guar­an­tees them the con­tin­u­a­tion of that rep­re­sen­ta­tion through the state clemen­cy process. The law says that such lawyers are to rep­re­sent their clients in all avail­able post-con­vic­tion process,” includ­ing pro­ceed­ings for exec­u­tive or oth­er clemen­cy.” Federal appeals courts had been divid­ed over the inter­pre­ta­tion of the law, with one side say­ing that the law applies only to fed­er­al clemency proceedings.

However, the Court deter­mined that the ref­er­ence to pro­ceed­ings for exec­u­tive and oth­er clemen­cy” in the fed­er­al statute reveals that the law is intend­ed to encom­pass state clemen­cy pro­ceed­ings. Justice John Paul Stevens, writ­ing for the major­i­ty, clar­i­fied that “[f]ederal clemen­cy is exclu­sive­ly exec­u­tive: Only the President has the pow­er to grant clemen­cy for offens­es under fed­er­al law. By con­trast, the States admin­is­ter clemen­cy in a vari­ety of ways.” In the dis­sent­ing opin­ion, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the fed­er­al law in ques­tion applies only to fed­er­al death row inmates and does not intend to extend rep­re­sen­ta­tion of state inmates by fed­er­al­ly appoint­ed and fund­ed coun­sel to the state clemency process.

Justice Stevens stat­ed that “[i]n autho­riz­ing fed­er­al­ly fund­ed coun­sel to rep­re­sent their state clients in clemen­cy pro­ceed­ings, Congress ensured that no pris­on­er would be put to death with­out mean­ing­ful access to the fail-safe’ of our jus­tice sys­tem.”

See Harbison v. Bell, No. 07 – 8521 U.S. (April 1, 2009). See Supreme Court and Representation.

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