OPINIONS OF THE COURT

BEARD v. BANKS, No. 02 – 1603

Decided June 24, 2004

The Court ruled on an appeal by the State of Pennsylvania stem­ming from a fed­er­al court rul­ing that inval­i­dat­ed the death sen­tence of George Banks, who was on death row for a mul­ti­ple mur­der com­mit­ted in 1982. Banks’ sen­tence had been over­turned on the grounds that the jury instruc­tion dur­ing sen­tenc­ing vio­lat­ed a 1988 Supreme Court rul­ing that held that jurors did not have to agree unan­i­mous­ly on the exis­tence of mit­i­gat­ing cir­cum­stances when deter­min­ing the appropriate sentence.

At issue in this appeal was whether or not the 1988 deci­sion could be applied retroac­tive­ly, as the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit so held. In addi­tion to this case, about 30 Pennsylvania death sen­tences were at stake for sim­i­lar con­cerns. Because the Supreme Court has pre­vi­ous­ly decid­ed that ​“new rules” gen­er­al­ly can­not be applied retroac­tive­ly in fed­er­al habeas pro­ceed­ings, the issue in Banks was whether the deci­sion in Mills v. Maryland was a ​“new rule” or an appli­ca­tion of an old rule.

On June 24, 2004 the Court held 5 – 4 that the Mills hold­ing con­sti­tut­ed a new rule of con­sti­tu­tion­al crim­i­nal pro­ce­dure and that it did not fit any of the excep­tions allow­ing a new rule to be applied retroac­tive­ly. Hence, Beard would not ben­e­fit from the Mills deci­sion and his death sen­tence was rein­stat­ed. For these rea­sons, the Court refused to apply Mills retroac­tive­ly to Beard. Dissenting were Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. Read the Court’s deci­sion (PDF).

Justice Stevens, writ­ing for the dis­sent­ing jus­tices, found noth­ing nov­el about the Mills rule and stat­ed , ​“the kind of arbi­trari­ness that would enable 1 vote in favor of death to out­weigh 11 in favor of for­bear­ance would vio­late the bedrock fair­ness prin­ci­ples that have gov­erned our tri­al pro­ceed­ings for cen­turies. Rejecting such a man­i­fest­ly unfair pro­ce­dur­al inno­va­tion does not announce a ​“new rule” … but sim­ply affirms that our fair­ness prin­ci­ples do not per­mit blatant exceptions.”

SCHRIRO v. SUMMERLIN, No. 03 – 526

Decided June 24, 2004

In a 5 – 4 deci­sion on June 24, 2004, the Supreme Court deter­mined that its 2002 deci­sion in Ring v. Arizona (No. 01 – 488) was not retroac­tive, there­by deny­ing new sen­tenc­ing hear­ings for dozens of death row inmates in Arizona, Idaho, Montana and Nebraska whose sen­tences were orig­i­nal­ly hand­ed down by judges, but whose cas­es are old­er and not in the first stages of their appeals. In Ring, the Court decid­ed that sen­tenc­ing laws must pro­tect the right to a jury deter­mi­na­tion of eli­gi­bil­i­ty for the death penal­ty. With their deci­sion in Summerlin, the Justices decid­ed that their orig­i­nal 7 – 2 deci­sion in Ring was a pro­ce­dur­al rule and thus was not retroac­tive. Dissenting in Summerlin were Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. Discussing the dif­fer­ences between the death row inmates grant­ed new sen­tenc­ing hear­ings and the death row inmates denied new sen­tenc­ing hear­ings because they are in a lat­er stage of appeals, Justice Breyer stat­ed: ​“Certainly the ordi­nary cit­i­zen will not under­stand the dif­fer­ence. That cit­i­zen will sim­ply wit­ness two indi­vid­u­als, both sen­tenced through the use of uncon­sti­tu­tion­al pro­ce­dures, one indi­vid­ual going to his death, the oth­er saved, all through an acci­dent of tim­ing. How can the Court square this spec­ta­cle with what it has called the ​‘vital impor­tance to the defen­dant and to the com­mu­ni­ty that any deci­sion to impose the death sen­tence be, and appear to be, based on reason’?”

The Court had grant­ed cer­tio­rari on two ques­tions in the case of Schriro v. Summerlin, No. 03 – 526 (for­mer­ly Summerlin v. Stewart):

Did the Ninth Circuit err by hold­ing that the new rule announced in Ring is sub­stan­tive, rather than pro­ce­dur­al, and there­fore exempt from the retroac­tiv­i­ty analy­sis of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plu­ral­i­ty)?

Did the Ninth Circuit err by hold­ing that the new rule announced in Ring applies retroac­tive­ly to cas­es on col­lat­er­al review under Teague​’s excep­tion for water­shed rules of crim­i­nal pro­ce­dure that alter bedrock pro­ce­dur­al prin­ci­ples and seri­ous­ly enhance the accu­ra­cy of the proceedings?

Click Here to read the Respondent’s Brief (PDF) in this case, filed February 26, 2004.

TENNARD v. DRETKE, No. 02 – 10038

Decided June 24, 2004

The Supreme Court grant­ed the cert. peti­tion in this case, and had con­sol­i­dat­ed the case with Smith v. Dretke (No. 02 – 11309) because both dealt with issues in Penry v. Johnson. In a 6 – 3 deci­sion deliv­ered on June 24, 2004, the Supreme Court held that the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit used an improp­er legal stan­dard when it refused to allow Tennard to appeal the District Court’s deci­sion deny­ing him a writ of habeas cor­pus. The Court ruled that rea­son­able jurists could con­clude that Tennard​’s low IQ was rel­e­vant mit­i­gat­ing evi­dence and that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ appli­ca­tion of law was unrea­son­able. The Court stat­ed that impaired intel­lec­tu­al func­tion­ing has mit­i­gat­ing dimen­sions beyond the impact it has on the abil­i­ty to act delib­er­ate­ly. (This case was ruled upon inde­pen­dent­ly fol­low­ing the clemen­cy grant­ed Robert Smith (No. 02 – 11309) on March 12, 2004, which ren­dered the com­pan­ion case to Tennard moot.)

Read the Court’s deci­sion (PDF)

NELSON v. CAMPBELL, No. 03 – 6821

Decided May 24, 2004

On May 24, 2004 the U.S. Supreme Court unan­i­mous­ly ruled that Alabama death row inmate David Nelson could pur­sue his claim that the lethal injec­tion pro­ce­dures in his case con­sti­tute cru­el and unusu­al pun­ish­ment. Nelson, who was less than three hours away from his sched­uled exe­cu­tion last fall when the Supreme Court gave him a tem­po­rary reprieve, had filed a claim under sec­tion 1983 of the Civil Rights Law stat­ing that his dam­aged veins would make it impos­si­ble to insert an intra­venous line with­out cut­ting deep into flesh and mus­cle. Nelson said that such a pro­ce­dure was a vio­la­tion of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. Alabama main­tained that this claim was sim­ply part of Nelson’s death penal­ty appeal and should be dis­missed because it was filed too late. The Justices ruled that low­er courts were wrong to block appeals by Nelson, and, in the opin­ion writ­ten by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the Justices agreed that Nelson’s claim was sep­a­rate from any chal­lenge to his sen­tence or con­vic­tion. Physicians have stat­ed that the cut-down pro­ce­dure the state would use to find a vein for lethal injec­tion could cause Nelson to bad­ly hem­or­rhage and suf­fer heart prob­lems pri­or to his death caused by the lethal injec­tion drugs. (See Associated Press, May 24, 2004)

The peti­tion for a writ of cer­tio­rari was grant­ed lim­it­ed to the fol­low­ing ques­tion: Whether a com­plaint brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 by a death-sen­tenced state pris­on­er, who seeks to stay his exe­cu­tion in order to pur­sue a chal­lenge to the pro­ce­dures for car­ry­ing out the exe­cu­tion, is prop­er­ly rechar­ac­ter­ized as a habeas cor­pus peti­tion under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254?

UPDATE: Nelson died of nat­ur­al caus­es on Alabama’s death row on Nov. 2, 2009.

BANKS v. DRETKE, No. 02 – 8286

Decided Feb. 24, 2004

On February 24, 2004, the United States Supreme Court over­turned the death sen­tence of Delma Banks, Jr. by a 7 – 2 vote, con­clud­ing that Banks was denied a fair tri­al as pros­e­cu­tors did not dis­close key infor­ma­tion to the defense. The case has been remand­ed to a lower court.

In an appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court had grant­ed cer­tio­rari in this case of a Texas death row inmate who main­tained that pros­e­cu­to­r­i­al mis­con­duct and inef­fec­tive defense coun­sel denied him a fair tri­al 23 years ago. The Court exam­ined the com­plex his­to­ry of Banks’ appeals and a low­er court rul­ing that held that Banks could not show his attor­ney’s per­for­mance affect­ed the out­come of his 1980 tri­al. Banks’ cur­rent attor­neys assert that their client was poor­ly rep­re­sent­ed at tri­al, that pros­e­cu­tors with­held key infor­ma­tion, and that tes­ti­mo­ny from two pros­e­cu­tion wit­ness­es was unre­li­able. (Associated Press, April 21, 2003).

MITCHELL v. ESPARAZA, No. 02 – 1369 (per curiam)

Decided Nov. 4, 2003

The Supreme Court grant­ed the state’s peti­tion for writ of cer­tio­rari and reversed the Sixth Circuit’s judg­ment affirm­ing the grant of habeas relief in this Ohio cap­i­tal case. Respondent (the habeas peti­tion­er below) con­tend­ed that the state vio­lat­ed the Eighth Amendment man­date to ​“nar­row the class of death eli­gi­ble defen­dants” by sen­tenc­ing him to death fol­low­ing a con­vic­tion on an indict­ment which failed to charge him as a ​“prin­ci­pal offend­er” as required by state cap­i­tal sen­tenc­ing law. The state courts implic­it­ly found this error harm­less in light of the absence of any evi­dence that any­one oth­er than respon­dent took part in the rob­bery and homi­cide. The District Court and Sixth Circuit dis­agreed, ​“hold­ing that the Eighth Amendment pre­clud­ed respon­den­t’s death sen­tence and that harm­less-error review was inap­pro­pri­ate.” In so doing, the Sixth Circuit ​“failed to cite, much less apply,” sec­tion 2254(d) of the Anti Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. The Court there­fore reversed the Sixth Circuit’s judg­ment and remand­ed for fur­ther pro­ceed­ings. (Summary pro­vid­ed by K. Weyble and J. Blume, November 4, 2003)

ORDERS OF THE COURT

Oken v. Maryland, No. 03 – 10808

On Wednesday, June 16, 2004 the Supreme Court denied Steven Oken’s request for a stay and denied his peti­tion for a writ of cer­tio­rari. The Court also grant­ed the State of Maryland’s motion to lift the stay grant­ed by the U. S. District Court (Sizer, Comm’r, Maryland DOC v. Oken, No. 03A1023, June 16, 2004). Dissenting in the order to vacate the stay of exe­cu­tion were Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens. Oken was exe­cut­ed by the State of Maryland on June 17, 2004.

Smith v. Dretke, No. 02 – 11309

This case involves the prop­er instruc­tions for the jury when men­tal retar­da­tion or sim­i­lar mit­i­gat­ing evi­dence is offered at a sen­tenc­ing hear­ing. The ques­tion for the court was: ​“Did the Court of Appeals mis­ap­ply Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001), by impos­ing a require­ment that evi­dence demon­strate a ​‘unique­ly severe per­ma­nent hand­i­cap’ in order for a Texas cap­i­tal mur­der defen­dant to claim that a ​‘nul­li­fi­ca­tion’ instruc­tion was improper?”

(UPDATE: This case was ren­dered moot when Smith was grant­ed clemen­cy in Texas on March 12, 2004 based on his mental retardation.)

Goughnour v. Cooper No. 03 – 1328

On May 17, 2004 the Supreme Court denied California’s peti­tion for cer­tio­rari in the case of Kevin Cooper. The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit grant­ed a stay to Cooper hours before his sched­uled exe­cu­tion in February to allow for fur­ther DNA test­ing. In the rul­ing, the Appeals Court ordered the DNA test­ing of hair and blood that was not test­ed before the ini­tial 1985 tri­al. California had sought to over­turn this rul­ing and to allow the exe­cu­tion to go for­ward. (Associated Press, May 17, 2004)

Torres v. Mullin, No. 03 – 5781

The Supreme Court denied cer­tio­rari in the case of Osbaldo Torres, a Mexican cit­i­zen on death row in Oklahoma. Torres request­ed review of his con­vic­tion and death sen­tence because he was not afford­ed his rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Two Justices dis­sent­ed regard­ing the appli­ca­tion of the Vienna Convention and pend­ing lit­i­ga­tion in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Mexico has sued sev­er­al states, includ­ing Oklahoma, in the ICJ, argu­ing that over 50 Mexican cit­i­zens on death row in the United States were not giv­en prop­er access to the Mexican con­sulate, as required by the Vienna Convention. Similar peti­tions have been filed on behalf of oth­er for­eign nation­als and are await­ing action by the Supreme Court. (N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 2003)

(UPDATE: Torres was grant­ed clemen­cy by Governor Brad Henry on May 14, 2004, respond­ing to the rec­om­men­da­tions of the Parole Board and the International Court of Justice Ruling on the 51 Mexican nation­als on U.S. Death Rows.)

Singleton v Norris, No. 02 – 10605

The United States Supreme Court let stand a fed­er­al appeals court rul­ing allow­ing Arkansas offi­cials to force drugs upon a con­vict­ed mur­der­er that would ren­der him men­tal­ly sta­ble enough to be exe­cut­ed. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit had ruled 6 – 5 that forcibly admin­is­ter­ing antipsy­chot­ic med­ica­tion did not vio­late the Eighth Amendment, which for­bids cru­el and unusu­al pun­ish­ment. While the Supreme Court did not hear the case, by let­ting the low­er court deci­sion stand, an exe­cu­tion date may now be set. (New York Times, October 6, 2003)

(UPDATE: On January 6, 2004, Charles Singleton was exe­cut­ed by the state of Arkansas.)

Nanon M. Williams v. Texas, No. 03 – 5956

The Supreme Court denied cer­tio­rari for Nanon Williams, who was a juve­nile (17-years-old) at the time of the crime.

(UPDATE: Williams’ death sen­tence was com­mut­ed in light of Roper v. Simmons (2005).)