United States Supreme Court Decisions: 2012 – 2013 Term

Opinions of the Court

RYAN v. SCHAD, No. 12 – 1084

Cert. grant­ed and decid­ed June 24, 2013 (per curiam)

The Supreme Court grant­ed the state’s peti­tion for cer­tio­rari in this Arizona cap­i­tal case, and held that the Ninth Circuit abused its dis­cre­tion by fail­ing to issue its man­date in accor­dance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(d)(2)(D). Pursuant to that rule, “‘[t]he court of appeals must issue the man­date imme­di­ate­ly when a copy of a Supreme Court order deny­ing the peti­tion for writ of cer­tio­rari is filed.” (empha­sis by the Court). In this case, how­ev­er, the Supreme Court’s final denial of a request for review of the Ninth Circuit’s deci­sion deny­ing habeas relief coin­cid­ed with Schad’s fil­ing of a request that the Ninth Circuit stay its man­date in light of a pend­ing Ninth Circuit en banc case address­ing the inter­ac­tion between Pinholster and Martinez.” In response to that request, the Ninth Circuit declined to grant the stay Schad sought, but instead decid­ed sua sponte to con­strue [the] motion as a motion to recon­sid­er our pri­or denial of his Motion to Vacate Judgment and Remand in light of Martinez,’ which the [Ninth Circuit] had denied on July 27, 2012.” After addi­tion­al brief­ing, the Ninth Circuit remand­ed the case for fur­ther pro­ceed­ings in light of Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012).

Relying on Bell v. Thompson, 545 U.S. 794 (2005), and Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998), the Supreme Court empha­sized the final­i­ty, comi­ty and fed­er­al­ism con­cerns reflect­ed in a court of appeals’ oblig­a­tion to issue its man­date upon the con­clu­sion of habeas review of a state court judg­ment. Without decid­ing the exis­tence or scope of any excep­tions to that oblig­a­tion, the Court observed that, “[e]ven assum­ing a court of appeals has author­i­ty to [devi­ate from the man­date require­ment], it abus­es its dis­cre­tion when it refus­es to issue the man­date once the Supreme Court has act­ed on the peti­tion, unless extra­or­di­nary cir­cum­stances jus­ti­fy that action.” (quot­ing K. Weyble & J. Blume, New Habeas Developments, July 12013).

TREVINO v. THALER, No. 11 – 10189

Cert. grant­ed October 29, 2012
Argument Feb. 25, 2013
Decided May 282013

On October 29, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear a death penal­ty case from Texas to deter­mine whether inmates there can raise claims of inad­e­quate tri­al rep­re­sen­ta­tion in fed­er­al court if they were effec­tive­ly pre­vent­ed from rais­ing such a claim in their state appeal by the fur­ther fail­ure of their appel­late lawyers. Lower courts con­sid­er­ing this issue have held that an ear­li­er Supreme Court rul­ing, Martinez v. Ryan (2012), which pro­vid­ed such a right in an Arizona case, does not apply in Texas because defen­dants have mul­ti­ple oppor­tu­ni­ties to claim their lawyers failed them. Carlos Trevino’s cur­rent lawyers argue that there was a great deal of mit­i­gat­ing evi­dence that the tri­al lawyers failed to find and present at trial.

On May 28, 2013, the Court ruled (5 – 4) in Trevino v. Thaler that death row inmates in Texas can raise claims of inef­fec­tive­ness of coun­sel for the first time in fed­er­al court if they did not have a mean­ing­ful chance to raise the claim in state appeals. The Court held that its rul­ing in Martinez v. Ryan (2012), which pro­vid­ed such a right in an Arizona case where state law for­bids rais­ing the claim in one’s direct appeal, applies in Texas because the state pro­ce­dur­al frame­work, by rea­son of its design and oper­a­tion, makes it high­ly unlike­ly in a typ­i­cal case that a defen­dant will have a mean­ing­ful oppor­tu­ni­ty to raise a claim of inef­fec­tive assis­tance of tri­al coun­sel on direct appeal.” In Martinez v. Ryan, the Supreme Court ruled that pro­ce­dur­al default will not bar a fed­er­al habeas court from hear­ing a sub­stan­tial claim of inef­fec­tive assis­tance at tri­al if, in the ini­tial-review col­lat­er­al pro­ceed­ing, there was no coun­sel or coun­sel in that pro­ceed­ing was ineffective.”

Six oth­er Texas death penal­ty cas­es were sent back by the Supreme Court to state court for recon­sid­er­a­tion in light of Trevino: Washington, Willie Balentine, John Ayestas, Carlos Haynes, Anthony Gates, Bill Newbury, Donald.

Other cas­es GVRd for Trevino: Dansby v. Hobbs (Ark.) Smith v. Colson (Tenn).

(M. Chammah, Supreme Court to Hear Texas Death Row Inmate’s Case,” Texas Tribune, October 29, 2012; A. Liptak, Divided Court, in 2 Rulings, Makes It Easier to Challenge Criminal Convictions,” New York Times, May 28, 2013). See Representation. Read full text of the Court’s opin­ion.

Questions Presented (Court restrict­ed case to 1st question.)

RYAN V. GONZALEZ, No. 10 – 930

TIBBALS V. CARTER, No. 11 – 218

Cert. grant­ed March 19, 2012
Argued October 9, 2012
Decided January 82013

On January 8, the U.S. Supreme Court unan­i­mous­ly reject­ed indef­i­nite delays in the fed­er­al review of death penal­ty cas­es when inmates are men­tal­ly incom­pe­tent to assist their attor­neys. Writing for the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas said such appeals are usu­al­ly based on estab­lished facts, not requir­ing fur­ther input from the defen­dant. Given the back­ward-look­ing, record-based nature of most fed­er­al habeas pro­ceed­ings, coun­sel can gen­er­al­ly pro­vide effec­tive rep­re­sen­ta­tion to a habeas peti­tion­er regard­less of the petitioner’s com­pe­tence,” he said. Attorneys are quite capa­ble of review­ing the state-court record, iden­ti­fy­ing legal errors, and mar­shal­ing rel­e­vant argu­ments, even with­out their clients’ assis­tance.” The opin­ion con­sol­i­dat­ed the cas­es of Ryan v. Gonzales (Arizona) and Tibbals v. Carter (Ohio). In Carter’s case, the Court left open the win­dow for a tem­po­rary stay if his appeals rely on evi­dence out­side the court record and if he might regain com­pe­tence. If a dis­trict court con­cludes that [Carter’s] claim could sub­stan­tial­ly ben­e­fit from the petitioner’s assis­tance, the dis­trict court should take into account the like­li­hood that the peti­tion­er will regain com­pe­tence in the fore­see­able future,” Thomas wrote. Where there is no rea­son­able hope of com­pe­tence, a stay is inap­pro­pri­ate and mere­ly frus­trates the state’s attempts to defend its pre­sump­tive­ly valid judgment.”

Read the full opin­ion.

Based on an ear­li­er Court deci­sion (Ford v. Wainwright (1986)), if an inmate is men­tal­ly incom­pe­tent at the time of his exe­cu­tion, he may not be put to death.

(D. Cassens Weiss, Supreme Court Allows Some Limited Stays for Competency in Habeas Corpus Appeals,” ABA Journal, January 82013.)

Orders of the Court and Related Matters

Boyer v. Louisiana, No. 11 – 9953, dismissed as improvidently granted. 

The Court orig­i­nal­ly grant­ed cer­tio­rari on the issue of whether a state’s fail­ure to fund coun­sel for an indi­gent defen­dant for five years, par­tic­u­lar­ly where fail­ure was the direct result of the prosecution’s choice to seek the death penal­ty, should be weighed against the state for speedy tri­al pur­pos­es”. Supporting the dis­missal was the belief that most of the delay had been caused by the defen­dant. The dis­sent would have allowed a deci­sion to instruct states that they have an oblig­a­tion to pro­tect a defendant’s con­sti­tu­tion­al right to a speedy trial.”

(5 – 4, Per curi­am on April 29, 2013. Concurring opin­ion by Justice Alito with Justices Scalia and Thomas join­ing. Dissenting opin­ion by Justice Sotomayor with Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Kagan joining.)

Balentine v. Thaler

For the third time, the exe­cu­tion of John Balentine in Texas was stayed with a day or less remain­ing. An hour before he was to die on August 22, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court halt­ed the exe­cu­tion to allow more time to review his peti­tion about inef­fec­tive rep­re­sen­ta­tion. In 1999, Balentine was giv­en a death sen­tence after a penal­ty tri­al last­ing one day, in which his attor­neys called no wit­ness­es and pre­sent­ed no mit­i­gat­ing evi­dence. Read Balentine’s peti­tion to the Supreme Court.

Chafee v. United States of America

Read Governor Lincoln Chafee’s (R.I.) peti­tion to the U.S. Supreme Court request­ing review of a low­er court deci­sion order­ing him to turn a pris­on­er over to the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment for death penal­ty pros­e­cu­tion. The gov­er­nor orig­i­nal­ly declined to sur­ren­der the defen­dant, Jason Pleau, because Rhode Island has elect­ed not to use the death penal­ty. (Chafee v. U.S. (2012)).

UPDATE: The Court declined to review the deci­sion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit requir­ing the gov­er­nor to hand over Pleau to fed­er­al author­i­ties for pros­e­cu­tion. (Jan. 142013).