
On May 1, Jeffrey Hutchinson, a Gulf War veteran, was executed in Florida for the murders of his girlfriend and her three young children. As he fought behind enemy lines in some of the most dangerous regions on earth, bombs rattled and nerve gas corroded his brain, causing permanent damage that would contribute to the tragedy just a few years later. “His mind was a casualty, just like any limb lost in combat,” a group of 129 military veterans wrote in a letter urging Gov. Ron DeSantis to halt the execution. But no federal court ever considered whether Mr. Hutchinson’s life should be spared because of the physical and mental trauma he suffered in the military. His federal appeals were dismissed not because they did not have merit, but because his attorneys miscalculated a filing deadline.
Mr. Hutchinson is one of at least 57 death-sentenced men who lost their chance for federal review of their claims because their attorneys did not file their appeals in time.1 He is the 29th to be executed; 17 remain on death row. These men suffered the consequences of their lawyers’ failures under the longstanding “agency” doctrine, which holds a client responsible for his lawyer’s actions because the client has authorized the lawyer to act as his agent. However, many argue that this doctrine should not apply in death penalty cases. “If you were to ask a child whether it would be fair to execute a prisoner because his lawyer had made a mistake, the answer would be no,” wrote Adam Liptak, a longtime legal journalist for The New York Times. “You might even get a look suggesting that you had asked a pretty stupid question.”
The Assumptions of Agency
Critics point out that the “agency” doctrine rests on certain assumptions: that clients freely choose their lawyers; that those lawyers have the time and expertise to provide high-quality representation; that clients are in regular contact with their lawyers to monitor the status of their case; and that clients have a competent understanding of the legal system. These assumptions clash with the realities of a capital case. “Now consider a client who is poor, uneducated, mentally troubled, scared, or imprisoned — or perhaps all of these things at once,” Mr. Liptak wrote. “And then add to this mix a lawyer who is not retained but a volunteer or assigned by the state. Does it still make sense to consider such a lawyer an authentic agent of the client?”
Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), death-sentenced prisoners have one year from the time their death sentences become “final” to file a habeas appeal in federal court. They are also entitled to pursue post-conviction appeals in state court, and their federal appeals are “tolled” — the clock is stopped — while their state appeals are considered. But these calculations can become complicated. DPI’s review of the 57 cases found several instances where judges and attorneys disagreed on the timing of a prisoner’s deadline. In Richard Hamilton’s case, a Florida judge, prosecutors, and his own attorney assured him that he still had time to file even though the deadline had passed months earlier.2
Mr. Hutchinson had a better understanding than most prisoners of the complex law governing his federal habeas filing. A week before his deadline, he told his attorneys “point blank and in no uncertain terms to ‘either file my…motion immediately or I will discharge you and file it myself.’” His attorneys promised they would do so but instead filed about three weeks later under the false belief that they had more time. The Eleventh Circuit denied Mr. Hutchinson relief in 2012. (In doing so, the judges themselves corrected the deadline in a footnote, saying that “for some reason” both parties and the lower court had agreed it was September 30th when it should have been the 29th.)
In a concurrence, Judge Rosemary Barkett laid out a systematic critique of the agency doctrine. She wrote that the theory makes two assumptions: 1) “that the client voluntarily chooses his lawyer for competence, diligence, and loyalty,” and 2) “that the client has the ability to direct the actions of the lawyer or, at the very least, that constant and adequate opportunities exist for communication between the client and his lawyer.”
However, most death-sentenced prisoners “must depend on appointed or pro bono volunteer counsel who too often lack expertise in post-conviction death penalty representation,” she wrote. “Prisons are often located in far-flung places that are difficult for lawyers to reach and often the lawyers are not even located within the same state as their death row clients,” who “have restricted access to phones, the internet, and law libraries.” She further noted that “the psychological effects of spending extended periods in solitary confinement…may impair an inmate’s mental capabilities to the extent that his active participation in litigation becomes impossible.” And “[f]inally, even if death row inmates were given the ability to access their attorneys without these formidable obstacles, most death row inmates lack the skills and intellect to supervise, direct or police the activities of their lawyers in the way that the agency paradigm assumes.”
None of the key assumptions underlying the application of an agency relationship to a death-sentenced client and his lawyer are valid in the post-conviction context. When the law already recognizes equitable exceptions to holding a client responsible for his lawyer’s actions under circumstances with less drastic consequences, an exception should also be made for death row inmates so that their lawyer’s negligence does not preclude federal review of constitutional claims.

Federal appeals rest on the legal doctrine of habeas corpus, which forces the government to justify its incarceration of a person. Known as the “Great Writ,” dating back at least eight centuries and commonly viewed as “the most celebrated writ in the English law,” habeas corpus is the only type of court order explicitly recognized in the Constitution as a right of the American people. The Supreme Court has held that “there is no higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired.” But the agency doctrine, coupled with AEDPA’s strict and unsparing requirements, too often result in death-sentenced prisoners losing their habeas rights even when all parties admit that the true fault lay with the lawyer.
It is no accident that habeas corpus has time and again played a central role in national crises, wherein the claims of order and of liberty clash most acutely, not only in England in the seventeenth century, but also in America from our very beginnings, and today. Although in form the Great Writ is simply a mode of procedure, its history is inextricably intertwined with the growth of fundamental rights of personal liberty. For its function has been to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints. Its root principle is that in a civilized society, government must always be accountable to the judiciary for a man’s imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is entitled to his immediate release.

Some warned before AEDPA was passed in 1996 that its harsh provisions would undermine the essential tradition of federal habeas review. An internal Clinton administration memo stated that the law “must provide for competent trial counsel” and noted the “high rate of error in capital trials” which habeas review helped address. But no such guarantee of competency was included in the final bill. Days before the law passed, New York Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan argued that it would “introduce a virus that will surely spread throughout our system of laws.”
Equitable Tolling: An Inadequate and Infrequent Solution
In rare cases, prisoners may receive “equitable tolling,” where a court extends the AEDPA deadline in the interests of justice. Yet, as Mr. Liptak wrote, the Supreme Court has “constructed a variety of unsatisfactory doctrines built on the fiction of agency,” which limit equitable tolling to cases where the attorney abandoned the prisoner entirely and the prisoner demonstrated extraordinary diligence in trying to pursue his appeals. In 2010 the Court ruled in favor of Albert Holland, who wrote his attorney a stream of letters about the federal filing deadline, contacted multiple courts, and filed complaints with the Florida Bar Association when his attorney did not update him on the status of his case. The Supreme Court noted that Mr. Holland, who spent hours in the prison law library, appeared to be a sharp legal mind who was “right about the law” where his attorney was “wrong.”
I]f I had a competent, conflict-free, postconviction, appellate attorney representing me, I would not have to write you this letter. I’m not trying to get on your nerves. I just would like to know exactly what is happening with my case on appeal.
Mr. Holland even tried to file his own federal habeas petition. But the state argued, and the Florida Supreme Court agreed, that he “could not file any pro se papers with the court while he was represented by counsel, including papers seeking new counsel.” Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito recognized this situation as “perverse,” yet as Judge Barkett pointed out in Mr. Hutchinson’s case, it is all too common. “Even if a client wanted to correct his lawyer’s mistakes, he would not be entitled to do so,” she wrote, because courts “routinely decline to consider pro se pleadings when an inmate is represented by counsel.”
Mr. Holland’s attorney failed to inform him when the Florida Supreme Court decided his state post-conviction appeal, which restarted the clock on his one-year federal deadline. Mr. Holland learned of the decision a few weeks later in the law library and filed his habeas petition the next day, but it was too late. Multiple lower courts ruled that Mr. Holland was not diligent enough and denied him equitable tolling before the Supreme Court ruled in his favor.
Justice Stephen Breyer, writing for the majority, acknowledged that equitable relief in habeas cases can correct injustices that “arise from a hard and fast adherence to more absolute legal rules, which, if strictly applied, threaten the evils of archaic rigidity.“3 But he also wrote that a “garden variety claim of excusable neglect” by an attorney was not enough to give the client another chance at federal appeals, and he described Mr. Holland’s case as a rare exception to the rule.
Mr. Liptak warned that “requiring clients to supervise their lawyers as vigorously as Mr. Holland did misapprehends what most of the relevant clients are capable of…it seems that only clients with legal acumen may be entitled to solicitude from the courts when their lawyers err.” Mr. Hutchinson was one of those judged not reasonably diligent. “He did everything any reasonable client would do to assure that his lawyers protected his interests, including imploring his lawyers to file his post-conviction pleadings in a timely manner,” Judge Barkett wrote.
What other steps could Hutchinson reasonably have taken? Should he not have trusted his lawyers when they assured him they were aware of and would comply with all filing deadlines? […] [A] represented client has every right to assume that his lawyer will competently discharge his duties.

The Holland Court’s examples of “garden variety” negligence included “a simple miscalculation that leads a lawyer to miss a filing deadline” — the exact situation that led the Eleventh Circuit to rule against Mr. Hutchinson. “The fact that [Mr. Hutchinson’s lawyers] ought to have known better does not justify equitable tolling,” the majority wrote. The judges then made a stunning admission:
“If attorney miscalculation, error, or negligence were enough for equitable tolling, the [federal habeas] statute of limitations would be tolled to the brink of extinction because in practically every case where there is a failure to meet the filing deadline an attorney is at fault.“4
It must also be noted that timeliness is an affirmative defense; a late appeal will be accepted unless the state decides to argue for dismissal based on the deadline. State attorneys have successfully argued that death-sentenced prisoners forfeited all federal appeals because their attorneys filed one day late. For example, attorneys for Kenneth Rouse filed his petition one day late even though an experienced habeas lawyer had given them the correct deadline. Mr. Rouse lost his chance for a federal court to review evidence that a juror had failed to disclose his mother’s rape and murder, called Black men like Mr. Rouse a racial slur, and claimed that Black men rape white women for “bragging rights.” Alabama successfully blocked Eugene Clemons’ federal appeals because, even though his attorneys filed a month in advance, the petition fell behind a filing cabinet in the clerk’s office.5 Johnny Ray Johnson and Keith Thurmond were both executed in Texas after the same appointed attorney, Jerome Godinich, tried to file their petitions after hours on the due date and found that the clerk’s time stamp was broken.6
Gregory Scott Johnson’s habeas deadline was Monday, June 28. His lawyer mailed his petition on Friday, June 25. But the court did not receive the petition until Tuesday the 29th, and the state moved to strike Mr. Johnson’s federal appeals for being untimely. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that Mr. Johnson’s lawyer “bungled the job” and should have known that appeals are only considered filed once received by the court. But the Seventh Circuit ruled against Mr. Johnson:
“No one interfered with Johnson’s ability to pursue collateral relief in a timely fashion. He wants us to treat his own lawyer as the source of interference, but lawyers are agents. Their acts (good and bad) are attributed to the clients they represent. […] So it is as if Johnson himself had made the decisions that led to the delay.”
The state of Indiana executed Mr. Johnson nine months later.

Systemic Failure to Provide Competent Counsel in Alabama and Florida
DPI found that over half (31/57) of prisoners denied federal review due to missed deadlines came from just two states — Alabama and Florida — despite those states accounting for only 18% of death sentences and 12% of executions in the modern era. It is not a coincidence that these same states have historically failed to appoint competent counsel for death-sentenced prisoners in state post-conviction appeals.
For many years Alabama was the only state in the country that refused to appoint attorneys for capital state post-conviction appeals. The state relied on pro bono representation alone, often from large out-of-state law firms. Even if the volunteer lawyers were “über-qualified” on paper, as the state once boasted in a brief, they were not always competent to defend a death-sentenced prisoner. Corey Maples’ pro bono attorneys at the white-shoe law firm Sullivan & Cromwell failed to notify their client or the court when they left the firm. As a result, the firm’s mailroom returned the decision in Mr. Maples’ case unopened; Mr. Maples learned that no appeal had been timely filed when the state moved to set his execution date. Alabama officials repeatedly argued that Mr. Maples was not entitled to equitable tolling. But the Supreme Court held in 2012 that the unique circumstances in Mr. Maples’ case amounted to an “abandonment” by counsel, severing the “agency” relationship. The ruling allowed him to successfully pursue his federal appeals and he was recently resentenced to life in prison. Mr. Maples’ former lawyers faced no professional consequences.7
Lawyers have missed deadlines and forfeited federal review for Alabama clients with innocence claims, including William Kuenzel, Robin “Rocky” Myers, and Christopher Barbour. Mr. Kuenzel had an alibi and the only physical evidence in the case pointed to the prosecution’s star witness, but his lawyers missed a filing deadline by five months, and Mr. Kuenzel died in 2022 while awaiting execution. Mr. Myers received the state’s first clemency grant in 25 years this past February; Gov. Kay Ivey said, “I have enough questions about Mr. Myers’ guilt that I cannot move forward with executing him.” His appointed lawyer had never before worked on a capital case and admitted that he did “not remember[]” that there was a one-year deadline for federal habeas petitions. And after DNA testing from a rape and murder scene excluded Mr. Barbour, a federal court allowed his “actual innocence” claim to proceed last year, a first in the state’s history.8 Mr. Barbour previously came within 48 hours of execution after his earlier federal attorneys missed his filing deadline.
Lawyers who do post-conviction work in capital cases face a daunting array of challenges: They must typically reinvestigate the evidence for both guilt and punishment; canvass witnesses called and uncalled; plumb a defendant’s criminal, social and family history; and round up and study thousands of pages of records. They must also navigate an ever-shifting landscape of appellate deadlines and procedures, identify promising issues and craft a detailed petition — all while under the pressure of defending a client whose life may depend on their success.
Florida’s record of poor appellate representation can be traced in part to policy changes a quarter-century ago that were intended to save the state money. Florida officials created a “registry” of attorneys eligible for appointment in capital cases and subsequently closed a major regional office of dedicated habeas attorneys. But reports quickly emerged of subpar representation. Florida Supreme Court Justice Raoul Cantero testifiedbefore the state legislature in 2005 that the registry attorneys performed “some of the worst lawyering I have ever seen” and wrote some of the “worst briefs I have read.” Florida alone accounts for 39% of the missed-deadlines cases but only 13% of death sentences in the modern era. Most of the missed deadlines occurred in the 2000s, the decade following the creation of the registry.
Attorney Jefferson Morrow filed Floyd Damren’s habeas petition 208 days late after being appointed through the registry. The Marshall Project reported that when “pressed for an explanation in court, he said he was inexperienced in habeas law, sent a petition to the wrong court and was never able to determine the deadline in the first place.” Despite Mr. Morrow’s “grossly negligent” work, he became a Florida trial judge, while Mr. Damren remains on death row. Another registry lawyer who missed two habeas filing deadlines admitted, “It was a terrible mistake for me to get involved.”
[I]t is hard for me to fathom how a lawyer who asked for and received the appointment of this Court, could abdicate the most basic function of filing the petition on time. […] I would be remiss if I did not share my deep concern that in these cases our federal system of justice fell short in the very situation where the stakes could not be higher.
Another effect of inadequate and flawed appointment processes is that some prisoners are not appointed counsel until the deadline has almost elapsed — or even passed entirely. But courts have shown little sympathy. Gary Lawrence “contend[ed] that delays in Florida’s program for appointing postconviction counsel and other issues outside of his control caused 298 days to pass before Florida appointed an attorney who took an active role in his postconviction case,” Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas wrote for the majority in denying Mr. Lawrence relief in 2007. “These facts have little relevance to our analysis.”9
James Ford filed a motion for a new lawyer before his deadline, but the court didn’t appoint him a new lawyer until after the deadline passed. The court then refused to accept his habeas petition even though his new lawyer filed it within 12 days of appointment.10 Mr. Ford was executed on February 13, the first person to die by state order in Florida this year, with no federal court having reviewed his claim that he could not be executed due to intellectual disability. Experts found that Mr. Ford, age 65, had a mental age of about 13 years old before his execution and had previously scored within the bottom 2% of the population on an IQ test.
Some scholars have proposed that all “garden variety” attorney mistakes, like miscalculating deadlines, forgetting to submit petitions, or filing petitions in the wrong court, should entitle prisoners to equitable tolling when the consequence could be an execution that violates the Constitution. Judge Barkett argued that the agency principle is bad policy in capital cases because punishing prisoners does not improve the actions of their lawyers, especially when the lawyers face no consistent professional sanctions for missing deadlines and are not subject to malpractice lawsuits like they are in civil cases.

The “reality is that death row inmates’ access to competent, post-conviction legal representation is at best inconsistent and at worst nonexistent,” Judge Barkett wrote, “and their ability to communicate freely and actively participate in their litigation is seriously compromised. […] Under this reality, I question whether strict adherence to the principle that a death row inmate must bear the consequences of his lawyer’s negligence is fair or just.”
Mr. Hutchinson’s attorneys challenged the agency relationship in their final Supreme Court petition, asking that the Court “grant review to ensure that other capital petitioners like Mr. Hutchinson, particularly those with significant cognitive impairments, are not denied all federal habeas review due to no fault of their own.” The Court “should not allow a situation where a wounded combat veteran is still being blamed for failing to navigate the minutiae of highly technical issues of tolling and federalism from death row that have vexed the bench and bar for decades.” The Court denied Mr. Hutchinson’s petitions without comment.11 He died by lethal injection at 8:15 p.m. on May 1.
James Powel, Gulf War vet Jeff Hutchinson executed for family’s murder; veterans say combat broke him, USA Today, May 1, 2025; Melanie Kalmanson, U.S. Army Veteran Jeffrey Hutchinson Executed 5/1/2025, Tracking Florida’s Death Penalty, May 1, 2025; Letter to Governor Ron DeSantis, Veterans Stand Against the Execution of Jeffrey “Ranger” Hutchinson, April 30, 2025; Petition for Certiorari, Hutchinson v. Dixon, No. 24 – 7084 (2025); Kim Chandler, Alabama governor commutes death row inmate Rocky Myers’ sentence to life in prison, Associated Press, February 28, 2025; Curt Anderson, Florida man is executed for the 1997 killing of a couple whose toddler witnessed the attack, Associated Press, February 13, 2025; Application for Stay of Execution, Ford v. Florida, No. 24A771 (2025); Ivana Hrynkiw, He’s been on death row for decades. Alabama ‘downplays’ DNA that points to someone else, judge says, AL.com, October 2, 2024; Eric M. Freedman, No Need to Wait: Congress Has the Power Under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to Abolish the Death Penalty in the States, 32 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1049 (2024); Staff, Two Death-Row Prisoners with Innocence Claims Die on Death Row, Two Days Apart., Death Penalty Information Center, February 26, 2022; Seth Freed Wessler, Eugene Clemons May Be Ineligible for the Death Penalty. A Rigid Clinton-Era Law Could Force Him to Be Executed Anyway., ProPublica, May 28, 2021; Liliana Segura, Gutting Habeas Corpus: The Inside Story of How Bill Clinton Sacrificed Prisoners’ Rights for Political Gain, The Intercept, May 4, 2016; Jonathan Atkins, Danielle B. Rosenthal, and Joshua D. Weiss, The Inequities of AEDPA Equitable Tolling: A Misapplication of Agency Law, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 427 (2016); Ken Armstrong, Death by Deadline, Part Two, The Marshall Project, November 16, 2014; Ken Armstrong, Death by Deadline, Part One, The Marshall Project, November 15, 2014; Adam Liptak, Agency and Equity: Why Do We Blame Clients for Their Lawyers’ Mistakes, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 875 (2012); Adam Liptak, Death Row Inmate’s Best Lawyer Was Himself, The New York Times, April 16, 2012; Hutchinson v. Florida, 677 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 2012); Ford v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 207-CV-333-FTM-99SPC, 2009 WL 3028886 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2009); Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327 (2007); Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, Thomas v. McDonough, 452 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (M.D. Fla. 2006); Gary Blankenship, Registry Lawyers Defended at Committee Meeting, Florida Bar News, April 1, 2005; Jan Pudlow, Commission Cuts the Cost of Capital Cases, Florida Bar News, October 1, 2002; David Firestone, Inmates on Alabama’s Death Row Lack Lawyers, The New York Times, June 16, 2001; Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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This list was developed by Professor Eric M. Freedman and law student Paul Sessa of Hofstra Law and is now maintained by DPI. To learn more, visit DPI’s page, “The Human Cost of Missed Deadlines,” and read Professor Freedman’s article, No Need to Wait: Congress Has the Power Under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to Abolish the Death Penalty in the States, 32 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1049 (2024). This list includes people who had all or substantially all of their claims in a federal petition dismissed solely due to timeliness, when a timely filed petition would have been reviewed on the merits in federal court.
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See Hamilton v. Sec’y, DOC, 410 F. App’x 216 (11th Cir. 2010), and Ken Armstrong, Death by Deadline, Part One, The Marshall Project, November 15, 2014.
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Justice Alito made the same argument in his Holland concurrence. He acknowledged that prisoners are “not personally at fault for the untimely filing” but reasoned that “if gross negligence may be enough for equitable tolling, there will be a basis for arguing that tolling is appropriate in almost every counseled case involving a missed deadline…[which would] impose a severe burden on the district courts.”
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See Thurmond v. Quarterman, 2008 WL 11444148 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (describing how “this is not the first time [Mr. Godinich] has run afoul of the statute of limitations in a capital habeas corpus case,” as in Mr. Johnson’s case he “offered the same excuse — that his attempt to file the petition after hours on the due date was frustrated by a broken time stamp machine”). Mr. Johnson was executed on February 12, 2009, and Mr. Thurmond on March 7, 2012.
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This outcome is common. The Marshall Project identified habeas attorneys who were battling addiction or mental health issues, had been placed on probation by the state bar, or missed filing deadlines for multiple clients facing execution. In virtually every case the attorney faced no professional consequences, and the state continued to assign them capital cases.
Besides timeliness, another key attorney error is “procedurally defaulting” certain claims on federal review by failing to present them earlier to the state courts. DPI’s analysis here only covers individuals who received no merits review on the federal petition at hand, but other death-sentenced prisoners have been denied federal review on numerous important claims because they were either untimely or procedurally defaulted. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Ryan, 2014 WL 4476588 (D. Ariz. 2014); Lopez v. Gittere, 2021 WL 1177865 (D. Nev. 2021).
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See also Bell v. Florida Atty. Gen., 461 Fed.Appx. 843 (11th Cir. 2012) (court acknowledged that “changes in Florida’s collateral-counsel appointment system and a large backlog of inmates without appointed counsel” resulted in a five-month delay before Michael Bell was assigned a post-conviction attorney).
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For a clear outline of Mr. Hutchinson’s final appeals and other information about his execution, see Melanie Kalmanson, U.S. Army Veteran Jeffrey Hutchinson Executed 5/1/2025, Tracking Florida’s Death Penalty, May 1, 2025.