On September 4, Oklahoma released a report from its inves­ti­ga­tion into the botched exe­cu­tion of Clayton Lockett. The review, which was con­duct­ed by inves­ti­ga­tors from the Oklahoma Highway Patrol, found sev­er­al prob­lems that may have con­tributed to the pro­longed exe­cu­tion attempt on April 29. The exe­cu­tion was stopped by the war­den, cur­tains were drawn in the cham­ber, but the inmate died after­wards, report­ed­ly from the residues of the lethal drugs in his sys­tem. The state report found insuf­fi­cient train­ing of cor­rec­tions offi­cials, com­mu­ni­ca­tion dif­fi­cul­ties between those inside and out­side the exe­cu­tion cham­ber, and a lack of con­tin­gency plan­ning in case prob­lems arose. The direct cause of the botched exe­cu­tion, accord­ing to the report, was the improp­er inser­tion of the IV, com­bined with the fact that the IV site was hid­den from view and was not mon­i­tored through­out the exe­cu­tion process. The report offered eleven rec­om­men­da­tions for future lethal injec­tions, includ­ing obser­va­tion of the IV inser­tion point, ongo­ing train­ing for the exe­cu­tion team, estab­lished con­tin­gency plans and back­up exe­cu­tion sup­plies in case of prob­lems, and improved com­mu­ni­ca­tions. Dale Baich, an attor­ney for Lockett, said, ​“The state’s inter­nal inves­ti­ga­tion rais­es more ques­tions than it answers. The report does not address account­abil­i­ty. It pro­tects the chain of com­mand. Once the exe­cu­tion was clear­ly going wrong, it should have been stopped, but it wasn’t. Whoever allowed the exe­cu­tion to con­tin­ue needs to be held accountable.”

(M. Berman, ​“Oklahoma inves­ti­ga­tion into botched exe­cu­tion finds prob­lems with IV inser­tion, train­ing of exe­cu­tion team,” Washington Post, September 4, 2014). Read the Oklahoma Report. See Lethal Injection and Botched Executions.

QUOTATIONS FROM THE OKLAHOMA REPORT:

  • The physi­cian had nev­er attempt­ed femoral vein access with a 11⁄4 inch needle/​catheter; how­ev­er, it was the longest DOC had read­i­ly avail­able. An addi­tion­al cen­tral venous catheter­i­za­tion kit was avail­able, but the physi­cian did not think about uti­liz­ing one for femoral access.
  • The physi­cian approached Lockett and indi­cat­ed to Warden Trammell that some­thing was wrong. He looked under the sheet and rec­og­nized the IV had infil­trat­ed. At this same time, Warden Trammell viewed what appeared to be a clear liq­uid and blood on Lockett’s skin in the groin area. The physi­cian observed an area of swelling under­neath the skin and described it as small­er than a ten­nis ball, but larg­er than a golf ball. The physi­cian believed the swelling would have been notice­able if the access point had been viewed dur­ing the process.
  • Warden Trammell and Director Patton both acknowl­edged the train­ing DOC per­son­nel received pri­or to the exe­cu­tion was inad­e­quate. Warden Trammell stat­ed the only train­ing she received was on-the-job train­ing and that DOC had no for­mal­ized train­ing pro­ce­dures or process­es con­cern­ing the duties of each spe­cif­ic position’s respon­si­bil­i­ty. The war­den and direc­tor both indi­cat­ed DOC had no train­ing pro­to­cols or con­tin­gency plans on how to pro­ceed with an exe­cu­tion if com­pli­ca­tions occur dur­ing the process.
  • General Counsel Mullins fur­ther told Director Patton that they would begin prepar­ing a stay at the direc­tion of the Governor. Lockett died pri­or to the order for a stay being relayed to the per­son­nel inside the exe­cu­tion cham­ber. There was con­ver­sa­tion inside the cham­ber about admin­is­ter­ing life-sav­ing mea­sures to Lockett, includ­ing trans­port­ing him to the emer­gency room, but no order was given.

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