On December 13, 2004, the U. S. Supreme Court ruled that the effec­tive­ness of defense coun­sel’s per­for­mance must be judged by stan­dards pre­vi­ous­ly set out by the Court in Strickland v. Washington. In Florida v. Nixon, Joe Nixon’s attor­ney told the jury his client was guilty with­out his clien­t’s express con­sent. After the jury sen­tenced Nixon to death, the Florida Supreme Court over­turned Nixon’s con­vic­tion, hold­ing that coun­sel’s con­ces­sion of guilt auto­mat­i­cal­ly fell below an objec­tive stan­dard of rea­son­able per­for­mance, neces­si­tat­ing a new tri­al. The court ruled that coun­sel’s per­for­mance was defi­cient and that the defi­cient per­for­mance was pre­sump­tive­ly prej­u­di­cial to Nixon. The U.S. Supreme Court over­ruled the Florida court, hold­ing that a con­ces­sion of guilt by coun­sel made with­out the express con­sent of the defen­dant does not auto­mat­i­cal­ly con­sti­tute inef­fec­tive assis­tance of coun­sel, but must be judged by Strickland’s two-pronged test: sub-par rep­re­sen­ta­tion AND a like­ly effect on the out­come of the case. The case is Florida v. Nixon, No 03 – 931, 543 U.S. _​_​_​(2004). See Supreme Court and Representation.

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