On Friday, October 4, the Supreme Court agreed to hear argu­ments in Gutierrez v. Saenz, a case regard­ing death-sen­tenced Texas pris­on­er Ruben Gutierrez’s abil­i­ty to sue the state for DNA test­ing in sup­port of his inno­cence claim. The Court had issued a stay to Mr. Gutierrez on July 16, just twen­ty min­utes before his sched­uled exe­cu­tion. Mr. Gutierrez was con­vict­ed and sen­tenced to death in 1999 for the mur­der and rob­bery of an 85-year-old woman but has long main­tained his inno­cence. Forensic evi­dence from inside the trail­er where the killing occurred has nev­er been test­ed for DNA, but the state has refused Mr. Gutierrez’s test­ing requests. The Court will now decide whether the Fifth Circuit was cor­rect when it ruled that Mr. Gutierrez did not have stand­ing to sue Texas over its refusal to give him access to DNA test­ing. The Court will like­ly hear Mr. Gutierrez’s case next spring.

Mr. Gutierrez was con­vict­ed and sen­tenced to death for the mur­der of Escolastica Harrison, an elder­ly man­ag­er of a trail­er park who kept over $600,000 in her home due to her mis­trust of banks. Mr. Gutierrez admit­ted to par­tic­i­pat­ing in plan­ning the rob­bery but said he stayed out­side the trail­er and did not know that Rene Garcia and Pedro Gracia, his code­fen­dants, would kill her. Rene Garcia was sen­tenced to life in prison while Pedro Gracia remains at large. Mr. Gutierrez’s legal team argues that no phys­i­cal or foren­sic evi­dence con­nects him to the crime,” and his con­vic­tion was based on a false con­fes­sion elicit­ed after police threat­ed to arrest his wife and take away their chil­dren, and on an unre­li­able eye­wit­ness who could not even iden­ti­fy Mr. Gutierrez in the court­room at trial.” 

For over a decade, Mr. Gutierrez has sought DNA test­ing of crime scene evi­dence, includ­ing blood­stains, scrap­ings from Ms. Harrison’s fin­ger­nails, and hair wrapped around her fin­ger. If DNA test­ing showed that Mr. Gutierrez was not present in the trail­er, he could still be con­vict­ed of mur­der under Texas’ law of par­ties,1 but it would sup­port his argu­ment that he did not actu­al­ly kill, intend to kill, or antic­i­pate a killing — which would the­o­ret­i­cal­ly bar the death penal­ty in his case. However, courts denied his requests under Texas’ unusu­al­ly strict post-con­vic­tion DNA statute, which only allows for test­ing when a per­son can prove that he would not have been con­vict­ed if the DNA test­ing pro­duced excul­pa­to­ry results. The statute does not allow DNA test­ing when the results would only affect the person’s death sen­tence. Mr. Gutierrez’s attor­ney Shawn Nolan called this require­ment a catch-22.” 

After his requests were denied under the DNA statute, Mr. Gutierrez brought a sec­tion 1983 fed­er­al law­suit argu­ing that the statute had uncon­sti­tu­tion­al­ly denied him due process. Texas law guar­an­tees death-sen­tenced pris­on­ers the right to file post-con­vic­tion peti­tions show­ing that they are not eli­gi­ble for the death penal­ty — but they can­not use DNA to do so because of the statute’s lim­it­ed applic­a­bil­i­ty. A fed­er­al dis­trict court agreed with Mr. Gutierrez and ruled that the lim­its of the DNA statute made that right illu­so­ry,” a mean­ing­less rit­u­al” that vio­lat­ed pro­ce­dur­al due process.

Rodney Reed

Mr. Gutierrez’s legal argu­ments close­ly track those of Rodney Reed, a death-sen­tenced pris­on­er who also brought a sec­tion 1983 law­suit against Texas offi­cials argu­ing that the state’s DNA statute had denied him due process. Mr. Reed’s claim focused on the statute’s strict chain-of-cus­tody require­ments for evi­dence, which he could not meet because pros­e­cu­tors had mis­han­dled and poten­tial­ly cor­rupt­ed the evi­dence. The state argued that Mr. Reed did not have stand­ing, a legal con­cept which refers to a person’s right to bring a law­suit. A plain­tiff has stand­ing if he can prove an injury, that the injury can be traced to the defendant’s con­duct, and that a favor­able rul­ing from the court will like­ly rem­e­dy the injury. In 2023 the Supreme Court sided with Mr. Reed and ruled that he did have stand­ing because he was injured by the denial of DNA test­ing, the injury could be traced to the state prosecutor’s behav­ior, and a court judg­ment find­ing that the DNA statute had vio­lat­ed Mr. Reed’s due process rights would like­ly rem­e­dy his injury by induc­ing the state pros­e­cu­tor to grant access to the evi­dence for test­ing. Therefore, Mr. Reed could pro­ceed with his legal effort to seek DNA test­ing. Several oth­er fed­er­al cir­cuit courts have since applied this rul­ing in favor of death-sen­tenced pris­on­ers bring­ing law­suits alleg­ing their rights were violated. 

However, in Mr. Gutierrez’s case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dis­trict court and ruled that he did not have stand­ing. The court agreed that Mr. Gutierrez had been injured by the state’s denial of DNA test­ing but depart­ed from Reed and the oth­er cir­cuit rul­ings on the third require­ment of a like­ly rem­e­dy. Where the Supreme Court assumed that a state pros­e­cu­tor would autho­rize DNA test­ing in response to a court order in Mr. Reed’s favor, the Fifth Circuit dove into the facts of Mr. Gutierrez’s case and con­clud­ed that the state pros­e­cu­tor in his case might nev­er­the­less refuse to fol­low the court’s order. In oth­er words, the Fifth Circuit denied Mr. Gutierrez the oppor­tu­ni­ty to pur­sue his chal­lenge to a poten­tial­ly uncon­sti­tu­tion­al statute on the rea­son­ing that an order find­ing the statute uncon­sti­tu­tion­al was not like­ly to pro­vide him with a remedy. 

Judge Stephen A. Higginson dis­sent­ed from the Fifth Circuit’s rul­ing because he did not see a mean­ing­ful dis­tinc­tion from Reed.” He wrote: 

Like Reed, Gutierrez filed suit against the appro­pri­ate local pros­e­cu­tor and made a sim­i­lar claim regard­ing Texas’s DNA test­ing regime. While I appre­ci­ate the major­i­ty’s care­ful trac­ing of the state-court case his­to­ry and fair inquiry into what the named state pros­e­cu­tor might or might not do, I do not per­ceive that the Supreme Court con­tem­plat­ed this nuance and dis­tinc­tion. Instead of con­duct­ing a fact-spe­cif­ic inquiry and delv­ing into what District Attorney Goertz him­self would do, the Court deter­mined that a declara­to­ry judg­ment inval­i­dat­ing Texas’s DNA test­ing pro­ce­dure would sig­nif­i­cant­ly increase the like­li­hood that the state pros­e­cu­tor would grant access to the request­ed DNA testing.”

The Supreme Court grant­ed cer­tio­rari to Mr. Gutierrez on the ques­tion of whether, under its rul­ing in Reed, the stand­ing require­ment includes a par­tic­u­lar­ized deter­mi­na­tion” of what the spe­cif­ic state offi­cial” would do fol­low­ing a favor­able declaratory judgment.” 

Mr. Gutierrez’s case illus­trates some of the pro­ce­dur­al hoops peo­ple on death row must jump through to pur­sue inno­cence claims. He sought DNA test­ing of key crime scene evi­dence under a state law, but the state fought his efforts and the state law itself lim­it­ed his options. Today Texas requires DNA test­ing for all items with bio­log­i­cal mate­r­i­al when the state pur­sues the death penal­ty — but state offi­cials often refuse to apply that prin­ci­ple to old­er cas­es. If this crime were com­mit­ted today, DNA test­ing of these items would have already hap­pened, and Gutierrez nev­er would have been sen­tenced to death,” his attor­neys argue in their Supreme Court peti­tion. He was then forced to file a fed­er­al law­suit, which state offi­cials chal­lenged his very author­i­ty to bring. Under Supreme Court prece­dent, an actu­al inno­cence claim does not save a per­son from exe­cu­tion—the pris­on­er must show an inde­pen­dent con­sti­tu­tion­al vio­la­tion in the legal process. Despite strong foren­sic evi­dence of inno­cence, Marcellus Williams was exe­cut­ed in Missouri on September 24, and Robert Roberson faces exe­cu­tion on October 17 in Texas despite experts say­ing no crime ever occurred. 

The Supreme Court extend­ed Mr. Gutierrez’s stay of exe­cu­tion while it con­sid­ers his case. This was not the first stay for Mr. Gutierrez; in 2020, the Court inter­vened an hour before his sched­uled exe­cu­tion because Texas had refused to allow a chap­lain to accom­pa­ny him into the exe­cu­tion cham­ber. The cur­rent stay came just 20 min­utes before the exe­cu­tion, as Mr. Gutierrez was about to be led to the cham­ber. He was vis­i­bly emo­tion­al,” said prison spokes­woman Amanda Hernandez. He turned around to the back of the cell, cov­ered his mouth. He was tear­ing up, speech­less. He was shocked.” 

Citation Guide
Sources

Leah Roemer, Hispanic Heritage Month: Leonel Herrera and the Agony of Doubt,” Death Penalty Information Center, September 19, 2024; Staff, Supreme Court grants Texas man a stay of exe­cu­tion just before his sched­uled lethal injec­tion, Associated Press, July 18, 2024; Juan A. Lozano, Delay of Texas death row inmate’s exe­cu­tion has not been the norm for Supreme Court, experts say, Associated Press, July 17, 2024; Kayla Guo, Supreme Court to review death penal­ty appeal chal­leng­ing Texas’s DNA test­ing law, The Texas Tribune, July 16, 2024; Michelle Pitcher, Texas Plans to Execute Man After Courts Refuse DNA Tests, Texas Observer, July 15, 2024; Gutierrez v. Saenz, Brief in Opposition, July 9, 2024; Pooja Salhotra, U.S. Supreme Court rejects Texas death row inmate’s peti­tion, The Texas Tribune, July 2, 2024; Gutierrez v. Saenz, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, June 25, 2024Gutierrez v. Saenz, 93 F.4th 267 (5th Cir. 2024); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 64.03 (2023); Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. _​_​(2023); Juan A. Lozano, US Supreme Court halts Texas exe­cu­tion over cler­gy ques­tion, Associated Press, June 16, 2020; Jolie McCullough, U.S. Supreme Court halts Texas exe­cu­tion of Ruben Gutierrez dur­ing legal fight over reli­gious advis­ers’ access to death cham­ber, The Texas Tribune, June 162020

Footnotes
  1. Texas’ law of par­ties, one of the most expan­sive felony mur­der statutes in the coun­try, holds that dur­ing a con­spir­a­cy to com­mit one felony, if a con­spir­a­tor com­mits anoth­er felony in fur­ther­ance of the con­spir­a­cy, all co-con­spir­a­tors are guilty of that sec­ond felony regard­less of their intent. A per­son can only be sen­tenced to death under the law of par­ties if the sec­ond or pred­i­cate” felony is a mur­der, and the jury finds beyond a rea­son­able doubt that that per­son actu­al­ly caused the death, intend­ed to cause the death, or antic­i­pat­ed the death.↩︎