The Future of the Death Penalty in the U.S.: A Texas-Sized Crisis

Posted on May 01, 1994

Executive Summary Top

Texas is the nation’s fore­most exe­cu­tion­er. It has been respon­si­ble for a third of the exe­cu­tions in the coun­try and has car­ried out two and a half times as many death sen­tences as the next lead­ing state. Death war­rants are being signed at an unman­age­able pace, yet the Texas death row is bulging with unprece­dent­ed num­bers of inmates. But this accel­er­at­ed form of jus­tice comes at a price. The rest of the coun­try should heed the warn­ing of the Texas expe­ri­ence before it embarks on a whole­sale expan­sion of the death penalty.

The death penal­ty in Texas is in a state of cri­sis. Numerous death penal­ty con­vic­tions have been taint­ed by overzeal­ous pros­e­cu­tions and the use of per­jured tes­ti­mo­ny. State paid med­ical experts” make unre­li­able pre­dic­tions about defen­dants’ future dan­ger­ous­ness while oth­er doc­tors sim­ply lie about tests they nev­er per­formed. Six inno­cent peo­ple have been sen­tenced to death and lat­er released since 1987. The race of the defen­dant and vic­tim play a major part in which cas­es are select­ed for the death penal­ty. Legal rep­re­sen­ta­tion of indi­gent defen­dants at tri­al is fre­quent­ly incom­pe­tent, and rep­re­sen­ta­tion for appeals is often non-exis­tent. And the costs of the death penal­ty in Texas are in the hun­dreds of mil­lions of dol­lars with no end in sight.

And yet, Texas has lit­tle to show for all this expense and the sac­ri­fice of judi­cial due process. During the peri­od when Texas rose to become the nation’s lead­ing death penal­ty state, its crime rate grew by 24% and its vio­lent crime increased by 46%, much faster than the nation­al aver­age. Texas leads the coun­try in num­bers of its police offi­cers killed and more Texans die from gun­shot wounds than from car accidents.

But Texas’s death penal­ty prob­lems are cer­tain­ly not unique. Many states with large death rows have also been plagued by pros­e­cu­to­r­i­al mis­con­duct, inno­cent defen­dants sen­tenced to death, racism in the appli­ca­tion of jus­tice, inad­e­quate rep­re­sen­ta­tion, and the high costs of the death penal­ty. Forty-eight defen­dants have been released from death row since cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment was rein­stat­ed after evi­dence of their inno­cence was dis­cov­ered. Half of the nation’s death row is made up of minori­ties and almost all cap­i­tal cas­es involve white victims.

Many in America are push­ing for a faster pace and a wider use of the death penal­ty on both the state and fed­er­al lev­els. Texas is a par­a­digm of what can hap­pen under such an expansion.

Some politi­cians and law enforce­ment offi­cers in Texas are begin­ning to have sec­ond thoughts about their state’s prac­tice of the death penal­ty. While peo­ple want to address the prob­lem of crime, they also want solu­tions that real­ly work. Nationally, there should be a care­ful exam­i­na­tion of death penal­ty jus­tice in Texas before we embrace an expan­sion of exe­cu­tions as an answer to crime.

When in Gregg v. Georgia the Supreme Court gave its seal of approval to cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment, this endorse­ment was premised on the promise that cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment would be admin­is­tered with fair­ness and jus­tice. Instead, the promise has become a cru­el and emp­ty mock­ery. If not reme­died, the scan­dalous state of our present sys­tem of cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment will cast a pall of shame over our soci­ety for years to come. We can­not let it con­tin­ue.

–Justice Thurgood Marshall, 1990 [1]

From this day for­ward, I no longer shall tin­ker with the machin­ery of death.… I feel moral­ly and intel­lec­tu­al­ly oblig­at­ed to con­cede that the death penal­ty exper­i­ment has failed.

–Justice Harry Blackmun, 1994 [2]

Introduction Top

Between 1967 and 1977, exe­cu­tions in the United States were halt­ed as evi­dence of racial injus­tice and arbi­trari­ness in the use of the death penal­ty mount­ed. When most states revised their cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment laws, the Supreme Court allowed the death penal­ty to resume in 1976. But this approval inau­gu­rat­ed a new peri­od of exper­i­men­ta­tion regard­ing the appli­ca­tion of the death penal­ty. In the eyes of many, includ­ing Justice Blackmun who over­saw this entire crit­i­cal peri­od of death penal­ty his­to­ry, that exper­i­ment has failed to meet even the min­i­mal stan­dards of fair­ness and jus­tice. And nowhere are these fail­ings more evi­dent than in the state of Texas.

No oth­er state comes close to the num­ber of exe­cu­tions being car­ried out in Texas. It has put to death more than twice as many inmates as any oth­er state since the death penal­ty was rein­stat­ed. In 1993 alone, Texas account­ed for more than three times as many exe­cu­tions as any oth­er state and car­ried out almost half of the death sen­tences in the entire country.

The accel­er­at­ed pace of exe­cu­tions and the dis­turb­ing num­ber of inmates fac­ing death with­out legal rep­re­sen­ta­tion in Texas has drained both the state’s resources and the abil­i­ty of the defense bar to ade­quate­ly respond. At the same time, the polit­i­cal pres­sure to achieve even more death sen­tences and more exe­cu­tions has fre­quent­ly giv­en due process a back seat.

But the size and prob­lems of cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment in Texas are not unique to that state. The United States is perched on the precipice of a whole­sale expan­sion of the death penal­ty. Before it takes the plunge, the coun­try should look at Texas’ expe­ri­ence. The ware­hous­ing of hun­dreds of peo­ple await­ing exe­cu­tion, half of whom are minori­ties, the con­stant sign­ing of death war­rants, the gris­ly spec­ta­cle of week­ly exe­cu­tions, and the ero­sion of due process by the relent­less press to exe­cute will be much more com­mon in the years ahead if the United States choos­es to fol­low the Texas mod­el. The prob­lems which Texas has been expe­ri­enc­ing in its rise to the posi­tion as the nation’s fore­most exe­cu­tion­er are already emerg­ing in oth­er states through­out the country.

This report will look at var­i­ous dimen­sions of the death penal­ty cri­sis in Texas:

  • The exam­ples of offi­cial mis­con­duct and result­ing mistaken convictions;
  • The evi­dence of racism infect­ing the appli­ca­tion of the death penalty;
  • The cri­sis in death penal­ty rep­re­sen­ta­tion which serves to per­pet­u­ate Texas’ death penalty problems.
  • The absence of clemen­cy as a real­is­tic rem­e­dy to pre­vent wrong­ful exe­cu­tions; and
  • The way in which Texas’ empha­sis on the death penal­ty inter­feres with address­ing the larg­er prob­lem of crime.


The United States is perched on the precipice of a whole­sale expan­sion of the death penal­ty. Before it takes the plunge, the coun­try should look at Texas’ experience.

At each step of the way, the report will look at the nation­al impli­ca­tions of what is hap­pen­ing in Texas. It will iden­ti­fy the extent to which the Texas death penal­ty is like­ly to be mir­rored in the rest of the United States in the near future. Finally, the report will point to the signs of offi­cial dis­il­lu­sion­ment with the death penal­ty in Texas. The death penal­ty cri­sis in Texas should be a warn­ing to our entire coun­try as we strug­gle to respond to the nation­al prob­lem of crime. 

The Death Penalty in Texas: A State of Crisis Top

To get an idea of the size of the death penal­ty in Texas, it is instruc­tive to look at what the death penal­ty in the entire coun­try would be like today if every state had pro­por­tion­ate­ly fol­lowed Texas’ lead. 

[T]he scan­dalous state of our present sys­tem of cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment will cast a pall of shame over our soci­ety for years to come.”

–Justice Thurgood Marshall 

In 1993 alone, there would have been 250 exe­cu­tions, one for every busi­ness day of the year and the largest num­ber of exe­cu­tions in the coun­try’s his­to­ry. In the last ten years, the U.S. would have exe­cut­ed over 1,000 peo­ple. The nation’s death row would house more than 5,300 con­demned indi­vid­u­als. The nation­al cost for the death penal­ty would be at least two bil­lion dol­lars, with much more expense to come. The courts of appeals and the Supreme Court would be del­uged with peti­tions from con­demned inmates, while at the same time hun­dreds of inmates would have no attor­ney as their exe­cu­tion dates approached. Meanwhile, all of these exe­cu­tions would have done noth­ing to low­er the nation’s mur­der rate. [3]

In achiev­ing this pro­fi­cien­cy in exe­cu­tions, Texas has sac­ri­ficed the pur­suit of jus­tice. It was prob­a­bly no coin­ci­dence that Justice Blackmun chose a Texas case to con­demn the death penal­ty. Justice Thurgood Marshall had ear­li­er warned that the entire coun­try was in sim­i­lar dan­ger because of the death penal­ty: “[T]he scan­dalous state of our present sys­tem of cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment will cast a pall of shame over our soci­ety for years to come.” [4]As the nation moves toward an even greater expan­sion of this prac­tice, it should con­sid­er whether cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment is worth the man­tle of such a pall of shame. 

Official Misconduct Top

1. Official Misconduct: The Death Penalty With A Vengeance

Texas has pur­sued the death penal­ty with a vengeance. Prosecutors and politi­cians have staked their careers on get­ting peo­ple exe­cut­ed. Unfortunately, such polit­i­cal grand­stand­ing results in more than rhetoric — indi­vid­ual rights have been sac­ri­ficed and inno­cent peo­ple have been sent to death row.

This phe­nom­e­non is cer­tain­ly not unique to Texas, but Texas politi­cians have cam­paigned shame­less­ly on the strength of their com­mit­ment to ever more exe­cu­tions. In the 1990 guber­na­to­r­i­al race, for­mer Governor Mark White por­trayed his tough­ness” by walk­ing through a dis­play of large pho­tos of peo­ple exe­cut­ed dur­ing his term, while Attorney General Jim Mattox insist­ed that he was the one who should be giv­en cred­it for the many exe­cu­tions under his watch. And the Republican can­di­date, Clayton Williams, claimed that his pro­posed laws to expand the death penal­ty were the way to make Texas great again.” [5]

The end result of all this polit­i­cal pos­tur­ing was a spoof of Texas on Saturday Night Live” and the elec­tion of Ann Richards as gov­er­nor. Governor Richards was the least vocif­er­ous of the can­di­dates on the death penal­ty but has nev­er­the­less presided over a dra­mat­ic increase in the pace of exe­cu­tions in Texas. 

Convicting the Innocent

Among elect­ed state pros­e­cu­tors, death penal­ty rhetoric has some­times spilled over into seri­ous abus­es in order to secure a death sen­tence. Two of the most famous Texas exam­ples of this mis­con­duct involved Randall Dale Adams and Clarence Brandley, both of whom were released from Texas’ death row after years of strug­gle to prove their inno­cence. Adams’ sto­ry was elo­quent­ly told in the award win­ning movie, The Thin Blue Line, and Brandley’s strug­gle with Texas racism is relat­ed in Nick Davies’ book, White Lies.

The orig­i­nal con­vic­tions of Adams and Brandley were not sim­ply the prod­uct of hon­est pros­e­cu­to­r­i­al mis­takes. When Randall Dale Adams had his mur­der con­vic­tion unan­i­mous­ly over­turned by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Judge M. P. Duncan sharply cas­ti­gat­ed the pros­e­cu­tion: “[T]he State was guilty of sup­press­ing evi­dence favor­able to the accused, deceiv­ing the tri­al court dur­ing the appli­can­t’s tri­al, and know­ing­ly using per­jured tes­ti­mo­ny.” [6]

The State was guilty of sup­press­ing evi­dence favor­able to the accused, deceiv­ing the tri­al court dur­ing the appli­can­t’s tri­al, and know­ing­ly using per­jured tes­ti­mo­ny.”

–deci­sion over­turn­ing Randall Dale Adams’ conviction

Similarly, when Texas Special District Judge Perry Pickett reviewed Clarence Brandley’s con­vic­tion in 1987, he con­clud­ed that the state’s inves­tiga­tive pro­ce­dure was so imper­mis­si­bly sug­ges­tive that false tes­ti­mo­ny was cre­at­ed, there­by deny­ing … due process of law and a fun­da­men­tal­ly fair tri­al.”[7] Furthermore, the state had whol­ly ignored any evi­dence or leads to evi­dence that might prove incon­sis­tent with their pre­ma­ture con­clu­sions that Brandley had com­mit­ted the mur­der. The con­clu­sion is inescapable that the inves­ti­ga­tion was con­duct­ed not to solve the crime, but to con­vict Brandley.”[8]

In their zeal to obtain cap­i­tal con­vic­tions, Texas pros­e­cu­tors have made wide use of med­ical experts” select­ed because of their will­ing­ness, in case after case, to par­rot the exact words the pros­e­cu­tor needs to get a con­vic­tion. One such expert” is Dr. James Grigson — or Dr. Death,” as he came to be known. 

Dr. Death, I

In Texas, jurors are required to deter­mine whether there is a prob­a­bil­i­ty that the defen­dant would com­mit crim­i­nal acts of vio­lence that would con­sti­tute a con­tin­u­ing threat to soci­ety.” [9]

Not only is it dif­fi­cult for a lay per­son to make such a judg­ment, it is also impos­si­ble for pro­fes­sion­als. Naturally, a jury would give con­sid­er­able weight to a state psy­chi­a­trist who unhesi­tat­ing­ly pre­dicts with sci­en­tif­ic cer­tain­ty that the per­son sit­ting in front of them will invari­ably kill again if he [10] is allowed to live.

Dr. James Grigson offered just such pre­dic­tions in at least 124 death penal­ty cas­es, 115 of which result­ed in death sen­tences. [11] Dr. Grigson trav­eled the plains of Texas offer­ing his tes­ti­mo­ny in exchange for siz­able fees. At first, Grigson would per­son­al­ly exam­ine the defen­dant, per­haps for 90 min­utes. Based on this cur­so­ry inter­view, Dr. Grigson would then be asked by the pros­e­cu­tor in court:

Can you tell us whether or not, in your opin­ion, hav­ing killed in the past, he is like­ly to kill in the future, giv­en the opportunity?

Grigson would reply:

He absolute­ly will, regard­less of whether he’s inside an insti­tu­tion­al-type set­ting or whether he’s out­side. No mat­ter where he is, he will kill again.[12]

Grigson made these same pre­dic­tions about Randall Dale Adams, despite Adams’ hav­ing no his­to­ry of vio­lence. The fact that Adams was exon­er­at­ed of all charges and was freed from prison a num­ber of years ago has done noth­ing to sway Grigson’s cer­tain­ty about his pre­dic­tions. [13]

In lat­er cas­es, Grigson would offer his absolute­ly cer­tain view of the future with­out even inter­view­ing the defen­dant. He would sim­ply lis­ten to the pros­e­cu­tor’s descrip­tion of the defen­dan­t’s crime and back­ground and then offer the con­clu­sion that such a per­son would cer­tain­ly kill again, no mat­ter what the setting.

The American Psychiatric Association has unequiv­o­cal­ly con­demned the process that Dr. Grigson has used so lib­er­al­ly. “[P]sychiatric tes­ti­mo­ny of future dan­ger­ous­ness imper­mis­si­bly dis­torts the fact-find­ing process in cap­i­tal cas­es,” [14] they said in a brief to the Supreme Court.

Moreover, empir­i­cal stud­ies have shown the inac­cu­ra­cies of pre­dict­ing future dan­ger­ous­ness. One study in Texas exam­ined 92 for­mer death row pris­on­ers whom juries had sen­tenced to death because of their future dan­ger­ous­ness. For var­i­ous rea­sons, these inmates had their sen­tences changed from death to life imprisonment. 

Overall these for­mer death row pris­on­ers were not a dis­pro­por­tion­ate threat to the insti­tu­tion­al order, oth­er inmates, or the cus­to­di­al staff. Indeed, their total rate of assaultive insti­tu­tion­al mis­con­duct was low­er than those of both the cap­i­tal mur­der offend­ers who were giv­en a life sen­tence [to begin with] and the gen­er­al prison pop­u­la­tion.[15]

Despite the unre­li­a­bil­i­ty of such pre­dic­tions, Dr. Grigson’s tes­ti­mo­ny has been used by the pros­e­cu­tion in one-third of Texas’ death sen­tences.[16] The prob­lem of manip­u­lat­ing juries with fear is com­pound­ed by Texas law which for­bids telling the juries what the alter­na­tive to a death sen­tence real­ly means. A life sen­tence in a cap­i­tal case in Texas now means that the defen­dant must serve 40 years before even being con­sid­ered for parole. But jurors are told only that their alter­na­tives are the death penal­ty or a life sen­tence. They are left with their erro­neous assump­tions that a life sen­tence will allow a dan­ger­ous mur­der­er to be released in 10 years or less. [17]

Dr. Death, II

Another crit­i­cal ele­ment of the pros­e­cu­tion’s case in a cap­i­tal tri­al is proof that the vic­tim’s death result­ed from the defen­dan­t’s vio­lent actions. To tie that knot, many pros­e­cu­tors in Texas have uti­lized a pathol­o­gist by the name of Ralph Erdmann, who has also earned the name Dr. Death.” Erdmann received his med­ical degree in Mexico in the 1950s and trav­eled to 40 Texas coun­ties sup­pos­ed­ly per­form­ing 400 autop­sies a year in cap­i­tal and non-cap­i­tal cas­es. Lubbock County alone paid Dr. Erdmann $140,000 a year for his work. Now the ver­dicts in at least 20 cap­i­tal mur­der cas­es and dozens of oth­er pros­e­cu­tions are being appealed because Erdmann lied, fal­si­fied reports and even neglect­ed to per­form some of the autop­sies he tes­ti­fied about. [18]

Erdmann’s word began to be doubt­ed when one fam­i­ly read his autop­sy report indi­cat­ing that the deceased’s spleen had been exam­ined and weighed as part of the exam­i­na­tion. However, the fam­i­ly knew that the dead man’s spleen had been removed years ear­li­er. As a result of the fam­i­ly’s inter­ven­tion, the body was exhumed and no inci­sion marks from an autop­sy were found.[19] At that point, attor­ney Tommy Turner of Lubbock was appoint­ed spe­cial pros­e­cu­tor to look into Erdmann’s decep­tions. Turner con­clud­ed that Erdmann was a liar and a con man: If the pros­e­cu­tion the­o­ry was that death was caused by a Martian death ray, then that was what Dr. Erdmann report­ed.”[20]

If the pros­e­cu­tion the­o­ry was that death was caused by a Martian death ray, then that was what Dr. Erdmann report­ed.”

–Special pros­e­cu­tor Tommy Turner 

Killing the Messenger

When Erdmann’s meth­ods and tes­ti­mo­ny came under increas­ing crit­i­cism in death penal­ty cas­es, some pros­e­cu­tors retal­i­at­ed by pros­e­cut­ing Erdmann’s crit­ics. Two police offi­cers, Patrick Kelly and William Hubbard from Lubbock County, who had tes­ti­fied about Erdmann’s mis­deeds, were indict­ed for alleged per­jury. And nation­al­ly famous death penal­ty defense attor­ney, Millard Farmer of Atlanta, was indict­ed for sup­pos­ed­ly tam­per­ing with a wit­ness. However, this effort to cov­er-up the grow­ing scan­dal around Dr. Erdmann fell apart.

A fed­er­al District Court judge ordered a halt to the pros­e­cu­tions and stat­ed that those being attacked have offered sub­stan­tial evi­dence that the pros­e­cu­tions were brought in bad faith and for pur­pos­es of retal­i­a­tion.[21]

A suit brought by the police offi­cers and Mr. Farmer against the pros­e­cu­tors who indict­ed them was set­tled in favor of the plain­tiffs with the agree­ment that the pros­e­cu­tions be per­ma­nent­ly stopped, that the police­men be restored to their jobs with full back pay, and that they be award­ed $300,000 in dam­ages.[22]

Dr. Erdmann had ear­li­er plead­ed no con­test to sev­en felony charges. He was sen­tenced to 10 years pro­ba­tion, and fined $17,000 for botched autop­sies and exhuma­tion expens­es. He also sur­ren­dered his med­ical license and moved to anoth­er state. [23]

As dis­grace­ful as the behav­ior of these med­ical experts” has been, the real scan­dal is that pros­e­cu­tors were will­ing to repeat­ed­ly uti­lize such wit­ness­es in order to get con­vic­tions and death sen­tences. In oth­er instances, pros­e­cu­tors failed to inves­ti­gate cas­es thor­ough­ly and allowed defen­dants, lat­er found inno­cent, to be sen­tenced to death. Besides Randall Dale Adams and Clarence Brandley, at least four oth­er Texas death row inmates have been found inno­cent in recent years (Muneer Deeb, 1993; Federico Macias, 1993; John Skelton, 1990; and Vernon McManus, 1987) and that num­ber could increase as fur­ther abuse is exam­ined. Unfortunately, this pat­tern of pros­e­cu­to­r­i­al mis­con­duct in cap­i­tal cas­es is not unique to Texas. 

National Implications: Official Misconduct

The pres­sure on pros­e­cu­tors and police to suc­ceed in death penal­ty cas­es has result­ed in mis­car­riages of jus­tice all over the coun­try. Representative Don Edwards, Chair of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, released a staff report in October, 1993, recount­ing 48 cas­es since 1970 in which the defen­dants were sen­tenced to death but lat­er exon­er­at­ed and released. [24] In many of these cas­es, the pros­e­cu­tors or police ille­gal­ly with­held vital infor­ma­tion from the defense, encour­aged wit­ness­es to lie, and deceived the court in a vari­ety of ways. In oth­er cas­es, pros­e­cu­tors pushed for the death penal­ty in head­line cas­es in which they lacked suf­fi­cient evi­dence even to sus­tain a conviction.

For exam­ple, when Attorney General Janet Reno was a pros­e­cu­tor in Dade County, Florida, she helped uncov­er a pat­tern of offi­cial abuse in the death penal­ty con­vic­tion of James Richardson. Richardson had been sen­tenced to death for poi­son­ing his own chil­dren in 1968. He was spared the elec­tric chair when the Supreme Court over­turned all exist­ing death sen­tences in 1972, but he remained in prison. Reno’s 1989 inves­ti­ga­tion affirmed what had long been claimed by the defense: the state had know­ing­ly used per­jured tes­ti­mo­ny and sup­pressed evi­dence help­ful to the defense.”[25] Richardson was released in 1989.

Just last year, five peo­ple were released after years on death row for crimes they did not com­mit. [26] In the case of Walter McMillian in Alabama, pros­e­cu­tors admit­ted that the case had been mis­han­dled. Evidence was improp­er­ly with­held from the defense, the state’s three main wit­ness­es all admit­ted that they had lied, and the eye­wit­ness” said that he had been pres­sured to pin the blame for the mur­der of the young white woman on McMillian, who is black. [27]

In the case of Kirk Bloodsworth in Maryland, pros­e­cu­tors improp­er­ly with­held evi­dence of a dif­fer­ent sus­pect who bore a strik­ing resem­blance to the police sketch in the rape and mur­der of a young girl. The oth­er sus­pect had been found in the woods near the mur­der scene, had a blood-like spot on his shirt, and was very dirty except for his hands, which were metic­u­lous­ly clean. Moreover, the police found a young girl’s under­wear in this sus­pec­t’s car. The sus­pect had a pri­or con­vic­tion for inde­cent expo­sure and had failed a poly­graph test. [28] Nevertheless, pros­e­cu­tors sought and obtained a death sen­tence against Bloodsworth. Fortunately, he was com­plete­ly cleared in June, 1993, when a new DNA test con­firmed that some­one else had com­mit­ted the crime. [29]

Federal pros­e­cu­tors are also not immune from such prac­tices. If Congress pass­es a great­ly expand­ed fed­er­al death penal­ty in 1994, U.S. Attorneys will be respon­si­ble for a much larg­er num­ber of death penal­ty cas­es. However, recent inves­ti­ga­tions into abus­es in the El Rukin gang pros­e­cu­tion in Illinois and a major rack­e­teer­ing case in Los Angeles in which an appel­late court described the gov­ern­men­t’s con­duct as intol­er­a­ble,” [30] have shown that some fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tors also engage in mis­con­duct to obtain convictions.

Attorney General Janet Reno has promised much swifter inves­ti­ga­tions into alle­ga­tions of abuse by fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tors. But expe­ri­ence has shown that evi­dence of pros­e­cu­to­r­i­al abuse, if dis­cov­ered at all, may come only long after the defen­dan­t’s con­vic­tion. In cap­i­tal cas­es that may be too late. This prob­lem rais­es the almost cer­tain specter that inno­cent peo­ple will be exe­cut­ed, espe­cial­ly if cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment is expand­ed. [31]


Racism in Deciding Who Should Die Top

Judge (Roy) Bean opened the ses­sion by spend­ing two hours read­ing the Texas statutes aloud to the court­room spec­ta­tors. He then closed the law book, and, drop­ping it on the bench, declared: 

That’s … the com­plete statutes of this here state from the Alamo on ahead, and there ain’t a damned line in it nowheres that makes it ille­gal to kill a Chinaman. The defen­dant is discharged.”

–Judge Roy Bean, pre­sid­ing at the tri­al of his son for mur­der­ing a Chinese laun­dry­man who over­charged him [32]

The cop paused and stared at the two of them, the black man in his white T‑shirt and shab­by jeans, the lit­tle white man with the thick glass­es and the ballooning belly.

One of you two is gonna hang for this,” said the cop. Then he turned to Brandley. Since you’re the nig­ger, you’re elected.”

–Nick Davies in White Lies, quot­ing tes­ti­mo­ny lead­ing to Clarence Brandley’s release [33]

In 1993, nation­al atten­tion was drawn to two mur­der cas­es in Texas. In one case, the defen­dant was giv­en the death sen­tence; in the oth­er, he was placed on pro­ba­tion. Although, the cas­es dif­fer in some respects, the most glar­ing inequity is that a young white man was giv­en lenien­cy for the mur­der of a black man, while a young black man was con­demned to death for the mur­der of a white man. This dis­par­i­ty is symp­to­matic of broad­er inequities in Texas depend­ing on the race of the defen­dant and the race of the victim.

Both of those con­vict­ed of the crimes were 17 years old at the time of the mur­ders. In the first case, a white suprema­cist skin­head, Christopher Brosky, was giv­en 10 years pro­ba­tion for the mur­der of Donald Thomas, a black man. One of the jurors respon­si­ble for the sen­tence com­ment­ed: We just felt like this might be a man who might be able to turn his life around .… If we had sent him to Huntsville, he might have come back in worse shape.” [34]

In the sec­ond case, a young black man, Gary Graham, was giv­en the death penal­ty for the mur­der of Bobby Lambert in Houston back in 1981. Graham has been on death row in Huntsville ever since. Both cas­es have split the com­mu­ni­ty and result­ed in demon­stra­tions rais­ing issues of race and the admin­is­tra­tion of jus­tice. Graham’s case gained par­tic­u­lar atten­tion in 1993 because of new evi­dence point­ing to his inno­cence. [35] His exe­cu­tion has been stayed three times, but he remains on death row. 

Racism in Texas’ Earlier Use of the Death Penalty

Outcomes based on race in death penal­ty cas­es have a long his­to­ry in Texas. From the time of the first state exe­cu­tions, the race of the defen­dant played a large role in who was giv­en the death penal­ty. For exam­ple, between 1924, when cen­tral­ized state exe­cu­tions were begun, and 1972, 361 peo­ple were put to death in Texas. About 70% of them were either African- or Mexican-American, with blacks con­sti­tut­ing 63% of those exe­cut­ed.[36] Of the whites sen­tenced to death dur­ing this peri­od, 34% had their sen­tences com­mut­ed. Only 20% of the blacks received clemen­cy. [37]

The race of the vic­tim was an even more cer­tain pre­dic­tor of which cas­es would receive the death penal­ty. Prior to 1972, 80% of the vic­tims in Texas death penal­ty cas­es were white. [38] In rape cas­es where the death penal­ty was applied, 95% of the vic­tims were white. When a black man was con­vict­ed of rap­ing a white woman, the sen­tence was vir­tu­al­ly always death. No white man, how­ev­er, was exe­cut­ed for rap­ing a black woman. [39]

Before 1924, cen­tral state records on exe­cu­tions were not com­piled, since the death penal­ty was car­ried out local­ly. However, Texas’ part in the his­to­ry of lynch­ings in the U.S. reveals an even more severe prac­tice of racial bias. In post-Civil War Texas, lynch­ings were often used as a form of pun­ish­ment and intim­i­da­tion. Not sur­pris­ing­ly, almost all of those who suf­fered this ille­gal form of vig­i­lante jus­tice were black. From 1889 to 1899, over 95% of the record­ed lynch­ings in Texas were of blacks. [40] The geo­graph­i­cal pat­tern of lynch­ings in Texas close­ly fol­lowed those areas where slav­ery had been most preva­lent. [41]

As part of a response to the embar­rass­ment of racial lynch­ings, state leg­is­la­tors vot­ed to move exe­cu­tions to a cen­tral state loca­tion in Huntsville and to change the method of exe­cu­tion from hang­ing to the elec­tric chair.[42]Interestingly, the war­den of the Huntsville prison, Captain R.F. Coleman, resigned over this unwant­ed duty, say­ing: A war­den can’t be a war­den and a killer too. The pen­i­ten­tiary is a place to reform a man, not to kill him.” [43] Coleman was replaced by a more accom­mo­dat­ing war­den, and four days lat­er on Feb. 8, 1924, the State of Texas elec­tro­cut­ed its first five pris­on­ers, all black.[44]

Coleman was replaced by a more accom­mo­dat­ing war­den, and four days lat­er on Feb. 8, 1924, the State of Texas elec­tro­cut­ed its first five pris­on­ers, all black.” 

Racism in the Current Use of the Death Penalty

Racial dis­crim­i­na­tion in the appli­ca­tion of cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment was one of the fac­tors that led the U. S. Supreme Court in 1972 to throw out vir­tu­al­ly all exist­ing death penal­ty statutes and sen­tences. Their rul­ing required states to more care­ful­ly craft new statutes that nar­row the class of defen­dants who can receive the death penal­ty. Texas was one of the first leg­is­la­tures to approve new death penal­ty laws, less than one year after the High Court’s deci­sion. In 1976, when the Court allowed the death penal­ty to resume, the Texas statute was one of three such laws that the Court approved.

The racial com­po­si­tion of Texas’ death row has improved only slight­ly since the death penal­ty resumed. The per­cent­age of minori­ties on Texas’ death row has decreased from 70% to 55%, still a large dis­pro­por­tion. However, the racial dis­par­i­ties with respect to vic­tims has changed lit­tle. In cap­i­tal cas­es, if you mur­der a white per­son in Texas, you are over five times more like­ly to receive the death penal­ty than if you mur­der a black per­son.[45] In none of the 74 Texas exe­cu­tions was the vic­tim black and the defen­dant white. In fact, a recent Texas study of homi­cide cas­es between 1980 and 1988 found that no white offend­er who killed a black vic­tim has even been charged and con­vict­ed with cap­i­tal mur­der. [46]

Racism in the death penal­ty does not ful­ly explain the pace of exe­cu­tions or the size of death row in Texas. However, it is a recur­rent and large­ly untreat­ed sore which skews the use of the death penal­ty in Texas and eats away at the hope for bet­ter rela­tions among the races. A Texas gov­ern­men­tal report showed that racial dis­par­i­ties are evi­dent in oth­er areas of crim­i­nal jus­tice, as well. For exam­ple, the incar­cer­a­tion rate for blacks in Texas is over eight times the rate for whites. [47] Almost half of black offend­ers are sen­tenced to prison, but less than one-third of white offend­ers are so sen­tenced. [48]

But in many respects, the racial prob­lems in oth­er states are as severe as they are in Texas.

National Implications: Race and the Death Penalty 

Racism is also appar­ent in nation­al death penal­ty sta­tis­tics. Half of those on death row are from minor­i­ty pop­u­la­tions that make up only 20% of the coun­try’s pop­u­la­tion. Blacks are rep­re­sent­ed on death row at three and a half times their pro­por­tion in the pop­u­la­tion as a whole. As is the case in Texas, how­ev­er, the form of racial dis­crim­i­na­tion which is most direct­ly attrib­ut­able to cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment con­cerns the race of victims.

Blacks con­sti­tute about 50% of the vic­tims of homi­cide in this coun­try.[49] One might expect, there­fore, that the per­cent­age of death penal­ty cas­es involv­ing black vic­tims would approx­i­mate 50%. That has nev­er been the case, and all the reforms insti­tut­ed at the insis­tence of the Supreme Court in 1976 have done noth­ing to alle­vi­ate the problem.

Since 1976, 84% of the vic­tims in the cas­es result­ing in an exe­cu­tion were white. In 1993, the num­bers were even worse: 89% of the cas­es result­ing in an exe­cu­tion involved white vic­tims. Only one out of the 226 exe­cu­tions between 1976 and 1993 involved a white defen­dant who had killed a black vic­tim. This rep­re­sents a con­sis­tent pat­tern since the found­ing of this country.

In all, only 31 of the over 18,000 exe­cu­tions in this coun­try’s his­to­ry involved a white per­son being pun­ished for killing a black per­son.[50] In 1990, the U.S. General Accounting Office reviewed the exist­ing stud­ies on racism and the death penal­ty in the United States and concluded:

Our syn­the­sis of the 28 stud­ies shows a pat­tern of evi­dence indi­cat­ing racial dis­par­i­ties in the charg­ing, sen­tenc­ing, and impo­si­tion of the death penal­ty after the Furman decision.

In 82% of the stud­ies, race of the vic­tim was found to influ­ence the like­li­hood of being charged with cap­i­tal mur­der or receiv­ing the death penal­ty, i.e., those who mur­dered whites were found more like­ly to be sen­tenced to death than those who mur­dered blacks.[51]

The fed­er­al gov­ern­men­t’s use of the death penal­ty has been even more racial­ly dis­pro­por­tion­ate than the states. Under a new 1988 statute aimed at mur­ders by drug king-pins,” almost 90% of those approved by the Attorney General for cap­i­tal pros­e­cu­tions have been either black or Hispanic defen­dants. [52]

[T]hose who mur­dered whites were found more like­ly to be sen­tenced to death than those who mur­dered blacks.”

–U.S. General Accounting Office

The con­tin­u­a­tion of racial dis­par­i­ties in the use of cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment is an embar­rass­ment for the entire coun­try. The riots fol­low­ing the ver­dict in the first Rodney King beat­ing case in California indi­cate the seri­ous reper­cus­sions pos­si­ble when a jury appears to ignore the facts and decide a case based on the sta­tus of who com­mit­ted the crime and who was the vic­tim. There have been some Congressional attempts to rec­ti­fy the prob­lem in cap­i­tal cas­es, but these were defeat­ed when pros­e­cu­tors argued that any law that pro­hib­it­ed racial­ly dis­pro­por­tion­ate death sen­tenc­ing would mark the end of the death penal­ty in the entire country.

This ongo­ing prob­lem of racial dis­par­i­ties was addressed by Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun in his dra­mat­ic dis­sent to a death penal­ty rul­ing: Even under the most sophis­ti­cat­ed death penal­ty statutes,” said Blackmun, race con­tin­ues to play a major role in deter­min­ing who shall live and who shall die.” He announced that he would no longer tin­ker with the machin­ery of death” because he had con­clud­ed that the death penal­ty exper­i­ment had failed.” [53]

As the num­ber of peo­ple on death row and the num­ber of peo­ple exe­cut­ed in this coun­try con­tin­ue to grow, the pat­terns of racial dis­par­i­ty will become clear­er and more dis­grace­ful. What has been a peren­ni­al prob­lem in Texas’ admin­is­tra­tion of the death penal­ty will become appar­ent as a nation­al prob­lem as well. 

Even under the most sophis­ti­cat­ed death penal­ty statutes, race con­tin­ues to play a major role in deter­min­ing who shall live and who shall die.”

–Justice Harry A. Blackmun 

Source: NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Death Row USA (1994)

The Crisis of Representation in Texas Top

You are an extreme­ly intel­li­gent jury. You’ve got that man’s life in your hands. You can take it or not. That’s all I have to say.”

–entire defense offered by a Texas attor­ney for his client, Jesus Romero, at a cap­i­tal sen­tenc­ing [54]

The state [of Texas] paid defense coun­sel $11.84 per hour. Unfortunately, the jus­tice sys­tem got only what it paid for.”

–U.S. Court of Appeals over­turn­ing Federico Macias’ death penal­ty con­vic­tion [55]

The enor­mi­ty of the death penal­ty in Texas has over­tak­en the state’s will­ing­ness to mete this pun­ish­ment out with even a mod­icum of fair­ness and due process. Of all the fac­tors which deter­mine whether or not a par­tic­u­lar defen­dant will ulti­mate­ly receive the death penal­ty, prob­a­bly the most impor­tant is the qual­i­ty of rep­re­sen­ta­tion he or she receives. In Texas, death penal­ty defen­dants are fre­quent­ly giv­en inex­pe­ri­enced and under­paid attor­neys at tri­al. For some crit­i­cal stages of their appeal, the defen­dants are giv­en no attor­ney at all.

As in oth­er states, almost every­one who is charged with a cap­i­tal crime in Texas can­not afford his own attor­ney. The state is there­fore required to pro­vide him with one. Texas del­e­gates that respon­si­bil­i­ty to the local coun­ty which is try­ing the case. The State of Texas itself pro­vides no funds for the rep­re­sen­ta­tion of those charged with a cap­i­tal crime. The selec­tion and qual­i­fi­ca­tions of the attor­ney, the fee he or she will be paid, and the amount of resources which will be made avail­able for inves­ti­ga­tion and expert wit­ness­es are total­ly in the hands of the 375 local judges, who have wide­ly vary­ing economic resources.

In the larg­er coun­ties, such as those encom­pass­ing Houston or Dallas, the judge might select from more expe­ri­enced defense coun­sel and pay them a high­er rate. In poor­er coun­ties, a gen­er­al prac­ti­tion­er might be cho­sen and paid as lit­tle as $800 for an entire case. [56] In Randall County, for exam­ple, defense coun­sel Mallory Holloway was told that he had bet­ter not ask for inves­ti­ga­tion funds since he had already drained the coun­ty’s bud­get by insist­ing on co-coun­sel. [57]

Recently, the State Bar of Texas com­mis­sioned a study of the sys­tem of rep­re­sen­ta­tion in death penal­ty cas­es. A com­pre­hen­sive report pre­pared by the Spangenberg Group of Massachusetts was released in March, 1993. The report found that cap­i­tal rep­re­sen­ta­tion in Texas was plagued with tremen­dous prob­lems at both the tri­al and appel­late lev­el. It described the lack of coun­sel and the inad­e­qua­cy of fund­ing as des­per­ate” and urgent” and concluded:

We believe, in the strongest terms pos­si­ble, that Texas has already reached the cri­sis stage in cap­i­tal rep­re­sen­ta­tion and that the prob­lem is sub­stan­tial­ly worse than that faced by any oth­er state with the death penal­ty.[58]

Representation At Trial The prob­lem of rep­re­sen­ta­tion in cap­i­tal cas­es in Texas is mul­ti-lay­ered, begin­ning at the tri­al stage. Texas is the only death penal­ty state which makes prac­ti­cal­ly no use of a pub­lic defend­er sys­tem to pro­vide attor­neys. Instead, Texas allows each coun­ty to secure coun­sel through the pri­vate bar, often on a con­tract basis. The coun­ty judges can indi­vid­u­al­ly deter­mine what they believe to be a rea­son­able attor­ney fee” and com­pen­sa­tion for rea­son­able expens­es.” Until 1987, the statute regard­ing pay­ment of attor­neys for such work made no men­tion of com­pen­sa­tion for the inves­ti­ga­tion, research and con­sul­ta­tion with experts before tri­al. The statute did pro­vide min­i­mum pay­ments for in-court appear­ances and these often became the de fac­to max­i­mum paid to attor­neys for the entire case. Although the statute was changed in 1987, the rates paid in many coun­ties did not change, and Texas’ com­pen­sa­tion for court-appoint­ed attor­neys remains near the low­est in the coun­try. [59] The pros­e­cu­tors, on the oth­er hand, rep­re­sent a team of salaried state employ­ees with ample resources and ready access to oth­er law enforce­ment agen­cies for inves­ti­gat­ing and pur­su­ing their cas­es. [60]

The rate of com­pen­sa­tion often deter­mines the qual­i­ty of rep­re­sen­ta­tion. The Spangenberg Report con­clud­ed that defend­ing death penal­ty cas­es in Texas is fre­quent­ly a los­ing finan­cial ven­ture for attor­neys: The rate of com­pen­sa­tion pro­vid­ed to court-appoint­ed attor­neys is absurd­ly low and does not cov­er the cost of pro­vid­ing rep­re­sen­ta­tion.” [61] Without ade­quate com­pen­sa­tion, it would be unre­al­is­tic to expect the con­sis­tent pro­vi­sion of a thor­ough defense. The con­se­quences of poor rep­re­sen­ta­tion can be dis­as­trous. Federico Macias, for exam­ple, came with­in two days of exe­cu­tion in Texas because his tri­al attor­ney did almost noth­ing to pre­pare for tri­al. Today he is a free man, thanks to vol­un­teer coun­sel from a large Washington law office that inter­vened just before Macias’ exe­cu­tion. With qual­i­fied coun­sel and ample resources, Macias was not only grant­ed a stay of exe­cu­tion but was even­tu­al­ly cleared of all charges in 1993. The fed­er­al court’s order over­turn­ing the con­vic­tion not­ed that the first attor­ney had missed evi­dence of Macias’ innocence:

We are left with the firm con­vic­tion that Macias was denied his con­sti­tu­tion­al right to ade­quate coun­sel in a cap­i­tal case in which actu­al inno­cence was a close ques­tion. The state paid defense coun­sel $11.84 per hour. Unfortunately, the jus­tice sys­tem got only what it paid for.[62]

Another man who was freed from death row this past year in Texas was Muneer Deeb. Deeb said he was poor­ly rep­re­sent­ed at his first tri­al. At his re-tri­al, how­ev­er, he was rep­re­sent­ed by one of Texas’ best known crim­i­nal attor­neys, Dick DeGuerin, and was acquit­ted of all charges. [63] Other death row inmates who may also be inno­cent are not so fortunate. 

Post-Trial Representation: A Desperate Situation

Access to the appeals process is crit­i­cal to spar­ing the lives of those who are mis­tak­en­ly sen­tenced to death. Former Texas death row inmates like Randall Dale Adams, Clarence Brandley, Federico Macias, and Muneer Deeb were extreme­ly for­tu­nate that oth­ers became inter­est­ed in their cas­es and helped them attain free­dom. But Texas has severe­ly lim­it­ed that access by not pro­vid­ing attor­neys dur­ing crit­i­cal appeal stages. And most recent­ly, the state has even pushed for exe­cu­tions pri­or to the com­ple­tion of a defendant’s appeals.

Death row inmates are enti­tled to rep­re­sen­ta­tion for only one direct state appeal of their con­vic­tion or sen­tence. After that appeal, Texas gen­er­al­ly pro­vides no attor­ney for sub­se­quent appeals. Unless some court grants a stay, exe­cu­tion war­rants can be signed and car­ried out despite the fact that an inmate might have sig­nif­i­cant issues requir­ing state and federal review.

With respect to this peri­od of post-con­vic­tion rep­re­sen­ta­tion, the Spangenberg Report found that:

[T]he sit­u­a­tion in Texas can only be described as des­per­ate. The vol­ume of cas­es is over­whelm­ing. Presently no funds are allo­cat­ed for pay­ment of coun­sel or lit­i­ga­tion expens­es at the state habeas lev­el.[64]

Whereas most oth­er states have a sys­tem for appoint­ing and com­pen­sat­ing attor­neys after the direct appeal is over, [65] Texas leaves this impor­tant step to the dis­cre­tion of the local judge. In almost every case, no attor­ney is appoint­ed for state post-con­vic­tion relief, and those who do the legal work do it with­out pay. Similarly, funds for expert wit­ness­es and expens­es are almost nev­er approved. [66]

With the defen­dant unrep­re­sent­ed, local pros­e­cu­tors have recent­ly begun to push for exe­cu­tions, and some local judges are no longer grant­i­ng stays until an attor­ney can be found. The dan­ger­ous con­se­quences of this pro­ce­dure were seen in the recent case of Lesley Lee Gosch, who was sched­uled to die just after mid­night on September 16, 1993 and who had no attor­ney. Despite the fact that the Texas Attorney General’s office acknowl­edged that Gosch still had legit­i­mate appeals to pur­sue, the pros­e­cu­tion per­suad­ed fed­er­al District Judge Hippo Garcia to refuse a stay of exe­cu­tion, which was just hours away.

As time was run­ning out, the Texas Resource Center told Judge Garcia that an attor­ney had been found to rep­re­sent Gosch. The Judge still refused to stay the exe­cu­tion and instead appoint­ed the Resource Center to rep­re­sent Gosch. Finally, just 25 min­utes before the exe­cu­tion, with the inmate already being pre­pared for the lethal injec­tion, Judge Garcia relent­ed and grant­ed a stay because, he said, new unre­solved legal ques­tions deserved review.[67] Jay Jacobson, Executive Director of the ACLU of Texas, sharply crit­i­cized this unnec­es­sar­i­ly close call: Texas jus­tice is in mor­tal dan­ger of revert­ing back to the speedy vig­i­lan­tism of Roy Bean; a rush to judg­ment in place of jus­tice.” [68]

In response to this cri­sis, the Texas Resource Center recent­ly brought a case before the U.S. Supreme Court to clar­i­fy the fed­er­al courts’ author­i­ty to stay exe­cu­tions while attor­neys are being found to prop­er­ly pre­pare death row appeals. [69] In an ami­cus curi­ae brief filed sup­port­ing the Resource Center’s posi­tion, the American Bar Association called Texas’ attempt­ed denial of an oppor­tu­ni­ty to appeal a per­verse process” which effec­tive­ly nul­li­fies the Great Writ” of habeas cor­pus. [70]

Thus, the death penal­ty in Texas is caught in a spiraling crisis:

  • The vol­ume of cas­es in Texas which has reached the post-con­vic­tion stage sur­pass­es that of any oth­er state and is exhaust­ing the sup­ply of vol­un­teer attor­neys from Texas and around the country.
  • No state funds are avail­able for car­ry­ing on the appeals nec­es­sary to pre­vent an inmate’s exe­cu­tion, thus dis­cour­ag­ing attor­neys who might rep­re­sent death row inmates. [71]
  • With the defen­dant unrep­re­sent­ed, the state push­es ahead for exe­cu­tions. Death war­rants are signed, putting prospec­tive vol­un­teer attor­neys under more pres­sure and cre­at­ing even more reluc­tance to take these cases.

The Texas Resource Center

In response to the inad­e­quate sys­tem of rep­re­sen­ta­tion for death row inmates in Texas, rep­re­sen­ta­tives from the University of Texas School of Law and a com­mit­tee of attor­neys con­cerned about the cri­sis pro­posed a resource cen­ter to recruit and train vol­un­teer attor­neys to han­dle death penal­ty cas­es after the direct appeal. The Texas Resource Center was cre­at­ed in 1988 and receives the bulk of its fund­ing from the fed­er­al gov­ern­men­t’s Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.

With over 360 peo­ple on death row and with new cas­es being con­stant­ly added to the list, there is no way that the 16 attor­neys of the Resource Center can rep­re­sent even a sig­nif­i­cant pro­por­tion of the appeals. The Resource Center recent­ly esti­mat­ed that more than 75 death row inmates in Texas had no rep­re­sen­ta­tion, many of whom were sched­uled for exe­cu­tion with­in 5 weeks.[72] Much of the Center’s efforts go into recruit­ing and assist­ing coun­sel from other

states who agree to rep­re­sent Texas’ death row inmates. Despite Texas’ rel­a­tive­ly high rate of exe­cu­tions, the sit­u­a­tion would be much graver with­out the Resource Center. The Spangenberg Report con­clud­ed that the Resource Center’s staff pro­vides an invalu­able array of ser­vices under tru­ly unique pres­sures and cir­cum­stances.” [73] They are not staffed, how­ev­er, to fill all the gaps cre­at­ed by Texas’ fail­ure to appoint and pay coun­sel in capital cases.

Not sur­pris­ing­ly, the Resource Center’s pur­suit of legal rep­re­sen­ta­tion and their suc­cess in stop­ping many exe­cu­tions has drawn reac­tions from pros­e­cu­tors and politi­cians intent on an expe­di­tious­ly func­tion­ing death penal­ty. There have been attempts to dis­cred­it the Resource Center in the media and to have Congress with­draw its fund­ing. [74] These chal­lenges have, in turn, been met by promi­nent mem­bers of the Texas Bar, some of whom serve on the Board of Directors of the Resource Center.[75] The dis­pute illus­trates the high­ly polit­i­cal nature of the death penal­ty in Texas.

The Pressure to Execute: A Chronology 

  • February 17 Federal District Court judge grants a stay to hear con­sti­tu­tion­al claims regard­ing the exe­cu­tion of an innocent person.
  • February 18 Texas Attorney General’s office obtains a Circuit Court order vacat­ing the stay on the grounds that a claim of inno­cence is irrel­e­vant in federal court.
  • 9:30 PM Defense attempts to obtain anoth­er stay of exe­cu­tion from the state or federal courts.
  • 10:00 PM Request for stay filed with U.S. Supreme Court.
  • 12:05 AM Defense checks with local weath­er sta­tion regard­ing the exact time of sun­rise: Texas law requires that the exe­cu­tion take place before sun­rise on the appointed day.
  • 1:00 AM Supreme Court rejects stay by vote of 5 – 4.
  • 4:30 AM Supreme Court again refus­es to stay exe­cu­tion but indi­cates it will enter­tain a request to review the issue of exe­cut­ing the innocent.
  • 4:35 AM State of Texas informs attor­neys that it will begin the lethal injec­tion of Herrera in 30 min­utes if a stay is not in place.
  • 4:35 – 6:20 AM Frantic efforts to obtain a stay from state and fed­er­al courts; two mem­bers of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and a fed­er­al District Court judge agree to stay exe­cu­tion so the Supreme Court can hear the case; Texas Attorney General attempts to have stays vacat­ed; State court stay upheld.
  • 6:20 – 6:55 AM Silence regard­ing Herrera’s status.
  • 7:00 AM Clerk of Supreme Court announces that state court stay is valid.
  • 7:08 AM Texas sun­rise: no exe­cu­tion. [76]

Leonel Herrera’s case was even­tu­al­ly argued before the Supreme Court eight months lat­er, in October 1992. He argued that he should be giv­en a hear­ing to review new evi­dence of his inno­cence and that it would be uncon­sti­tu­tion­al to exe­cute some­one who was inno­cent. Witnesses, includ­ing a for­mer Texas judge, revealed that Herrera’s broth­er had actu­al­ly con­fessed to the crime. A deci­sion was reached on January 25, 1993, with Herrera los­ing on a vote of 6 – 3. Herrera was exe­cut­ed on May 12, 1993.

National Implications: The Crisis in Representation 

The cri­sis in death penal­ty rep­re­sen­ta­tion is start­ing to spread to oth­er death penal­ty states as well. Because of the num­ber of peo­ple on Texas’ death row and the rate at which those peo­ple are now being processed for exe­cu­tion, the prob­lem in Texas is more acute than in oth­er places. But the size of the nation­al death row is also increas­ing rapid­ly: at

least 250 peo­ple are sen­tenced to death each year and oth­er states are expe­ri­enc­ing both a short­age of attor­neys and a short­age of funds to pay for the death penalty.

A six month study by The National Law Journal of death penal­ty rep­re­sen­ta­tion in the south concluded:

Southern jus­tice in cap­i­tal mur­der tri­als is more like a ran­dom flip of the coin than a del­i­cate bal­anc­ing of the scales. Who will live and who will die is decid­ed not just by the nature of the crime com­mit­ted but equal­ly by the skills of the defense lawyer appoint­ed by the court. And in the nation’s Death Belt, that lawyer too often is ill-trained, unpre­pared and gross­ly under­paid.[77]

The study found high dis­bar­ment rates for attor­neys who rep­re­sent­ed death row inmates, wide­spread inex­pe­ri­ence among those appoint­ed to cap­i­tal cas­es, and whol­ly unre­al­is­tic caps on the funds avail­able for defense. With lim­its on attor­neys’ fees of $1,000 in states like Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi, lawyers offer­ing even min­i­mal rep­re­sen­ta­tion were work­ing for $5 an hour.[78] Such mea­ger pay obvi­ous­ly can affect performance.

In Tennessee, a state not includ­ed in the Law Journal study, it is not uncom­mon for tri­al attor­neys to spend less than 100 hours prepar­ing a cap­i­tal case, while it typ­i­cal­ly takes over 1,000 hours in oth­er states. In two death row cas­es, the attor­neys spent 10 and 16 hours respec­tive­ly prepar­ing for tri­al. [79]In 17 Tennessee cas­es, no mit­i­ga­tion evi­dence what­so­ev­er was offered dur­ing the penal­ty phase of the tri­al. Under Tennessee law, if no mit­i­ga­tion evi­dence is pre­sent­ed, the court is com­pelled to direct a sen­tence of death, assum­ing the pros­e­cu­tor has pre­sent­ed aggra­vat­ing cir­cum­stances.[80]Tennessee has one of the low­est com­pen­sa­tion rates for indi­gent defense in the coun­try: $20/​hr. for out-of-court time and $30/​hr in-court. [81]

In con­trast, the state of Ohio allowed $40,000 for two attor­neys in cap­i­tal cas­es. [82] In California, attor­neys are paid about $75 an hour and total fees often exceed $100,000 just for the appel­late work. [83] But even in California, which recent­ly sur­passed Texas as the state with the largest death row, near­ly a third of those on death row lack lawyers for their appeals. [84]

In Georgia 60 of the 80 peo­ple on death row who have gone beyond their direct appeals are being rep­re­sent­ed by lawyers from out­side the state. Many [Georgia] firms view defend­ing a per­son on death row as polit­i­cal­ly unpop­u­lar, bad pub­lic rela­tions and bad busi­ness,” said Robert Remar, who heads a state bar com­mit­tee to cor­rect the prob­lem. [85]

Ronald Tabak, chair of the ABA’s Individual Rights and Responsibilities death penal­ty com­mit­tee, said that the sit­u­a­tion is get­ting mate­ri­al­ly worse because demand for lawyers is grow­ing sub­stan­tial­ly as the num­ber of inmates mov­ing into state post-con­vic­tion and fed­er­al habeas pro­ceed­ings is increas­ing.”[86] States like California, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Illinois, with bulging death rows but few exe­cu­tions so far, are a warn­ing that the cri­sis in death penal­ty rep­re­sen­ta­tion will soon be spreading. 

Clemency in Texas Top

The U.S. Supreme Court recent­ly ruled in the Herrera case that a defen­dant with a claim of inno­cence still has the oppor­tu­ni­ty to apply for exec­u­tive clemen­cy. [87] Even though Texas has by far the most death row inmates who have reached the end of their appeals and whose last chance for relief lies with the gov­er­nor, there have been no com­mu­ta­tions grant­ed at a defen­dan­t’s request since the death penal­ty was rein­stat­ed. [88] Texas has refused clemen­cy in one case where it was request­ed by the pros­e­cu­tor and by the father of the vic­tim, [89] and in anoth­er case where it was even request­ed by the Pope. [90] Clemencies have been rare in oth­er states as well, but most of those states have had few inmates who had exhaust­ed all their appeals and sought clemency.

The case of Gary Graham, dis­cussed above, is test­ing the seri­ous­ness of Texas’ clemen­cy pro­ce­dure. Graham was con­vict­ed and sen­tenced to death on the basis of one eye­wit­ness who viewed him only from a dis­tance at night. New evi­dence indi­cat­ing that Graham may be inno­cent has emerged, but it has been barred by Texas pro­ce­dur­al rules which for­bid intro­duc­ing new evi­dence more than 30 days after a con­vic­tion. [91]

Graham was denied clemen­cy and the Pardon Board did not even meet to hear his evi­dence. He has filed a suit claim­ing that his due process rights have been vio­lat­ed because he was not giv­en a hear­ing by the Pardon Board. The Graham case tests whether there is any sub­stance to Texas’ clemen­cy process. Texas courts are still con­sid­er­ing whether the Board will be required to hold the hear­ing and pos­si­bly spare Graham’s life. But regard­less of the out­come in Graham’s case, clemen­cy in Texas has not been the safe­ty-valve rec­om­mend­ed by the High Court.

National Implications: Clemency

With respect to clemen­cy, the extreme hes­i­tan­cy of gov­er­nors to uti­lize this process in death penal­ty cas­es is also a nation­al prob­lem. Clemency used to be grant­ed more lib­er­al­ly by gov­er­nors in cap­i­tal cas­es. Prior to the Furman deci­sion in 1972, com­mu­ta­tions were grant­ed in approx­i­mate­ly one in five death sen­tenced cas­es. The cur­rent rate is rough­ly one out of forty. [92] The increased politi­ciza­tion of the death penal­ty has meant that a gov­er­nor could suf­fer a sharp decline in pop­u­lar­i­ty for grant­i­ng a com­mu­ta­tion.[93] Indeed, of the 31 clemen­cies grant­ed since 1972, more than half were by gov­er­nors as they were leav­ing office. [94]

Thus, despite the Supreme Court’s assur­ances that clemen­cy exists as a pro­tec­tion against exe­cut­ing an inno­cent per­son, it has nev­er been used in Texas, or most oth­er death penal­ty states, since 1972. As long as the issue of cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment is thought of as a lit­mus test for politi­cians to attain and retain office, the prospect of clemen­cy for any death row inmate will remain dim. 

Texas Crime and the State’s Response Top

The word cri­sis’ is used far too often in pol­i­tics and gov­ern­ment — but a cri­sis is pre­cise­ly what Texas faces today.

The Texas crim­i­nal jus­tice sys­tem is fail­ing.

–Report from the Texas Office of the Comptroller [95]

Closely inter­twined with the death penal­ty is the broad­er response which a state makes to the prob­lem of crime. Not sur­pris­ing­ly, the tur­moil exhib­it­ed in Texas’ admin­is­tra­tion of the death penal­ty is reflect­ed in an even larg­er cri­sis with crime. In the same peri­od in which Texas moved from its first exe­cu­tion in 1982 to become the undis­put­ed leader in the use of the death penal­ty, the state also expe­ri­enced a tremen­dous growth in its vio­lent crime rate. From 1982 to 1991, the nation­al crime rate rose by 5%. In the same peri­od, the Texas crime rate rose by 24%, and the vio­lent crime rate in Texas rose by near­ly 46%. In 1990, Texas earned the dubi­ous dis­tinc­tion of being the first state in which more peo­ple died from gun­shot wounds than from traf­fic acci­dents. [96] In 1991, Texas’ over­all crime rate was third in the nation, and its mur­der rate was the second highest.

But the prob­lems in Texas go far beyond mere crime sta­tis­tics. A recent report from the Texas Office of the Comptroller point­ed to a larg­er cri­sis in the state’s response to crime:

[D]espite the need for real solu­tions, pub­lic debate over crime in Texas revolves around hol­low calls for the state to become tougher.” In fact, this is a call for the sta­tus quo — for more of the same, only more so. It is a call for a con­tin­u­ing cycle of cyn­i­cal quick fix­es and stop-gap mea­sures, for cost­ly prison con­struc­tion that can­not keep pace with the demand for new prison space — for a con­stant drain on state and local trea­suries that make Texas tax­pay­ers poor­er, not safer.[97]

The death penal­ty is pre­cise­ly one of those quick fix­es” that drain the tax­pay­ers’ mon­ey. A 1992 study by the Dallas Morning News report­ed that each death penal­ty case, fol­lowed through to the fed­er­al appeal, is cost­ing tax­pay­ers $2.3 mil­lion. That is in line with the costs that oth­er states have pro­ject­ed. New York esti­mat­ed that each cap­i­tal case would cost $1.8 mil­lion, with­out includ­ing costs past the direct appeal. Florida cal­cu­lat­ed the cost of each exe­cu­tion to be about $3.2 mil­lion. [98]

With over 70 exe­cu­tions since 1976 and close to 400 oth­er peo­ple wait­ing on death row, Texas has like­ly spent sev­er­al hun­dred mil­lion dol­lars on the death penal­ty, far more than it would have if there were no death penal­ty and peo­ple were sen­tenced to life imprisonment.

As a response to crime, then, the death penal­ty is exceed­ing­ly expen­sive and focus­es on only a tiny frac­tion of the prob­lem. Nevertheless, politi­cians through­out Texas have con­sis­tent­ly seized on the death penal­ty as an answer to vio­lence. They have pushed the death penal­ty at every pos­si­ble turn and have lashed out at any­one oppos­ing them. But when the caus­es of crime are root­ed in guns, gangs, drugs, and the dete­ri­o­ra­tion of the social fab­ric, cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment offers noth­ing in the way of a solution. 

The Winds of Change

Crime was rec­og­nized as a para­mount prob­lem in Texas well before nation­al media atten­tion began to focus on crime. In the 1990 guber­na­to­r­i­al race, the can­di­dates tripped over each oth­er in an effort to look tougher in their respons­es to vio­lence. The death penal­ty became the lead­ing sym­bol of tough­ness. In fact, pop­ulist Democrat Jim Hightower described the cam­paign as a race to see who could kill the most Texans.” [99] The rapid rise in the pace of exe­cu­tions in Texas also began in 1990, but now dis­sat­is­fac­tion with both the process and the results is start­ing to emerge.

Jim Mattox, the for­mer Attorney General of Texas who over­saw 36 exe­cu­tions in the state, was one of the can­di­dates for gov­er­nor who cam­paigned on his sup­port for the death penal­ty. But cas­es like Gary Graham’s and Clarence Brandley’s, which raised the prospect of inno­cent peo­ple being exe­cut­ed, have giv­en him second thoughts.

For one thing, Mattox does­n’t believe the death penal­ty is a deter­rent to crime: It is my own expe­ri­ence that those exe­cut­ed in Texas were not deterred by the exis­tence of the death penal­ty law,” he said.[100] I think in most cas­es you’ll find that the mur­der was com­mit­ted under severe drug and alco­hol abuse.” [101]

As an alter­na­tive to the death penal­ty, he sug­gests a sen­tence of life with­out parole, which oth­er Texas pros­e­cu­tors have resist­ed so far: Life with­out parole could save mil­lions of dol­lars,” said Mattox. It cur­rent­ly costs three times as much — more than $2 mil­lion per inmate — to car­ry out the death sen­tence than to keep an inmate in prison for 40 years.”

In oth­er words,” he wrote, it’s cheap­er to lock em up and throw away the key .… As vio­lent crime con­tin­ues to esca­late, it’s some­thing to con­sid­er.” [102]

Others in law enforce­ment agree. Norman Kinne, First Assistant District Attorney of Dallas County, praised a new Texas law which allowed sen­tences for life with no pos­si­bil­i­ty of parole for 35 years (now 40) [103]: I think we can take more vio­lent offend­ers out of soci­ety for longer peri­ods of time with less expense to the tax­pay­ers.”[104]

He point­ed out that the new law can also bring a sense of final­i­ty to the vic­tim’s fam­i­ly: On a death penal­ty case, I can’t ever tell them they won’t have to come back and live it all over again. This can go on ad nau­se­am.” But under the new life sen­tence law, there’s a final­i­ty to all this.” [105]

On anoth­er occa­sion he said:

Even though I’m a firm believ­er in the death penal­ty, I also under­stand what the cost is. If you can be sat­is­fied with putting a per­son in the pen­i­ten­tiary for the rest of his life … I think maybe we have to be sat­is­fied with that as opposed to spend­ing $1 mil­lion to try and get them exe­cut­ed.”[106]

Dr. George Beto, who head­ed the Texas prison sys­tem for ten years, also favors the death penal­ty in the­o­ry but oppos­es it in prac­tice. He has clear­ly rec­og­nized some of the prob­lems with the appli­ca­tion of cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment: “[I]n a demo­c­ra­t­ic soci­ety like ours, the death penal­ty is capri­cious­ly and inequitably admin­is­tered. Whether a per­son is con­vict­ed depends on the qual­i­ty of his defense, the hys­te­ria of the moment in the com­mu­ni­ty and the cul­ture.”[107]

And in Washington, some of Texas’ Congressional del­e­ga­tion have been lead­ing the way towards alter­na­tives to the death penal­ty. Rep. Craig Washington (D‑TX) has spear­head­ed the effort to present an alter­na­tive fed­er­al crime bill which excludes the death penal­ty and empha­sizes a range of pos­i­tive respons­es to crime, and Rep. Henry Gonzalez (D‑TX) is the peren­ni­al spon­sor of a con­sti­tu­tion­al amend­ment to end the death penalty altogether.

Meanwhile, juries in Texas are also begin­ning to see things dif­fer­ent­ly, espe­cial­ly with the avail­abil­i­ty of longer guar­an­teed sen­tences. Formerly, crim­i­nals in Texas were serv­ing only 20% of their sen­tence and some of those with life sen­tences were released after only five years. [108] Now that life can mean no parole for 35 – 40 years, juries have real alter­na­tives to a death sen­tence. Dallas County District Attorneys, for exam­ple, used to have a per­fect record when seek­ing the death penal­ty. But three of the past six cap­i­tal cas­es have end­ed in life sen­tences. Sometimes it makes you think the pub­lic isn’t 100 per­cent with you,” said Assistant District Attorney Hugh Lucas, who recent­ly lost” a cap­i­tal case when it end­ed in a life sen­tence for Anthony Hampton. [109]

National Implications: The Crime Problem

The issue of vio­lent crime has now reached nation­al promi­nence as well. Politicians all over the coun­try have been using the head­lines of crime to pro­mote the death penal­ty as a quick fix solu­tion. If the peo­ple buy this pro­mo­tion as they did in Texas, then it is like­ly that oth­er states will match Texas’ high rate of exe­cu­tions. The fed­er­al gov­ern­ment, for exam­ple, has increased death penal­ty pros­e­cu­tions and is seek­ing ways to great­ly expand their role as a response to the nation­al prob­lem of vio­lence. States like New York, Kansas, and Alaska have all been con­sid­er­ing rein­stat­ing capital punishment.

On the oth­er hand, states that have used cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment exten­sive­ly, like Texas, have been beset with its prob­lems. The death penal­ty has failed to reduce the num­ber of mur­ders, it has proved enor­mous­ly expen­sive, and there con­tin­ues to be the uncom­fort­ably present dan­ger of exe­cut­ing an inno­cent indi­vid­ual. As a result of these prob­lems, some states are rely­ing more on the alter­na­tive of life sen­tences with severe restric­tions on parole.[110] The polit­i­cal tug of war between more and faster exe­cu­tions on the one hand, and more effi­cient and effec­tive ways of reduc­ing crime on the oth­er, is a bat­tle rag­ing in the entire nation, as well as in Texas. 

Conclusion: Foreshadowing a National Crisis Top

The death penal­ty in Texas is in a state of cri­sis. Even more alarm­ing, how­ev­er, is the prospect that what is hap­pen­ing in Texas will be hap­pen­ing across the coun­try if the U.S. expands its use of the death penal­ty. The size of the nation­al death row, the will­ing­ness of the courts to accept the prac­tices uti­lized in Texas, the increas­ing pace of exe­cu­tions, the pub­lic’s con­cern about crime — all indi­cate that the use of the death penal­ty could become as com­mon nation­wide as it is in Texas.

On the oth­er hand, the prob­lems in imple­ment­ing the death penal­ty in Texas are a warn­ing to the rest of the coun­try that it is wad­ing into a swamp that it should avoid. The death penal­ty skews the process of pros­e­cu­tion and leads to offi­cial abuse. The death penal­ty has also been a sym­bol of racial divi­sion. As the num­bers of exe­cu­tions begins to rise, the impact of these injus­tices will force itself more clear­ly into our consciousness.

Similarly, the costs of the death penal­ty are not a prob­lem only in Texas. As thou­sands of cas­es move into the lat­er stages of appeal and as more and more peo­ple are added to death row every year, the costs will become greater and the strain on oth­er crime fight­ing pro­grams will become more severe. It is clear even to pro­po­nents of cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment that this expan­sion of the death penal­ty will mean that hard choic­es must be made between pre­ven­tive meth­ods of law enforce­ment and more cost­ly and ineffectual executions.

Furthermore, the cri­sis in death penal­ty rep­re­sen­ta­tion, which is close­ly relat­ed to the prob­lem of costs, augurs poor­ly for the coun­try as a whole. What is a cri­sis in Texas because of the num­bers involved and the scarci­ty of qual­i­fied coun­sel will­ing to take these cas­es, will become a nation­al prob­lem as the num­ber of inmates approach­ing exe­cu­tion con­tin­ues to grow.

Such a death penal­ty may not be accept­able to the American pub­lic. Moreover, such a death penal­ty may not meet the stan­dards of the High Court, which set this exper­i­ment in motion 18 years ago. That exper­i­ment, as Justices Marshall and Blackmun have point­ed out, has so far estab­lished that the death penal­ty remains arbi­trary and capri­cious. Texas has been the nation’s cru­cible for this exper­i­ment with the death penal­ty, and the results of this exper­i­ment should speak vol­umes to those who choose to listen.

Sources

[1]. Speech at Annual Dinner in Honor of the Judiciary, American Bar Association, 1990, quot­ed in The National Law Journal, Feb. 81993.

[2]. Callins v. Collins, No. 93 – 7054, slip opin., at 4 (Feb. 22, 1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

[3]. Projections based on Texas pop­u­la­tion of 17.66 mil­lion and United States pop­u­la­tion of 259 mil­lion. The cost pro­jec­tion was based on a cost of $2 mil­lion per exe­cu­tion and a nation­al pro­jec­tion of 1,027 exe­cu­tions. See, e.g., P. Cook & D. Slawson, The Costs of Processing Murder Cases in North Carolina (Duke University, May, 1993), at 1 (“the extra cost … per exe­cu­tion exceeds $2 million.”)

[4]. See note 1.

[5]. See Millions Misspent: What Politicians Don’t Say About the High Costs of the Death Penalty, The Death Penalty Information Center, October 1992, at 13.

[6]. M. Radelet, H. Bedau, & C. Putnam, In Spite of Innocence 71 – 72 (1992).

[7]. Id. at 133.

[8]. Id. at 134 (empha­sis added).

[9]. Texas Penal Code Art. 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon’s 1985).

[10]. Since exe­cu­tions were cen­tral­ized at one state facil­i­ty in 1924, Texas has not exe­cut­ed any women. There are, how­ev­er, four women cur­rent­ly on Texas’ death row. Since defen­dants in cap­i­tal cas­es are almost exclu­sive­ly male, the male pro­nouns will some­times be used in a generic sense.

[11]. See R. Rosenbaum, Travels With Dr. Death, Vanity Fair, May, 1990, at 142.

[12]. Rodriguez v. Texas, tri­al tran­script, p. 2136 (1978), quot­ed in J. Marquart, et al., Gazing Into The Crystal Ball: Can Jurors Accurately Predict Dangerousness in Capital Cases?, 23 Law & Society Review 449, 458 (1989).

[13]. See R. Rosenbaum, note 11, at 142.

[14]. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (ami­cus curiae brief).

[15]. Marquart, et al., note 12, at 464.

[16]. See id. at 457.

[17]. Although the defense can offer their own experts to refute such claims that the defen­dant will be a dan­ger to soci­ety, they are at a dis­tinct dis­ad­van­tage for two rea­sons. First, the defense is severe­ly lim­it­ed in the funds avail­able for such experts. Secondly, even if a psy­chi­a­trist could be found who would pre­dict with absolute cer­taint­ly that some­one would not be a dan­ger in the future, the jury is less like­ly to believe that claim since it has already con­vict­ed the defen­dant in the underlying crime.

[18]. R. Suro, Impact of a Pathologist’s Misconduct Ripples Through West Texas Courts, The New York Times, Nov. 22, 1992, at 22.

[19]. Id.

[20]. R. Fricker, Pathologist’s Plea Adds to Turmoil, American Bar Association Journal, Mar. 1993, at 24.

[21]. G. Simmons, Judge Condemn’s Ware’s Tactics, The Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, Mar. 5, 1993, at 1 (empha­sis added).

[22]. V. Salazar, Parties Settle Federal Suit, The Globe News, April 19, 1993, at 1A.

[23]. R. Suro, note 18, at 22.

[24]. Innocence and the Death Penatly: Assessing the Danger of Mistaken Executions, Staff Report by the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Committee on the Judiciary (1993) (reprint avail­able from the Death Penalty Information Center).

[25]. M. Curriden, No Honor Among Thieves, American Bar Association Journal, June, 1989, at 54 (quot­ing Janet Reno).

[26]. Walter McMillian (Ala.), Federico Macias (Tex.), Muneer Deeb (Tex.), Kirk Bloodsworth (Md.), and Gregory Wilhoit (Ok.).

[27]. See P. Applebome, Black Man Freed After Years on Death Row, The New York Times, Mar. 3, 1993, at A1.

[28]. Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 173 (1986).

[29]. See P. Valentine, Jailed for Murder, Freed by DNA, The Washington Post, June 29, 1993, at A1.

[30]. A Reno Reform, The Washington Post, Dec. 20, 1993 (edi­to­r­i­al).

[31]. See, e.g., Justice Blackmun’s com­ments on ABC-TV’s Nightline, in which he said that he believed inno­cent peo­ple have been exe­cut­ed dur­ing his term. Transcript, ABC-TV News, Nightline, Nov. 181993.

[32]. M. Radelet, Executions of Whites for Crimes Against Blacks: Exceptions to the Rule?, 30 The Sociological Quarterly 529, 530 (1989) (cit­ing B. Botkin, A Treasury of American Folklore (1944)).

[33]. N. Davies, White Lies: Rape, Murder, and Justice Texas Style 23 (1991) (the sto­ry of Clarence Brandley’s con­vic­tion and even­tu­al exon­er­a­tion for a mur­der in Texas).

[34]. J. Floyd & S. Crawford, Skinhead Gets Probation in Murder of Black Man, The Dallas Morning News, Mar. 24, 1993, at 1A.

[35]. See, e.g., N. Hentoff, Death and Reasonable Doubt in Texas, The Washington Post, May 291993.

[36]. J. Marquart, S. Ekland-Olson, & J. Sorensen, The Rope, The Chair, and The Needle: Capital Punishment in Texas, 1923 – 1990 21 – 221994).

[37]. Id. at 24.

[38]. Id.

[39]. Id. at 65.

[40]. Id. at 6.

[41]. See id. at 4 & 6, maps 1.1 & 1.2.

[42]. Id. at 14 – 15.

[43]. Id. at 15.

[44]. Id.

[45]. See J. Sorenson & J. Marquart, Prosecutorial and Jury Decison-Making in Post-Furman Texas Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. Review of Law & Social Change 743, 765 – 72 (1990 – 91).

[46]. Marquart, et al., note 36, at 169.

[47]. See Criminal Justice Trends in Texas: Overview by Race, Criminal Justice Policy Council of Texas, at 2 (April, 1992) (1991 rates).

[48]. Id. at 8.

[49]. See, e.g., S. LaFraniere, FBI Finds Major Increase in Juvenile Violence in Past Decade, The Washington Post, Aug. 30, 1992, at A13 (half of U.S. mur­der vic­tims are black).

[50]. See D. Margolick, White Dies for Killing Black, For the First Time in Decades, The New York Times, Sept. 71991.

[51]. U.S. General Accounting Office, Death Penalty Sentencing, February, 1990, at 5 (empha­sis added).

[52]. See Racial Disparities in Federal Death Penalty Prosecutions, 1988 – 1994, Staff Report by the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civi and Constitutional Rights (March, 1994) (reprint avail­able from Death Penalty Information Center).

[53]. Callins v. Collins, No. 93 – 7054, slip opin. at 4 (Feb. 22, 1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

[54]. See Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1989) (Romero was exe­cut­ed in 1992), cit­ed in National Law Journal, see note 56, at 34.

[55]. Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 979 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1992) (Macias was freed in 1993).

[56]. Fatal Defense, National Law Journal, June 11, 1990, at 34.

[57]. See Hafdahl v. Texas, 69,646 (Texas Crim. App., 1988), cit­ed in Fatal Defense, note 56, at 34.

[58]. The Spangenberg Group, A Study of Representation of Capital Cases in Texas, at 4 & 152 (March, 1993) (empha­sis added) [here­inafter Spangenberg].

[59]. Id. at 14 – 15.

[60]. State fund­ing pays the salaries of the pri­ma­ry dis­trict or coun­ty felony pros­e­cu­tor … and pro­vides cash sup­ple­ments for par­tial fund­ing of assis­tants’ salaries and oth­er expens­es.” Texas Crime, Texas Justice 49, Office of the Comptroller (Sept., 1992). There is also an Office of the State Prosecuting Attorney to rep­re­sent the State’s inter­ests in the Court of Criminal Appeals. Id. at 47.

[61]. Spangenberg, note 58, at vi (Major Findings).

[62]. Martinez-Macias, note 55, 979 F.2d at 1067.

[63]. B. Kessler, Fighting the System, The Dallas Morning News, Nov. 4, 1993, at 1A.

[64]. Spangenberg, note 58, at ii (empha­sis added).

[65]. Id. at 127.

[66]. Id. at vii.

[67]. M. Graczyk, Death Row Inmate’s Lawyers Had Close Call, The Dallas Morning News, Sept. 18, 1993, at 26A.

[68]. ACLU press release, Sept. 16, 1993 (on file with Death Penalty Information Center).

[69]. See McFarland v. Collins, No. 93 – 1954, on Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Cir. (argu­ment Mar. 291994).

[70]. Id., Brief of the American Bar Association, at 7.

[71]. Federal funds are avail­able for indi­gent defen­dants in fed­er­al habeas cor­pus pro­ceed­ings. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 21 U.S.C. SS 848 (1988). However, fed­er­al pro­ce­dure requires that an inmate first exhaust all pos­si­ble state reme­dies. Thus, lack of funds and attor­neys at the state lev­el direct­ly affects what, if any­thing, can be accom­plished at the federal level.

[72]. C. Hoppe, Center Sees Crisis in Shortage of Public Defenders for Death Row, The Dallas Morning News, Oct. 271993.

[73]. Spangenberg, note 58, at 9.

[74]. See, e.g., R. Walt, Ending the Death Penalty Chaos, Texas Lawyer, Dec. 6, 1993, at 20 (quot­ing for­mer Assistant Texas Attorney General: Unlike any gov­ern­men­tal enti­ty, as best as can be deter­mined the [Texas Resource] cen­ter is answer­able to nobody.”); S. Warren, Taking Offense at Death Row Defense, Houston Chronicle, Nov. 7, 1993, at 20A (“Prosecutors, though, were in a lousy mood, com­plain­ing of more trou­ble, more stress and more frus­tra­tion in their jobs than ever before. Accusing fin­gers point­ed in one direc­tion: the Texas Resource Center.”).

[75]. See, e.g., C. Hoppe, note 72 (Resource Center has been respon­si­ble for prov­ing the inno­cence of a num­ber of peo­ple on death row but cur­rent surge of cas­es endan­gers ade­quate rep­re­sen­ta­tion); see also let­ter and accom­pa­ny­ing report to Meryl Silverman of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts from Edward Sherman, Chair of the Board of Directors of the Texas Resource Center, Oct. 29, 1993, on file with the Death Penalty Information Center; see also, Crisis in Representation of Texas Death Row Inmates, released by the Board of Directors of the Texas Resource Center, Oct. 251993.

[76]. Unpublished chronol­o­gy from Leonel Herrera’s defense attor­neys on file with the Death Penalty Information Center (Feb. 201992).

[77]. Fatal Defense, The National Law Journal, June 11, 1990, at 1.

[78]. Id. at 33.

[79]. W. Redick, The Crisis in Representation of Tennessee Capital Cases, Tennessee Bar Journal, Mar./April, 1993, at 23.

[80]. Id. at 24.

[81]. Id. at 25.

[82]. Id. at 32.

[83]. M. Coyle, Death Counsel Shortage Grows, The National Law Journal, Sept. 27, 1993, at 346.

[84]. R. Smothers, A Shortage of Lawyers to Help the Condemned, The New York Times, June 41993.

[85]. M. Curriden, Ga. Bar Calls on Local Lawyers, The National Law Journal, Dec. 6, 1993, at 3.

[86]. See M. Coyle, note 83, at 3.

[87]. See Herrera v. Collins, 113 S.Ct. 853 (1993).

[88]. There have been 36 com­mu­ta­tions grant­ed in Texas for the sake of judi­cial expe­di­en­cy when the death sen­tence has been over­turned by the courts. In Texas, the tri­al jury deter­mines the sen­tence of the defen­dant in cap­i­tal cas­es. If a mis­take was made in the sen­tenc­ing process, the whole case, includ­ing the guilt/​innocence phase, would have to be tried again before a new jury. To avoid this re-tri­al, when courts have dis­cov­ered errors in the sen­tenc­ing process, the state has fre­quent­ly asked the gov­er­nor for a com­mu­ta­tion of the death sen­tence to a life sen­tence, thus avoid­ing the neces­si­ty for a new tri­al and pos­si­ble exon­er­a­tion of the defen­dant. These should be dis­tin­guished from the cas­es in which the defen­dant requests clemen­cy. None have been grant­ed in this lat­ter cat­e­go­ry. See, e.g., M. Radelet & B. Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-Furman Capital Cases, 27 Univ. of Richmond Law Review 289, 293 – 94 (1993).

[89]. See Slayer of Store Manager Executed Despite Plea By Father of Victim, The New York Times, June 20, 1986, at A13, col. 1.

[90]. See Pope’s Plea Stops Execution, The New York Times, Jan. 8, 1992 (Johnny Frank Garrett was grant­ed a 30 day stay by the gov­er­nor, but was then exe­cut­ed on Feb. 111992).

[91]. A recent rul­ing by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals will allow Graham to peti­tion for a new tri­al based on new evi­dence. He will have to show that the new evi­dence shows that no ratio­nal tri­er of fact could find proof of guilt beyond a rea­son­able doubt.” See S. Verhovek, Texas Opens Door for Death-Row Appeals, The New York Times, April 211994.

[92]. M. Vandiver, The Quality of Mercy: Race and Clemency in Florida Death Penalty Cases, 1924 – 1966, 27 Univ. of Richmond Law Review 315, 315 n.2 (1993).

[93]. See, e.g., for­mer California Governor Pat Brown’s book, Public Justice, Private Mercy: A Governor’s Education on Death Row (1989) (with Dick Adler) for a dis­cus­sion of the polit­i­cal pres­sures surrounding clemency.

[94]. Governor Tony Anaya com­mut­ed all five death row inmates in New Mexico as he left office. Governor Celeste of Ohio com­mut­ed eight death sen­tences at the end of his term. Governor Wilder of Virginia com­mut­ed the sen­tence of Earl Washington in 1994 on his last full day in office.

[95]. See Texas Crime, Texas Justice, note 60, at 119.

[96]. Id. at 4. Also, “[f]or the sixth straight year, Texas was the most dead­ly state in which to be a law enforce­ment offi­cer.” C. Flournoy, Texas Tops Lethal List for Officers, The Dallas Morning News, Jan. 2, 1994, at 25A.

[97]. Id. at p.119 (empha­sis in original).

[98]. For a dis­cus­sion of the costs of the death penal­ty, cit­ing the cost stud­ies men­tioned, see Millions Misspent: What Politicians Don’t Say About the High Costs of the Death Penalty, The Death Penalty Information Center, October 1992.

[99]. See id. at 13.

[100]. R. Dugger, In the Dead of the Night, The Texas Observer, April 22, 1988, at 7.

[101]. Id.

[102]. J. Mattox, Texas’ Death Penalty Dilemma, The Dallas Morning News, Aug. 251993.

[103]. For crimes after Sept. 1, 1993, the sen­tence is no parole for 40 years. See S. Scott, Prosecutors Find Juries Balking at Death Penalty, The Dallas Morning News, Dec 26.,1993, at 42A.

[104]. D. Barber, Law Could Curb Texas Executions, The Dallas Morning News, April 18, 1993, at 35A37A.

[105]. Id. at 37A.

[106]. C. Hoppe, Executions Cost Texas Millions, The Dallas Morning News, Mar. 8, 1992, at 12A.

[107]. Texas Town Leading in Executions In a New U.S. Era of Death Penalty, The New York Times, Sept. 6, 1986, at 8, col. 4.

[108]. See, e.g., B. Denson, The Pros, Cons of Throwing Away Key, The Houston Post, July 14, 1991, at A‑1.

[109]. S. Scott, Prosecutors Find Juries Balking at Death Penalty, The Dallas Morning News, Dec. 26, 1993, at 41 – 42A.

[110]. See, e.g., Sentencing for Life: Americans Embrace Alternatives to the Death Penalty, Death Penalty Information Center, April, 1993, at 19 (decrease in death sen­tences in states giv­ing jurors the option of life without parole).