A State of Denial: Texas Justice and the Death Penalty Texas Defender Service*

Executive Summary

The nation is embroiled in a debate over the death penal­ty. Each day brings fresh accounts of racial bias, incom­pe­tent coun­sel, and mis­con­duct com­mit­ted by police offi­cers or pros­e­cu­tors in cap­i­tal cas­es. The pub­lic increas­ing­ly ques­tions whether the ulti­mate penal­ty can be admin­is­tered fair­ly — free from the taint of racism; free from the dis­grace of coun­sel sleep­ing through a clien­t’s tri­al; free from the risk of exe­cut­ing an inno­cent per­son. Support for the death penal­ty is falling, and across the coun­try, momen­tum gath­ers for a mora­to­ri­um. Even death penal­ty sup­port­ers — such as Illinois Governor George Ryan — have acknowl­edged the need for fundamental reform.

In Texas, the call for reform has been deflect­ed by state offi­cials’ aggres­sive defense of the Texas sys­tem. Repeatedly, Governor Bush and oth­ers have defend­ed the admin­is­tra­tion of the death penal­ty. Texas Attorney General John Cornyn has gone so far as to describe the death penal­ty in Texas as a mod­el for the nation.”

This report chal­lenges that con­fi­dent assess­ment. To show why Texas jus­tice is not a mod­el for any­one, we have under­tak­en a pre­lim­i­nary exam­i­na­tion of the Texas death penal­ty sys­tem. We have con­duct­ed orig­i­nal research into the dis­crim­i­na­to­ry charg­ing prac­tices of Texas pros­e­cu­tors. We stud­ied hun­dreds of cas­es, includ­ing every pub­lished deci­sion (and many unpub­lished deci­sions) of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in cap­i­tal cas­es in the mod­ern death penal­ty era. We exam­ined over half of the cap­i­tal post-con­vic­tion appeals filed in Texas since 1995 — a stage of the appeals that has nev­er before been sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly scru­ti­nized — and we eval­u­at­ed treat­ment giv­en to those appeals by the state courts.

In this Report, we explain and lay bare many dis­turb­ing fea­tures of a thor­ough­ly flawed system.

CHAPTER ONE

A Brief Overview

In this Chapter, we set forth a pre­lim­i­nary intro­duc­tion to the Texas death penal­ty sys­tem: the death row pop­u­la­tion, the pro­ce­dure by which peo­ple are sen­tenced to death, and the out­lines of the tor­tur­ous path of post-conviction appeals.

CHAPTER TWO

Official Misconduct: A Deliberate Attack on the Truth

We exam­ined and assem­bled in this report numer­ous exam­ples of Texas death penal­ty tri­als in which the pros­e­cu­tors failed to dis­charge their duty to learn, dis­close, and speak the truth. After an exten­sive review of Texas death penal­ty cas­es in the post-Furman era, we iden­ti­fied 84 cas­es in which a Texas pros­e­cu­tor or police offi­cer delib­er­ate­ly pre­sent­ed false or mis­lead­ing tes­ti­mo­ny, con­cealed excul­pa­to­ry evi­dence, or used noto­ri­ous­ly unre­li­able evi­dence from a jailhouse snitch.

  • In 41 of these cas­es, state offi­cials inten­tion­al­ly dis­tort­ed the truth-seek­ing process by engag­ing in prac­tices that result­ed in the pre­sen­ta­tion, or seri­ous risk of pre­sen­ta­tion, of false or misleading evidence.
  • In 43 doc­u­ment­ed cas­es pros­e­cu­tors relied upon the inher­ent­ly unre­li­able tes­ti­mo­ny of jail­house infor­mants, despite the obvi­ous risk that inmates may fab­ri­cate tes­ti­mo­ny to cur­ry favor with author­i­ties. In many of those cas­es, such tes­ti­mo­ny was the pri­ma­ry evi­dence used to obtain a conviction.

Texas pros­e­cu­tors freely engage in tac­tics that oth­er juris­dic­tions have found vio­late due process. In mul­ti­ple-defen­dant cas­es, for exam­ple, Texas pros­e­cu­tors have pre­sent­ed irrec­on­cil­ably incon­sis­tent the­o­ries of the same crime: to the first jury, the pros­e­cu­tor presents evi­dence and argu­ment that A’ shot the vic­tim while B’ stood by; in a lat­er tri­al to a dif­fer­ent jury, the same pros­e­cu­tor presents evi­dence and argu­ment that B’ shot the vic­tim, while A’ stood by.

In oth­er cas­es described in our report, police and pros­e­cu­tors have sup­pressed evi­dence show­ing that some­one oth­er than the defen­dant com­mit­ted the crime, have lost or destroyed poten­tial­ly excul­pa­to­ry evi­dence, have resist­ed the foren­sic exam­i­na­tion of evi­dence that could exon­er­ate the defen­dant, have manip­u­lat­ed wit­ness­es’ tes­ti­mo­ny to sup­port the pros­e­cu­tion’s the­o­ry despite con­trary evi­dence, and have used threats against defen­dants or their fam­i­ly mem­bers to coerce confessions.

Several inno­cent men have been released from Texas’s death row. These wrong­ful con­vic­tions usu­al­ly stemmed from mis­con­duct com­mit­ted by pros­e­cu­tors or police offi­cers. In the over­whelm­ing major­i­ty of these cas­es, the mis­con­duct that sent these men to death row only came to light years after the tri­al had end­ed. Since offi­cial mis­con­duct is by its nature hid­den, it is always dif­fi­cult to expose. Today, new pro­ce­dures sharply lim­it a defen­dan­t’s abil­i­ty to secure review of his case in state and fed­er­al court, mak­ing it unlike­ly that the truth about the wrong­ful con­vic­tion of an inno­cent per­son will ever come to light.

CHAPTER THREE

A Danger to Society: Fooling the Jury with Phony Experts

We treat sep­a­rate­ly anoth­er kind of offi­cial mis­con­duct: those cas­es involv­ing junk sci­ence, includ­ing pre­dic­tions” of future dan­ger­ous­ness, hair com­par­i­son evi­dence, and bite mark tes­ti­mo­ny. Of the sam­ple we exam­ined, we found 160 cas­es which con­tained some form of sci­en­tif­ic” evi­dence of dubious reliability.

  • In 121 cas­es, an expert“psychiatrist tes­ti­fied with absolute cer­tain­ty that the defen­dant would be a dan­ger in the future. In the major­i­ty of those cas­es, the pre­dic­tions were based on hypo­thet­i­cal ques­tions, or only the most per­func­to­ry inter­view with the defen­dant. These impos­si­bly cer­tain pre­dic­tions of future behav­ior have been uni­ver­sal­ly con­demned as junk sci­ence. When the American Psychiatric Association expelled from its ranks the lead­ing pro­po­nent of this tes­ti­mo­ny, he attacked the APA as a bunch of lib­er­als who think queers are normal.”
  • In 36 cas­es, the state relied upon hair com­par­i­son tes­ti­mo­ny — a prac­tice which has been repeat­ed­ly proved to be inac­cu­rate and mis­lead­ing — to obtain a con­vic­tion. This sci­ence” is ful­ly replace­able by high­ly reli­able mito­chon­dr­i­al DNA technology.

Because many case records and court opin­ions are unavail­able, these num­bers are extreme­ly con­ser­v­a­tive, and like­ly rep­re­sent only a frac­tion of the cas­es in which the state relied upon junk sci­ence to obtain a con­vic­tion and sen­tence of death.

CHAPTER FOUR

Race and the Death Penalty: The Inescapable Conclusion

In this Chapter, we stud­ied the per­sis­tent racism in the Texas death penal­ty, inter­view­ing prac­ti­tion­ers across the state regard­ing the jury selec­tion process, research­ing the effect of dis­crim­i­na­tion statewide, and con­duct­ing orig­i­nal research into the charg­ing prac­tices of one East Texas county.

Though more com­pre­hen­sive statewide research must be done, our data reveals a clear pat­tern of dis­par­i­ty in the pun­ish­ment met­ed out to those con­vict­ed of killing whites as com­pared to those con­vict­ed of killing non-whites, despite the fact that black males are the most like­ly mur­der vic­tims. Our research indi­cates that the death penal­ty is used most often to pun­ish those con­vict­ed for mur­der­ing white women, the least like­ly vic­tims of murder.

  • While a 1998 study indi­cates that 23% of all Texas mur­der vic­tims were black men, only 0.4% of those exe­cut­ed since the rein­state­ment of the death penal­ty were con­demned to die for killing a black man.
  • Conversely, as of 1998, white women rep­re­sent­ed 0.8% of mur­der vic­tims statewide, but 34.2% of those exe­cut­ed since rein­state­ment were sen­tenced to die for killing a white woman.
  • Capital juries in the coun­ties we pro­file are far whiter” than the com­mu­ni­ties from which they are select­ed. The over­all pic­ture that emerges of the Texas death penal­ty is stark: non-whites are for the most part exclud­ed from the process of assess­ing a pun­ish­ment that is dis­pro­por­tion­ate­ly vis­it­ed upon them. African- American Texans are the least like­ly to serve on cap­i­tal juries, but the most like­ly to be con­demned to die.

CHAPTER FIVE

Executing the Mentally Retarded

Despite a grow­ing nation­al con­sen­sus that defen­dants with the men­tal age of a child should not be sub­ject to the death penal­ty, Texas con­tin­ues the prac­tice of allow­ing the men­tal­ly retard­ed to be sen­tenced and put to death. Thirteen states and the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment have banned the exe­cu­tion of the men­tal­ly retard­ed. Just last year, the Texas Senate passed a bill to ban the exe­cu­tion of the men­tal­ly retard­ed, but the bill was scut­tled by the Texas House of Representatives.

Although there are many inmates — both those exe­cut­ed and those who are still on death row — who have nev­er under­gone even pre­lim­i­nary I.Q. test­ing, we know that, to date, Texas has exe­cut­ed at least six men­tal­ly retard­ed inmates. In this sec­tion, we pro­file two such men: one who has been exe­cut­ed; one who is still on death row.

  • Mario Marquez, whose jury nev­er heard he was retard­ed, with an I.Q. of 66. When the tri­al judge and pros­e­cu­tor learned the extent of Marquez’s impair­ment, they joined his new lawyer in ask­ing that he be spared. Their plea fell on deaf ears and Marquez was exe­cut­ed the day George W. Bush was inaugurated Governor.
  • Doil Lane, who may soon be exe­cut­ed by the State of Texas. After Lane gave a con­fes­sion to a Texas Ranger, he crawled into the offi­cer’s lap and began to cry. Throughout his life, Lane’s I.Q. has mea­sured con­sis­tent­ly between 62 and 70.

CHAPTERS SIX AND SEVEN

The Right to Counsel in Texas: You Get What You Pay For; and Sham Appeals: The Appearance of Representation in State Habeas Corpus

Recent pub­lic­i­ty has focused the nation’s atten­tion on Texas defense lawyers who slept through cap­i­tal tri­als, ignored obvi­ous excul­pa­to­ry evi­dence, suf­fered dis­ci­pline for eth­i­cal laps­es, or used drugs or alco­hol while rep­re­sent­ing an indi­gent cap­i­tal defen­dant at tri­al. Defenders of the sys­tem dis­miss these cas­es as an aber­ra­tion. Our research indicates otherwise.

  • In some cas­es, coun­sel’s per­for­mance was the prod­uct of his own greed or inep­ti­tude. Joe Lee Guy was rep­re­sent­ed at tri­al by an attor­ney who ingest­ed cocaine on the way to tri­al, and con­sumed alco­hol dur­ing court breaks. Guy’s state habeas attor­neys failed to inves­ti­gate the mis­con­duct — which means those facts may nev­er be con­sid­ered by either a state or federal court.
  • In oth­er cas­es, blame lies with the State’s refusal to both appoint lawyers with suf­fi­cient expe­ri­ence and train­ing and to fund an ade­quate defense. For exam­ple, despite know­ing about his clien­t’s his­to­ry of men­tal ill­ness, Paul Colella’s lawyer failed to make any inquiry into his clien­t’s psy­chi­atric his­to­ry. The only evi­dence Colella’s jury heard about his back­ground before sen­tenc­ing him to death was a brief plea from his mother.

Further, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rou­tine­ly denies any rem­e­dy to inmates whose court-appoint­ed lawyers per­formed poor­ly. The Court has forced lawyers to remain on cap­i­tal cas­es even when the lawyers them­selves expressed doubts about their abil­i­ty to han­dle such cas­es, and it has denied relief to two death row inmates whose lawyers slept through tri­al. The Court’s ratio­nale in these two cas­es — that the inmate failed to show that he was harmed by coun­sel’s sleep­ing — reflects a pro­found dis­re­gard for the con­sti­tu­tion­al­ly-guar­an­teed right to effec­tive assis­tance of counsel.

When the truth has been hid­den by the State or ignored by defense coun­sel at tri­al, post- con­vic­tion appeals are the only oppor­tu­ni­ty an inmate has to set the record straight. Yet the qual­i­ty of coun­sel in these appel­late pro­ceed­ings has received almost no atten­tion. To eval­u­ate whether post-con­vic­tion coun­sel in Texas are pro­vid­ing the rep­re­sen­ta­tion demand­ed by a cap­i­tal case, we exam­ined over half the post-con­vic­tion appeals filed in Texas since 1995 (187) — a study nev­er before con­duct­ed. Our find­ings are deeply unsettling.

  • In 42% of the appeals, post-con­vic­tion coun­sel appeared to have con­duct­ed no new inves­ti­ga­tion, and raised no extra-record claims — even though this is the only type of claim that can be con­sid­ered for review in such a proceeding.
  • In many cas­es, appoint­ed attor­neys mere­ly repeat­ed, some­times word-for-word, claims which had already been reject­ed by the courts in a pre­vi­ous appeal- prac­ti­cal­ly guar­an­tee­ing that there would be noth­ing for the courts to review in state or federal court.
  • In approx­i­mate­ly one-third of the cas­es reviewed, the post-con­vic­tion appli­ca­tion was under 30 pages long. In 17%, the appli­ca­tion was under fif­teen pages long. Such short appli­ca­tions can bare­ly con­tain the req­ui­site pro­ce­dur­al for­mal­i­ties, let alone the legal argu­ments and fac­tu­al asser­tions that are nec­es­sary to present a con­sti­tu­tion­al claim of error.
  • In a num­ber of cas­es where patent­ly inad­e­quate state habeas appli­ca­tions were filed, sub­se­quent inves­ti­ga­tion has revealed sig­nif­i­cant con­sti­tu­tion­al errors — includ­ing an alco­holic tri­al attor­ney and a pos­si­ble claim of inno­cence — that were not reflect­ed in the habeas appli­ca­tion, and would have remained undis­cov­ered if they had con­tin­ued on the nor­mal track of Texas habeas appeals.

Further, the Court of Criminal Appeals has dis­played dis­grace­ful indif­fer­ence to these prob­lems. The Court has tak­en no action to pro­tect the rights of defen­dants — who were promised com­pe­tent” coun­sel by the Texas Legislature — even when the post-con­vic­tion lawyers it appoints have dis­played obvi­ous signs of inex­pe­ri­ence and incom­pe­tence. Not only is there no stan­dard of review for these appoint­ed attor­neys, there also is no over­sight of their work.

CHAPTER EIGHT

The Myth of Meaningful Review

Officials in Texas insist that redun­dant lev­els of appel­late review will pre­vent wrong­ful con­vic­tions, and that defi­cien­cies at tri­al will be cor­rect­ed in post-con­vic­tion appeals. This rhetoric of super due process” is meant to reas­sure the pub­lic that, despite the astound­ing num­ber of exe­cu­tions in Texas, each case has received close scruti­ny in the state and fed­er­al courts. In many cas­es, how­ev­er, the notion of care­ful and mean­ing­ful review is a myth. For exam­ple, our study found that:

  • In the great major­i­ty (79% of the 103 cas­es stud­ied) of post-con­vic­tion cas­es, the judge nev­er held an actu­al hear­ing on the inmate’s claims of con­sti­tu­tion­al error, but instead relied mere­ly on what­ev­er doc­u­ments were submitted.
  • In 83.7% of the cas­es reviewed, the tri­al court’s fac­tu­al find­ings were iden­ti­cal or vir­tu­al­ly iden­ti­cal to those filed by the pros­e­cu­tor. In 93% of these cas­es, the Court of Criminal Appeals sum­mar­i­ly adopt­ed the tri­al court’s opin­ion.” In all but the most unusu­al cas­es, the opin­ion then binds the federal court.

Few cas­es illus­trate the myth bet­ter than Gary Graham’s. After Graham’s ini­tial post- con­vic­tion pro­ceed­ings proved unsuc­cess­ful, his new post-con­vic­tion attor­neys found com­pelling evi­dence to sup­port Graham’s long­stand­ing claim of inno­cence. Graham spent the next sev­en years try­ing to secure an evi­den­tiary hear­ing — in state and fed­er­al courts — at which the strength of his new­ly devel­oped evi­dence of inno­cence could be mea­sured against the pros­e­cu­tion’s sin­gle eye­wit­ness. He nev­er got it. The state courts adopt­ed find­ings” penned by the pros­e­cu­tor assess­ing Graham’s inno­cence claims as if there had been a hear­ing where wit­ness­es tes­ti­fied — but there was no such hear­ing. The pros­e­cu­tor’s ver­sion of the facts con­trolled the lit­i­ga­tion in sub­se­quent pro­ceed­ings, and no fed­er­al court ever reviewed the mer­its of Graham’s claims.

CHAPTER NINE

A Bitter Harvest

In our final chap­ter, we pro­file the cas­es of six men exe­cut­ed despite sub­stan­tial and com­pelling doubt about their guilt. Some of these cas­es received wide­spread nation­al atten­tion, like the case of Gary Graham. Others were exe­cut­ed in obscu­ri­ty. These six men, how­ev­er, have at least two things in com­mon. In each case, the truth came to light long after the tri­al — long after it had been sup­pressed by the State of Texas, ignored by defense coun­sel at tri­al, or dis­missed by the courts. And in each case, the truth came too late.

CONCLUSION

Five years ago, the State of Texas imple­ment­ed sev­er­al changes in the sys­tem of review of death penal­ty con­vic­tions. These changes, how­ev­er, have done very lit­tle to repair a sys­tem that needs fun­da­men­tal reform. Indeed, some of the changes have back­fired. The reforms to state post-con­vic­tion appeals were intend­ed to speed up the process, while ensur­ing fair­ness by grant­i­ng defen­dants a right to com­pe­tent legal assis­tance. However, many of the lawyers appoint­ed under the law do not know how to pro­vide effec­tive rep­re­sen­ta­tion in state habeas pro­ceed­ings and end up gross­ly mis­han­dling this crit­i­cal stage of the case. Thus, the 1995 reforms cre­at­ed mere­ly an appear­ance of review, and thwart­ed mean­ing­ful access to the state and fed­er­al courts. Neither this reform, nor any oth­er, has slowed the Texas death penal­ty sys­tem’s pow­er­ful but flawed rush to execution.

In this report, we have assem­bled an unprece­dent­ed vol­ume of objec­tive evi­dence that rais­es pro­found ques­tions about the fair­ness of how and when the death penal­ty is applied. We artic­u­late the scope and breadth of the under­ly­ing prob­lems, and offer pre­lim­i­nary rec­om­men­da­tions for change. We con­firm the crit­i­cal need for a thor­ough inves­ti­ga­tion of every cap­i­tal case, and we show that all too often, such an inves­ti­ga­tion either does not take place, or takes place too late for the courts to con­sid­er it. In short, we lay bare a sys­tem in des­per­ate need of reform. We urge all who are com­mit­ted to jus­tice to read our report thought­ful­ly. It com­pels the con­clu­sion, reached by increas­ing num­bers of Americans, that our cur­rent method of enforc­ing the death penal­ty does vio­lence to the ide­al of basic fair­ness that is sup­posed to be the foun­da­tion of our crim­i­nal justice system.

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*Texas Defender Service

Texas Defender Service (TDS) is a pri­vate, 501(c)(3) non-prof­it orga­ni­za­tion. Since 1995, TDS has pro­vid­ed direct rep­re­sen­ta­tion to indi­gent inmates on Texas’ death row, con­sult­ed with oth­er lawyers lit­i­gat­ing such cas­es, and inter­vened in unusu­al cas­es where expert legal assis­tance was urgent­ly need­ed. We strive to improve the qual­i­ty of rep­re­sen­ta­tion for Texas death row inmates in three ways: Direct Representation of Death-Sentenced Prisoners, Consulting, Training and Case-Tracking; and TDS’ Capital Trial Project.

The Texas Defender Service may be reached on the web at http://​tex​as​de​fend​er​.org/, and at the following locations:

Texas Defender Service

412 Main Street
Suite 1150
Houston, TX 77002
(713) 2227788
(713) 2220260 [fax]

Texas Defender Service

510 South Congress
Suite 307
Austin, TX 78704
(512) 3208300
(512) 4772153 [fax]