Arizona Republic

Editorial

The con­sti­tu­tion­al defect the U.S. Supreme Court found in Arizona’s death penal­ty last month is easily fixed.

Currently, judges decide whether there are aggra­vat­ing cir­cum­stances that war­rant, weighed against mit­i­gat­ing fac­tors, death rather than life in prison.

Arizona law spells out the aggra­vat­ing cir­cum­stances to be con­sid­ered, such as a mur­der espe­cial­ly cru­el or depraved, a mur­der for hire, or one of a police officer.

All the court deci­sion in the Timothy Ring death-penal­ty case real­ly requires is that the exis­tence of such aggra­vat­ing cir­cum­stances be deter­mined by a jury rather than a judge. That would ren­der Arizona’s death penal­ty com­pa­ra­ble to that of 29 oth­er states, con­sti­tu­tion­al­ly sound and secure.

Until the U.S. Supreme Court changes its mind again.

Undoubtedly there will be a demand for the Legislature to do exact­ly that: Fix the prob­lem and move on.

Instead, the Legislature should join 12 oth­er states and abol­ish the death penal­ty, leav­ing the max­i­mum pun­ish­ment under Arizona law as life in prison without parole.

We urge that course of action with great respect for the argu­ments in favor of the death penal­ty and those who make them. After all, until now we were among their ranks.

But the argu­ment against the death penal­ty has become more pro­found and salient. Simply put, we now know beyond dis­pute that the crim­i­nal-jus­tice sys­tem wrong­ly sen­tences peo­ple to death. We even know their names, because since 1970, 101 of them have sub­se­quent­ly been found inno­cent. Moreover, the pace of exon­er­a­tions has been accel­er­at­ing, due in part to the wider use of DNA evidence.

And we know it can hap­pen here in Arizona, because it did. Ray Krone, who spent 10 years in Arizona pris­ons, near­ly three of them on death row, was No. 100 of the 101.

The the­o­ret­i­cal argu­ment that the crim­i­nal-jus­tice sys­tem, being a human insti­tu­tion, is bound to be fal­li­ble is no longer the­o­ret­i­cal. It’s a real­i­ty, and pub­lic pol­i­cy must confront it.

Certainly the argu­ments in favor of the death penal­ty con­tin­ue to be pow­er­ful. For most peo­ple, there are some crimes so heinous that death is the only appro­pri­ate pun­ish­ment. The vile attacks of Sept. 11 under­score that sen­ti­ment. And the sense of clo­sure the fam­i­lies of many vic­tims report expe­ri­enc­ing after exe­cu­tions is real and important.

But soci­ety can no longer ignore the prac­ti­cal con­se­quences and risks of the death penalty.

Arguments about deter­rence are fruit­less. Supporters of the death penal­ty point out that nation­al mur­der rates increased after the court basi­cal­ly shut down the death penal­ty dur­ing the 1970s but declined once states resumed executions.

But oppo­nents point out that the 12 states with­out the death penal­ty have low­er mur­der rates than those with it, and expe­ri­enced sim­i­lar trends dur­ing the same time periods.

In real­i­ty, exe­cu­tion does not fol­low the cap­i­tal offense either quick­ly or con­sis­tent­ly enough to know whether the death penal­ty serves as a deterrent.

Nor will it. Neither the courts nor soci­ety will ever again per­mit a quick trig­ger on the death penalty.

And if the death penal­ty were more swift­ly applied, 101 inno­cent peo­ple may very well have been executed.

Nor can we have con­fi­dence that bet­ter foren­sics, such as DNA evi­dence, will elim­i­nate such errors in the future. The bounds of human error are lim­it­less. And the crim­i­nal-jus­tice sys­tem is a pro­found­ly human one, a search for truth among often cloudy cir­cum­stances and murky motives.

Perhaps it can be argued that, per­fect­ly applied, the death penal­ty is still the most appro­pri­ate penal­ty for some crimes. But an injus­tice isn’t served by sen­tenc­ing a mur­der­er to life in prison with­out parole. That is the pun­ish­ment pre­scribed by 12 oth­er states and most of the industrialized world.

Most impor­tant, life impris­on­ment per­mits the cor­rec­tion of error. Given what we now know, jus­tice requires retain­ing that possibility.