Summary of the Case

The Court grant­ed cer­tio­rari in Brumfield v. Cain, a death penal­ty case from Louisiana deal­ing with intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty. Kevan Brumfield was sen­tenced to death pri­or to the Court’s deci­sion in Atkins v. Virginia (2002), which banned the exe­cu­tion of defen­dants with intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ties. After that rul­ing, Brumfield filed a claim of intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty in state court. The court denied him a hear­ing because the tri­al tran­script showed no evi­dence of his dis­abil­i­ty. A fed­er­al dis­trict court found that the state court had mis­tak­en­ly – and unrea­son­ably– con­sid­ered the record from Petitioner’s pre-Atkins penal­ty phase as deter­mi­na­tive of Petitioner’s men­tal retar­da­tion claim under Atkins,” grant­ed Brumfield a hear­ing, and found him to be intel­lec­tu­al­ly dis­abled and there­fore exempt from exe­cu­tion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the fed­er­al dis­trict court’s deci­sion. Brumfield’s attor­neys said, As a result of this deci­sion, the com­pelling evi­dence pre­sent­ed to the dis­trict court will be ignored, and a per­son who was found to be men­tal­ly retard­ed will be exe­cut­ed.” The Supreme Court will deter­mine whether Brumfield should have been grant­ed a hear­ing on his claim of intellectual disability.

Decision

On June 18, 2015, the Court announced its deci­sion in Brumfield v. Cain. The Court held that the fed­er­al dis­trict court was enti­tled to con­duct an evi­den­tiary hear­ing to deter­mine whether Kevan Brumfield has intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty and is there­fore inel­i­gi­ble for exe­cu­tion. It reversed a rul­ing of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that would have deferred to a Lousiana state court deci­sion per­mit­ting Brumfield to be exe­cut­ed with­out a hear­ing on his claim of intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty. After an exten­sive evi­den­tiary hear­ing, the dis­trict court held that Brumfield was intel­lec­tu­al­ly dis­abled. By a vote of 5 – 4, the Supreme Court ruled that Louisiana had unrea­son­ably deter­mined the facts when it decid­ed that Brumfield had not pre­sent­ed suf­fi­cient evi­dence of intel­lec­tu­al and adap­tive impair­ments to war­rant an evi­den­tiary hear­ing in state court. Writing for the major­i­ty, Justice Sotomayor said, After Atkins was decid­ed, peti­tion­er, a Louisiana death-row inmate, request­ed an oppor­tu­ni­ty to prove he was intel­lec­tu­al­ly dis­abled in state court. Without afford­ing him an evi­den­tiary hear­ing or grant­i­ng him time or fund­ing to secure expert evi­dence, the state court reject­ed petitioner’s claim. That deci­sion, we hold, was based on an unrea­son­able deter­mi­na­tion of the facts in light of the evi­dence pre­sent­ed in the State court pro­ceed­ing.’ Petitioner was there­fore enti­tled to have his Atkins claim con­sid­ered on the mer­its in fed­er­al court.” The case returns to the Fifth Circuit for con­sid­er­a­tion of whether the dis­trict court’s find­ings are sup­port­ed by the record.

UPDATE: On Dec. 16, 2015, the Fifth Circuit, on remand, held that the District Court’s orig­i­nal rul­ing that Brumfield was intel­lec­tu­al­ly dis­abled was not clear­ly erro­neous and hence should be upheld, there­by ren­der­ing him inel­i­gi­ble for exe­cu­tion. (Brumfield v. Cain, No. 12 – 30256 (5th Cir., Dec. 162015)).

Overview of the Case

Kevan Brumfield Suffers From Intellectual Disability (formerly known as Mental Retardation).

After an exten­sive, sev­en day hear­ing with tes­ti­mo­ny from numer­ous psy­chol­o­gists, a U.S. District Court judge found that Kevan Brumfield suf­fers from intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty. A per­son is intel­lec­tu­al­ly dis­abled if he has (1) sub­av­er­age intel­li­gence (gen­er­al­ly an IQ score of 75 or below); (2) sig­nif­i­cant impair­ment in adap­tive func­tion­ing; and (3) the dis­abil­i­ty man­i­fest­ed before the age of 18. Mr. Brumfield has all three. 

All of the experts who tes­ti­fied (for both the State and the defense) agreed that Mr. Brumfield’s IQ scores of 70, 70, 72 and 75 demon­strate that he has an intel­li­gence lev­el that is con­sis­tent with intellectual disability. 

The dis­trict court heard sub­stan­tial evi­dence demon­strat­ing Mr. Brumfield’s defi­cien­cies in adap­tive func­tion­ing. The evi­dence showed, for instance, that Mr. Brumfield has severe­ly lim­it­ed abil­i­ty to write. He takes an inor­di­nate amount of time, and needs assis­tance, to write a sim­ple let­ter. He also lacks motor skills, unable to write in a straight line with­out using a piece of card­board to guide him. Mr. Brumfield spent much of his child­hood in spe­cial edu­ca­tion class­es. He was not able to under­stand the sim­ple rules of child­hood games or process basic infor­ma­tion. By the time he dropped out in the ninth grade, he had been placed in 14 – 15 dif­fer­ent schools and sev­er­al men­tal health facil­i­ties. Despite hav­ing been in spe­cial edu­ca­tion, all of his aca­d­e­m­ic abil­i­ties reached a plateau, for the rest of his life, around the fourth or fifth grade — which is char­ac­ter­is­tic of per­sons with intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty. He still has at best a fourth grade reading level. 

The State’s experts did not con­test that Mr. Brumfield’s impair­ments man­i­fest­ed before the age of 18. When Mr. Brumfield was born, he weighed 3.5 pounds and suf­fered from fetal stress. He was born with slow­er respons­es than nor­mal babies, and expe­ri­enced severe abuse, neglect, and pover­ty dur­ing his upbring­ing — all risk fac­tors for intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty. He also has sev­er­al blood rel­a­tives who sim­i­lar­ly suf­fer from intellectual disability. 

The State’s experts acknowl­edged Mr. Brumfield’s sub­stan­tial impair­ments but argued that he is not intel­lec­tu­al­ly dis­abled because he pos­sessed some strengths. The dis­trict court judge found that the State’s experts were unre­li­able and lacked cred­i­bil­i­ty. The judge found that one of the State’s experts was unre­li­able because he had nev­er even heard of the rel­e­vant and lead­ing diag­nos­tic stan­dards devel­oped by the American Association of Mental Retardation (now American Association of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities) at the time he exam­ined Mr. Brumfield and had no for­mal train­ing in admin­is­ter­ing psy­cho­log­i­cal test­ing.” The judge found that the State’s oth­er expert failed to fol­low the stan­dard of care for assess­ing intellectual disability.

The State’s main argu­ment was that Mr. Brumfield was nev­er diag­nosed with intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty as a child. The dis­trict judge reject­ed that argu­ment. He relied upon tes­ti­mo­ny from an expert who explained, based on her per­son­al expe­ri­ence, that Mr. Brumfield’s school sys­tem, in East Baton Rouge Parish, delib­er­ate­ly avoid­ed diag­nos­ing African American stu­dents, like Mr. Brumfield, with intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty, in favor of diag­nos­ing him with more polit­i­cal­ly palat­able ail­ments, like con­duct dis­or­ders and behav­ioral prob­lems.” The court explained:

dur­ing Brumfield’s school years in the late 1970s, African – Americans males were bring dis­pro­por­tion­ate­ly diag­nosed with men­tal retar­da­tion. School offi­cials, psy­chol­o­gists, and appraisal teams were accord­ing­ly cau­tious not to over-rep­re­sent black males as being men­tal­ly retard­ed and were instead urged to con­sid­er oth­er alter­na­tives that would avoid plac­ing the men­tal retar­da­tion label on them. [Indeed, the] East Baton Rouge Parish schools, which Brumfield attend­ed, had received this admonition.”

If Mr. Brumfield Is Intellectually Disabled, Why Is He Still Facing Execution? 

Mr. Brumfield faces exe­cu­tion because the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decid­ed that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) requires that the evi­dence heard by the dis­trict court — as well as its find­ing that Mr. Brumfield is intel­lec­tu­al­ly dis­abled — be dis­re­gard­ed out of def­er­ence to the state court in Louisiana, where Mr. Brumfield was orig­i­nal­ly con­vict­ed and sen­tenced to death. 

First, What Happened In State Court?

Mr. Brumfield was con­vict­ed and sen­tenced to death before the Supreme Court had decid­ed its land­mark deci­sion in Atkins v. Virginia, which first held that it is uncon­sti­tu­tion­al to exe­cute intel­lec­tu­al­ly dis­abled (then referred to as men­tal­ly retard­ed”) per­sons. For that rea­son, Mr. Brumfield nev­er brought up his intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty at his tri­al. After Atkins was decid­ed, how­ev­er, Mr. Brumfield brought a peti­tion in state court argu­ing that he must be spared exe­cu­tion because he is intel­lec­tu­al­ly dis­abled. His pro bono lawyer point­ed to sev­er­al facts pre­sent­ed at his tri­al that indi­cat­ed he might be intel­lec­tu­al­ly dis­abled — includ­ing evi­dence that he had an IQ score of 75, had been placed in spe­cial edu­ca­tion, had a fourth grade read­ing lev­el, and was born with a low birth weight. His lawyer asked the court to pro­vide him with fund­ing for an expert so that Mr. Brumfield could be eval­u­at­ed for intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty and asked for a hear­ing to prove his dis­abil­i­ty. The state court reject­ed Brumfield’s claim that he was intel­lec­tu­al­ly dis­abled with­out pro­vid­ing him with any fund­ing or a hear­ing, rea­son­ing that the evi­dence from Mr. Brumfield’s pre-Atkins tri­al did not show that he was intellectually disabled. 

Second, What Happened In Federal Court?

It was after the state court denied him any fund­ing or a hear­ing that Mr. Brumfield filed a peti­tion in fed­er­al court. The fed­er­al dis­trict court held that the state court’s deter­mi­na­tion was not enti­tled to any def­er­ence for two rea­sons. First, it act­ed unrea­son­ably by rely­ing sole­ly on Mr. Brumfield’s tri­al record to deter­mine whether he is intel­lec­tu­al­ly dis­abled, when that tri­al record was cre­at­ed pri­or to the Supreme Court’s deci­sion in Atkins and Mr. Brumfield had thus nev­er attempt­ed to prove that he was intel­lec­tu­al­ly dis­abled at tri­al. Second, the state court vio­lat­ed Supreme Court prece­dent by deny­ing Mr. Brumfield fund­ing to prove his intellectual disability. 

In light of those con­clu­sions, the dis­trict court pro­vid­ed Mr. Brumfield fund­ing and his first oppor­tu­ni­ty to prove his intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty at a hear­ing. That led to the wealth of evi­dence above and a com­pre­hen­sive deci­sion find­ing that that Mr. Brumfield is intellectually disabled.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit did not over­turn the dis­trict court’s find­ing that Mr. Brumfield was intel­lec­tu­al­ly dis­abled — that find­ing has gone undis­turbed. Instead, it ruled that under AEDPA, the dis­trict court should have nev­er pro­vid­ed Mr. Brumfield with a hear­ing in the first place, out of def­er­ence to the state court’s decision. 

* * *

The Issue Before The Supreme Court:

The issue before the Supreme Court is whether the evi­dence heard by the dis­trict court should be dis­re­gard­ed because the dis­trict court should nev­er have pro­vid­ed Mr. Brumfield with a hear­ing out of def­er­ence to the state court. Mr. Brumfield asks the Supreme Court to reverse the Fifth Circuit’s deci­sion because the state court act­ed unrea­son­ably. In par­tic­u­lar, he argues that the state court’s deter­mi­na­tion that he was not intel­lec­tu­al­ly dis­abled was unrea­son­able because it was based on his tri­al record, which took place pri­or to Atkins and at which he nev­er attempt­ed to prove that he was intel­lec­tu­al­ly dis­abled. He also argues that the state court’s fail­ure to pro­vide expert fund­ing for a prop­er ID assess­ment runs afoul of clear­ly estab­lished Supreme Court precedent.

Underlying Facts Of The Case:

In January 1993, Baton Rouge Police Officer Betty Smothers was accom­pa­ny­ing a gro­cery store man­ag­er to a bank late at night to make the store’s deposits. When the car pulled up to the night drop, two men began fir­ing weapons, killing Officer Smothers and seri­ous­ly injur­ing the store man­ag­er. Mr. Brumfield was arrest­ed for the crime and, after 20 hours of inter­ro­ga­tion with­out food or sleep, Mr. Brumfield gave a con­fes­sion, which was the State’s pri­ma­ry evi­dence at tri­al. Mr. Brumfield has always main­tained that he was coerced into giv­ing a false con­fes­sion. The Supreme Court pre­vi­ous­ly rec­og­nized in Atkins itself that the risk of false con­fes­sions is greater in cas­es involv­ing intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty. Mr. Brumfield’s code­fen­dant, Henry Broadway, was also sen­tenced to death.