Capital Case Roundup — Death Penalty Court Decisions the Week of June 212021

NEWS (6/​25/​21) — Alabama: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has affirmed an Alabama fed­er­al dis­trict court deci­sion dis­miss­ing James Barbers habeas cor­pus chal­lenge to his con­vic­tion and death sen­tence. In an unsigned, unpub­lished opin­ion, the appeals court denied Barber’s claim that his lawyers pro­vid­ed inef­fec­tive rep­re­sen­ta­tion in the penal­ty phase of his cap­i­tal tri­al by fail­ing to inves­ti­gate and present mit­i­gat­ing evi­dence to the jury.


NEWS (6/​23 – 24/​21) — Florida: Florida courts issued deci­sions in three cas­es that had been remand­ed for resen­tenc­ing as a result of uncon­sti­tu­tion­al non-unan­i­mous death sen­tences in the defen­dants’ ini­tial death-penalty trials. 

On June 24, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the death sen­tence imposed on Michael Bargo in his cap­i­tal resen­tenc­ing tri­al for his role in a mur­der com­mit­ted when he was 18 years old.

Bargo chal­lenged the tri­al judge’s find­ing that the two aggra­vat­ing cir­cum­stances pre­sent­ed by the pros­e­cu­tion in the resen­tenc­ing hear­ing great­ly out­weighed … two statu­to­ry mit­i­ga­tors and fifty non­statu­to­ry mit­i­ga­tors” pre­sent­ed by the defense. He also specif­i­cal­ly chal­lenged the lim­it­ed con­sid­er­a­tion the tri­al court afford­ed par­tic­u­lar mit­i­gat­ing evi­dence in his case, includ­ing his age (which the court afford­ed slight weight”), that he had been diag­nosed with brain dam­age, bipo­lar dis­or­der, schizoaf­fec­tive dis­or­der, and a seizure dis­or­der (which it found not proven”), and that he had been pre­scribed anti-psy­chot­ic and anti-anx­i­ety med­ica­tion (which it afford­ed lit­tle weight”). 

The court ruled that the tri­al judge’s factfind­ing was sup­port­ed by the tes­ti­mo­ny of the state’s men­tal health expert and that Bargo’s “‘men­tal dis­or­der … may in some way explain [his] behav­ior at the time of the offense,’ but that there was no evi­dence the dis­or­der caused or con­tributed to the crime or impact­ed him such that he was inca­pable of reg­u­lat­ing his con­duct or mak­ing the choice not to plan and car­ry out the mur­der.’” Its rea­son­ing appears to con­tra­dict long-estab­lished U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 

In Eddings v. Oklahoma in 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a death sen­tence imposed on a teen offend­er when the state court dis­re­gard­ed mit­i­gat­ing evi­dence of his age and men­tal dis­or­der, which it had said was “’use­ful in explain­ing’ his behav­ior, but … did not excuse’ the behav­ior.” The Court ruled that consider[ing] only that evi­dence to be mit­i­gat­ing which would tend to sup­port a legal excuse from crim­i­nal lia­bil­i­ty” vio­lat­ed the Eighth Amendment. In 2004 in Tennard v. Dretke, the Court faced a sim­i­lar issue under the Texas death penal­ty statute. The Court reit­er­at­ed that requir­ing a defen­dant to prove a nexus between men­tal health mit­i­gat­ing evi­dence and the crime itself has no foun­da­tion in the deci­sions of this Court.”

Bargo also argued that Florida was barred from seek­ing the death penal­ty after his ini­tial death sen­tence was over­turned because the pros­e­cu­tion did not com­ply with amend­ments to Florida’s death penal­ty statute that required pros­e­cu­tors to give notice of the aggra­vat­ing cir­cum­stances it intend­ed to pur­sue with­in 45 days of arraign­ment. The Florida Supreme Court reject­ed that argu­ment, not­ing that defen­dants are not rear­raigned after their death sen­tences are over­turned and that the pros­e­cu­tion pur­sued the same aggra­vat­ing cir­cum­stances in both the resen­tenc­ing and Bargo’s initial trial.

The court also denied Bargo’s claim that the tri­al court had imper­mis­si­bly per­mit­ted the pros­e­cu­tion to present post-death acts as evi­dence sup­port­ing mul­ti­ple aggra­vat­ing fac­tors relat­ing to the nature of the murder.

A Citrus County tri­al judge on June 23 resen­tenced John William Campbell to life with­out parole, after Campbell had waived his right to a jury tri­al. Four jurors in Campbell’s first tri­al had vot­ed for life.

Judge Richard Howard resen­tenced Campbell to life after cred­it­ing sig­nif­i­cant mit­i­gat­ing evi­dence that Campbell was doomed in the womb” as a result of severe fetal alco­hol expo­sure that left him brain dam­aged, men­tal­ly and emo­tion­al­ly impaired, and phys­i­cal­ly stunt­ed and deformed. Howard found that Campbell’s father had aban­doned the fam­i­ly and left them to be raised by their abu­sive and chron­i­cal­ly alco­holic moth­er. Noting that the Florida leg­is­la­ture had amend­ed state law to require jury una­nim­i­ty, Howard said: They want 12 – 0. That is not this case.”

Also on June 23, Brevard County pros­e­cu­tors agreed to drop the death against Brandon Bradley in the shoot­ing death of Deputy Sheriff Barbara Pill, rather than pur­sue a cap­i­tal resen­tenc­ing hear­ing. In a state­ment released to the media, State Attorney Phil Archer wrote that the Pill fam­i­ly has request­ed that we agree to a sen­tence of life in prison for Mr. Bradley rather than seek the death penal­ty through a new sentencing proceeding.” 


NEWS (6/​21/​2021) — Ohio: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has affirmed the rul­ing of an Ohio fed­er­al dis­trict court dis­miss­ing the habeas cor­pus peti­tion filed by death-row pris­on­er Gary Hughbanks.

Hughbanks claimed that Hamilton County (Cincinnati) pros­e­cu­tors failed to dis­close to the defense six dif­fer­ent types of excul­pa­to­ry evi­dence: (1) infor­ma­tion iden­ti­fy­ing oth­er sus­pects; (2) doc­u­men­ta­tion con­cern­ing the actions of one of the vic­tims’ sons, that impli­cat­ed the son in the mur­ders; (3) the absence of trace evi­dence at the scene of the crime that impli­cat­ed Hughbanks; (4) eye­wit­ness descrip­tions of the killer that did not match Hughbanks; (5) evi­dence that impeached the prosecution’s the­o­ry of the case; and (6) evi­dence that impeached the prosecution’s wit­ness­es. The three-judge appel­late pan­el agreed that some of the evi­dence had been improp­er­ly with­held. However, the court found that the sup­pressed, favor­able evi­dence does not present a sig­nif­i­cant chal­lenge to the prosecution’s the­o­ry of the case or lead to a rea­son­able prob­a­bil­i­ty that a jury would have found Hughbanks’s mul­ti­ple confessions unreliable.”

Hughbanks also argued that his tri­al coun­sel had pro­vid­ed inef­fec­tive rep­re­sen­ta­tion in the penal­ty phase of his tri­al by fail­ing (1) to inter­view mit­i­ga­tion wit­ness­es; (2) to inves­ti­gate and present evi­dence of his men­tal ill­ness; (3) to retain a com­pe­tent men­tal-health expert; and (4) to present rel­e­vant evi­dence regard­ing Hughbanks’s child­hood.” The pan­el said it was con­cern­ing” that coun­sel failed to present evi­dence that an old­er cousin of Hughbanks molest­ed him repeat­ed­ly for an entire sum­mer, when Hughbanks was sev­en years old” and that “[a]n unknown assailant abduct­ed Hughbanks and raped him, when he was fif­teen.” Nonetheless, con­strained by the def­er­en­tial review required” by the fed­er­al habeas cor­pus statute, the pan­el ruled that Hughbanks has not shown that the Ohio Court of Appeals was objec­tive­ly unrea­son­able in deter­min­ing that Hughbanks’s coun­sel did not per­form so defi­cient­ly” that he could be deemed ineffective. 


NEWS (6/​18/​21) — North Carolina: A Mecklenburg County tri­al court has over­turned Michael Sherrills con­vic­tion and death sen­tence because of pros­e­cu­to­r­i­al mis­con­duct and accept­ed a plea deal that removes Sherrill from North Carolina’s death row. 

Sherrill was sen­tenced to death in 2009 for the 1984 rape and mur­der of Cynthia Dotson. Prosecutors failed to turn over to the defense fin­ger­print evi­dence that is now miss­ing and evi­dence from a rape kit with testable DNA from Dotson’s body that Charlotte-Mecklenburg police destroyed in 1985. Prosecutors agreed that over­turn­ing Sherrill’s con­vic­tions was in the inter­ests of jus­tice.” The par­ties reached agree­ment on a deal in which Sherrill plead­ed guilty to 2nd-degree mur­der, 2nd-degree rape and 2nd-degree arson and was resen­tenced to 20 years imprisonment.