Capital Case Roundup — Death Penalty Court Decisions the Week of October 192020

NEWS (10/​22/​20) — Florida: The Florida Supreme Court has upheld the con­vic­tion and death sen­tence for Daniel Craven, Jr. for a 2015 prison mur­der. The court denied Craven’s claims that he was uncon­sti­tu­tion­al­ly denied the right to rep­re­sent him­self and that the tri­al court had vio­lat­ed his right to a fair jury by impan­el­ing an African-American juror whom defense coun­sel had attempt­ed to peremp­to­ri­ly strike. It also reject­ed sev­er­al chal­lenges Craven posed to the aggra­vat­ing cir­cum­stances pre­sent­ed in the case.

Chief Justice Charles Canady dis­sent­ed, writ­ing that the tri­al court had failed to con­duct the required fac­tu­al analy­sis before declar­ing that defense coun­sel had attempt­ed to strike the juror based on his race. Historically, the court has rarely found an expla­na­tion for a jury strike to be pre­tex­tu­al when a pros­e­cu­tor has assert­ed that he or she struck a Black juror because the juror expressed oppo­si­tion to the death penal­ty. Here, how­ev­er, the tri­al court ruled that Craven’s defense coun­sel had attempt­ed to exclude a Black juror because of his race whom coun­sel assert­ed was pre­dis­posed to impos­ing the death penalty. 


NEWS (10/​21/​20) — Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has denied David Chmiel’s post-con­vic­tion chal­lenge to the con­sti­tu­tion­al­i­ty of his con­vic­tion and death sen­tence in his third tri­al for a triple mur­der based upon the prosecution’s use of junk-sci­ence hair-com­par­i­son tes­ti­mo­ny. While the court expressed sub­stan­tial con­cerns about the appro­pri­ate use of micro­scop­ic hair com­par­i­son analy­sis,” it decline[d] … to use [Chmiel’s] case as a vehi­cle to cat­e­gor­i­cal­ly dis­ap­prove micro­scop­ic hair com­par­i­son analy­sis and bar it from the courtroom.”

Chmiel argued that new evi­dence demon­strat­ed that iden­ti­fi­ca­tion tes­ti­mo­ny based on micro­scop­ic hair analy­sis was sci­en­tif­i­cal­ly invalid and vio­lat­ed his right to due process. In sup­port of his argu­ment, he cit­ed a series of devel­op­ments, includ­ing the National Academy of Sciences’ ground­break­ing August 2009 report, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward; a September 2016 report by the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods; state­ments by the FBI retract­ing micro­scop­ic hair com­par­i­son tes­ti­mo­ny; and a joint press release by the FBI, Department of Justice, and National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in April 2015 announc­ing that FBI expert micro­scop­ic hair com­par­i­son tes­ti­mo­ny had been erro­neous in 90% of the cas­es in which it had been provided testimony.

The court, how­ev­er, cred­it­ed the tri­al court’s find­ing that the tes­ti­mo­ny of the pros­e­cu­tion expert in Chmiel’s case did not exceed[] the lim­its of sci­ence and over­state[] to the jury the sig­nif­i­cance of the micro­scop­ic hair analy­sis.” It fur­ther found that any error was harm­less because Chmiel failed to demon­strate a rea­son­able prob­a­bil­i­ty that the ver­dict against him would be dif­fer­ent in a tri­al in which [the hair-com­par­i­son] tes­ti­mo­ny would be excluded.”


NEWS (10/​20/​20) — Missouri: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has over­turned a grant of habeas relief for Missouri death-row pris­on­er Carman Deck and rein­stat­ed the death sen­tence imposed in his third cap­i­tal sen­tenc­ing tri­al. The appeals court ruled that Deck could not receive fed­er­al review of his claim that the pas­sage of a decade between his orig­i­nal tri­al and his third sen­tenc­ing tri­al had caused crit­i­cal mit­i­ga­tion wit­ness­es to become unavail­able, mak­ing it impos­si­ble for him to receive a fair resentencing. 

The Eighth Circuit held that Deck’s claim was pro­ce­du­ral­ly default­ed because his post-con­vic­tion lawyer had failed to raise the issue in state court. It fur­ther ruled that because the law on the issue was not set­tled at the time of Deck’s resen­tenc­ing, post-con­vic­tion counsel’s fail­ure to raise the issue was not inef­fec­tive and Deck there­fore could not estab­lish grounds to excuse the procedural default.

Deck was con­vict­ed and sen­tenced to death in Missouri in 1998. The Missouri Supreme Court over­turned his death sen­tence in 2002, find­ing that his tri­al lawyer had sub­mit­ted a prej­u­di­cial­ly defi­cient jury instruc­tion on mit­i­gat­ing evi­dence that failed to explain what evi­dence the jury could con­sid­er as grounds to spare his life and that jurors did not need to unan­i­mous­ly agree that a mit­i­gat­ing cir­cum­stance was present before they could take that evi­dence into con­sid­er­a­tion in their sen­tenc­ing deci­sion. The United States Supreme Court over­turned Deck’s sec­ond death sen­tence, imposed in 2003, because the tri­al court had vio­lat­ed his right to due process by requir­ing him to appear before the jury shack­led with leg irons, hand­cuffs, and a bel­ly chain. He was resen­tenced to death in a third sen­tenc­ing hear­ing in November 2008, which was the sub­ject of the April 2017 U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri deci­sion reversed by the Eighth Circuit.

Sources

Robert Patrick, Death penal­ty restored against man con­vict­ed of mur­der­ing De Soto cou­ple in 1996, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, October 202020.