by Dr. Andrew D. Moran
London Metropolitan University
American Politics Group Annual Conference
St. Anne’s College, University of Oxford
E‑mail: a.​moran@​londonmet.​ac.​uk


Introduction

Since the Supreme Court rul­ing of Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, in 1976, which rein­stat­ed the use of the death penal­ty, 1,136 Americans have been exe­cut­ed in the United States. 1 The begin­ning of the 21st Century, how­ev­er, has seen a notable decline in the num­ber of peo­ple sen­tenced to death and the num­ber of inmates who are actu­al­ly exe­cut­ed. The end of 2007 wit­nessed a de fac­to mora­to­ri­um on exe­cu­tions that would last until 16 April 2008. This was in response to the Supreme Court exam­in­ing whether the pro­to­col sur­round­ing the use of lethal injec­tion in Kentucky was uncon­sti­tu­tion­al. A fur­ther Supreme Court case in 2008 would place lim­i­ta­tions on cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment, restrict­ing its use to mur­der or crimes com­mit­ted against the state.

State action also chal­lenged the death penal­ty. At the begin­ning of 2007, there were 38 states with the death penal­ty. By the end of the year, New Jersey had abol­ished cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment, and New York’s death penal­ty statutes had been allowed to lapse, reduc­ing the num­ber of states to 36. In February 2008, the Supreme Court of Nebraska would rule the use of elec­tro­cu­tion as the pre­ferred method of exe­cu­tion as uncon­sti­tu­tion­al. To date it has not approved a replace­ment. Then in December 2008, spurred on by the suc­cess in New Jersey, a com­mis­sion in Maryland rec­om­mend­ed that the death penal­ty be abol­ished in the state.

According to Richard Dieter, Executive Director of the abo­li­tion­ist pres­sure group the Death Penalty Information Centre (DPIC), there is a broad con­sen­sus for change’ in the USA. 2 It is the pur­pose of this paper to exam­ine devel­op­ments in 2008 and to con­sid­er whether Dieter’s opti­mism, and that of oth­ers in the abo­li­tion­ist move­ment, is jus­ti­fied.


Death Penalty Statistics

In 2008, 37 exe­cu­tions took place – five less than in 2007 and the low­est num­ber since 1994 when there were 31 exe­cu­tions. This fall con­tin­ued a down­ward trend that began after the peak of 98 exe­cu­tions in 1999. 3


Source: Facts About the Death Penalty’, Death Penalty Information Centre,
8 December 2008.


Last year, the num­ber of states car­ry­ing out the death penal­ty also fell slight­ly to nine, of which only Ohio was from out­side the south. This was one less state than in 2007, and five less than in 2001. In 2007, the South account­ed for 86% of exe­cu­tions, with 62% in Texas, a region­al bias that con­tin­ued in 2008 when the South account­ed for 95%, with almost half in Texas.

According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics in 2007 there were 115 death sen­tences, rep­re­sent­ing a drop of over 60% in death sen­tenc­ing in the last ten years. 4 DPIC research esti­mates the fig­ure for 2008 fell to 111, the low­est num­ber of inmates received under sen­tence of death since the death penal­ty was rein­stat­ed in 1976, and con­tin­u­ing a down­ward trend since 2001.

As the num­ber of death sen­tences falls, so the num­ber of those exon­er­at­ed increas­es. Since 1973, 130 inno­cent peo­ple have been released from death row, and the trend appears to be for more to be released in the future as new tech­nolo­gies, notably advances in DNA evi­dence, increas­ing­ly under­mine ini­tial sen­tences. From 1973 – 99, there were 3.1 exon­er­a­tions per year. Since 2000, that fig­ure has risen to an aver­age of 5 per year. 5 Last year was no excep­tion, with four peo­ple being exon­er­at­ed. All four were mem­bers of a racial minor­i­ty, with an aver­age of four­teen years sep­a­rat­ing con­vic­tion and exon­er­a­tion. 6

Though there has been a been a sig­nif­i­cant decline across the coun­try in the num­ber of death sen­tences passed, this has not been the case with the fed­er­al death penal­ty, where the aver­age num­ber of death sen­tences has actu­al­ly grown. 7 This, in part, is the result of the num­ber of death penal­ty offences being increased sig­nif­i­cant­ly by Congress in 1994 from one to over 50 com­bined with a more aggres­sive enforce­ment pol­i­cy being pur­sued by the Bush Administration. 8 In June 2001 the first fed­er­al exe­cu­tions since 1963 took place when Timothy McVeigh and Juan Garza were put to death, and a third fed­er­al pris­on­er, Louis Jones Jr, was exe­cut­ed in March 2003. All were found guilty of mur­der. 9 There are cur­rent­ly 55 pris­on­ers on fed­er­al death row.

2008 would also wit­ness the first sched­uled mil­i­tary exe­cu­tion for 47 years. 10 The pris­on­er was Private Ronald Gray who was con­vict­ed of two mur­ders and five rapes in 1988 and had been on the military’s death row at Fort Leavensworth, Kansas since then. Though Gray had had an appeal turned down by the Supreme Court in 2001, and President Bush had approved the death sen­tence in July 2008, the U.S. District Judge Richard Rogers of Kansas grant­ed a stay of exe­cu­tion on 26 November, to allow Gray to pur­sue a fed­er­al appeal. Under fed­er­al law, Gray has a year from the moment his death penal­ty was made final to file an appeal. It is the first time the US mil­i­tary has active­ly pur­sued an exe­cu­tion of a mil­i­tary pris­on­er since President Kennedy com­mut­ed a death sen­tence in 1962. 11 The last mil­i­tary exe­cu­tion was in 1961, when Private John Bennett was hanged for rap­ing and attempt­ing to kill an 11-year-old Austrian girl. There are nine men cur­rent­ly on mil­i­tary death row. 12


Public Opinion

Public sup­port for the death penal­ty has remained rel­a­tive­ly con­sis­tent since 2001. This is in stark con­trast to the peri­od from 1972 to 2001, dur­ing which pub­lic sup­port for the death penal­ty for those con­vict­ed of mur­der rose from a low of 57% in 1972 to a peak 80% in 1994, after which it began to decline before sta­bi­liz­ing in 2001. 13

A Gallup Poll con­duct­ed in February 2001 found that when Americans were asked Are you in favor of the death penal­ty for a per­son con­vict­ed of mur­der?’ 67% of respon­dents replied yes’, with 25% no’ and 8% hav­ing no opin­ion’. In October 2007, 69% of Americans respond­ed yes’. 14 In October 2008, the same ques­tion saw a slight fall in favour of the death penal­ty to 64%, with 30% oppos­ing. 15 This was low­er than the highs of the 1980s and 1990s, when sup­port aver­aged 75%, and is close to the fig­ures polled when the death penal­ty was rein­tro­duced in 1976.


Source: Americans Hold Firm to Support for Death Penalty’, Lydia Saad,
Gallup News Service, 17 November 2008.

Perhaps the most impor­tant trend iden­ti­fied by opin­ion polls in recent years, and one that has giv­en impe­tus to the abo­li­tion­ist move­ment, con­cerns the issue of life impris­on­ment with­out parole. Since 2001 the num­bers favour­ing the death penal­ty have fall­en and the num­bers favour­ing life impris­on­ment have risen. When Gallup asked in February 2001, If you could choose between the fol­low­ing two approach­es, which do you think is the bet­ter penal­ty for mur­der – the death penal­ty or life impris­on­ment, with absolute­ly no pos­si­bil­i­ty of parole’, 54% favoured the death penal­ty and 42% life impris­on­ment. By May 2006 (the most recent time Gallup asked this ques­tion) the num­bers favour­ing the death penal­ty fell to 47% and the num­ber favour­ing life impris­on­ment increased to 48%. 16 For the first time more Americans favoured impris­on­ment to exe­cu­tion. This sug­gests that if the pub­lic are giv­en a work­able alter­na­tive to the death penal­ty, they will con­sid­er it.


State chal­lenges to the death penal­ty

Many abo­li­tion­ists believe that the move­ment in American pub­lic opin­ion towards favour­ing life with­out parole may be the most pro­duc­tive route to end­ing the death penal­ty in the USA. Recent events sug­gest­ed addi­tion­al alter­na­tives. For a long time it was assumed that exe­cut­ing a pris­on­er was more cost-effi­cient that impris­on­ing a mur­der­er for life. Now, that appears not to be the case. According to The Economist, the fear of putting the wrong per­son to death has caused death penal­ty appeals to grow longer and cost­lier. 17 It is this grow­ing cost in an age of eco­nom­ic down­turn when state bud­gets are tight­ened, and how this impacts on tax­pay­ers, which might give the abo­li­tion­ists a new line of attack.

In 2003, The Times Union esti­mat­ed that the cost of the death penal­ty in New York since 1995 (when it was rein­stat­ed) was $160 mil­lion, or $23 mil­lion for each per­son sen­tenced. No one was exe­cut­ed dur­ing this peri­od. 18 In December 2003, the Kansas Performance Audit Report found that cap­i­tal cas­es were 70% more expen­sive than com­pa­ra­ble non-cap­i­tal cas­es, includ­ing the costs of incar­cer­a­tion. It found that the inves­ti­ga­tion costs for death sen­tence cas­es were 3 times greater than non-death cas­es, the tri­al costs 16 times greater, and the appeal costs 21 times greater. 19 In 2005 the Los Angeles Times esti­mat­ed that the death penal­ty cost California $114 mil­lion per year more than the cost of keep­ing sim­i­lar inmates in prison for life. The Times con­clud­ed that Los Angeles tax­pay­ers were pay­ing more than $250 mil­lion for each of the state’s executions.20

Evidence sug­gests that as a result of these spi­ralling costs, some states are exe­cut­ing few­er inmates, par­tic­u­lar­ly where they have tight state bud­gets. For exam­ple, in 2007 Georgia delayed the tri­al of Brian Nichols, who, dur­ing his trail for rape, shot the judge and two oth­ers in court in front of a large num­ber of wit­ness­es. Though the evi­dence against Nichols was strong, the state could not afford to pay his defence lawyers. 21 Furthermore, when Nichols final­ly went to court in 2008, he was sen­tenced to life with­out parole when the jury could not unan­i­mous­ly decide on the impo­si­tion of the death penal­ty. 22

On 23 April, 2008, after eight years and mil­lions of dol­lars spent, the New Mexico chief pros­e­cu­tor dropped cap­i­tal charges against Reis Lopez and Robert Young, both accused of mur­der­ing a prison guard, Ralph Garcia, dur­ing a prison riot in 1999. The court issued its direc­tive after the state leg­is­la­ture had failed to allo­cate more mon­ey to the court-appoint­ed lawyers office. The court had asked the state leg­is­la­ture to allo­cate a fur­ther $200,000 dol­lars to the office after lawyers defend­ing Lopes and Young com­plained about a lack of mon­ey to meet their fees. The state leg­is­la­ture refused. Said Gail Chasey, a New Mexico law­mak­er, We have declin­ing rev­enues and have to bal­ance the bud­get.’ 23 As a result, the State Supreme Court unan­i­mous­ly ruled that death penal­ty pros­e­cu­tions would have to be aban­doned. The unprece­dent­ed deci­sion to drop cap­i­tal charges on costs grounds sug­gests that New Mexico pros­e­cu­tors may not press for the death penal­ty in future.

A sim­i­lar sit­u­a­tion occurred in Utah where the State Supreme Court warned that death penal­ty sen­tences could not be pur­sued unless the leg­is­la­ture pro­vid­ed ade­quate fund­ing to rep­re­sent indi­gent defen­dants. 24

The California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice, set up by the state Senate to rec­om­mend improve­ments in the crim­i­nal jus­tice sys­tem, con­clud­ed in July 2008 that the admin­is­tra­tion of the death penal­ty in the state was dys­func­tion­al’ and close to col­lapse’, part­ly because of inad­e­quate fund­ing. 25 The Commission not­ed that the lengthy sen­tenc­ing and appeals process had result­ed in the aver­age length of time from death sen­tence to exe­cu­tion in California being 20 to 25 years, as opposed to the nation­al aver­age of 12 years. Though the Commission did not rec­om­mend abol­ish­ing the death penal­ty, it did note that California could save $100 mil­lion a year if the state replaced the pun­ish­ment with life impris­on­ment with­out parole. Furthermore, it argued a large amount of mon­ey was need­ed for sig­nif­i­cant improve­ments to occur. The Commission con­clud­ed that to reduce the back­log of cas­es alone would require almost dou­bling spend­ing on inves­ti­ga­tors and lawyers, trim­ming the offences that qual­i­fy for the death penal­ty, or sen­tenc­ing those sub­ject to the death penal­ty to life impris­on­ment with­out the pos­si­bil­i­ty of parole.

It was cost that the Democratic Governor of Maryland, Martin O’Malley, (D), used in his attempt to abol­ish the death penal­ty in his state at the begin­ning of 2007. Appealing to the vot­ers of Maryland, O’Malley not­ed that since 1978 Maryland had sen­tenced 56 peo­ple to the death penal­ty, which equalled approx­i­mate­ly $22.4 mil­lion more than the cost of impris­on­ment, or $4.5 mil­lion dol­lars for each of the five exe­cu­tions car­ried out by the state. Said O’Malley, If… we were to replace the death penal­ty with life with­out parole, that $22.4 mil­lion could pay for 500 addi­tion­al police offi­cers or pro­vide drug treat­ment for 10,000 of our addict­ed neigh­bours. Unlike the death penal­ty, these are invest­ments that save lives and pre­vent vio­lent crimes.’ 26 O’Malley failed in his bid in February 2007 when a state Senate com­mit­tee tied at five votes each, pre­vent­ing the bill from advanc­ing to the floor. 27
In the wake of the abo­li­tion of the death penal­ty in New Jersey at the end of 2007, how­ev­er, oppo­nents of the death penal­ty in Maryland were rein­vig­o­rat­ed. Rather than bring­ing the issue to a vote in the Senate, they cre­at­ed a com­mis­sion in 2008 to review the use of the death penal­ty in the state.

The Maryland Commission on Capital Punishment con­sist­ed of 23 mem­bers drawn from a broad range of back­grounds, includ­ing police offi­cers, cor­rec­tion­al offi­cers, fam­i­ly mem­bers of mur­der vic­tims, pros­e­cu­tors and defence attor­neys, and an inno­cent Maryland man who had been sen­tenced to death and lat­er exon­er­at­ed. 28

On 12 November 2008, after hear­ing over 35 hours of tes­ti­mo­ny over five months, the Commission vot­ed 13 – 9 to rec­om­mend the abo­li­tion of the death penal­ty in the state. At a press con­fer­ence, the Chair of the Commission, Benjamin Civiletti, a for­mer US Attorney General under Jimmy Carter, not­ed that though he did not oppose the death penal­ty on moral grounds, he sup­port­ed the Commission’s find­ings because of the cost of the death penal­ty, the poten­tial for an inno­cent per­son to be mis­tak­en­ly exe­cut­ed, the geo­graph­i­cal and racial dis­par­i­ties in its use, and the lack of per­sua­sive evi­dence to sup­port the argu­ment that the death penal­ty act­ed as a deter­rent against mur­der in Maryland. 29 Supporting the Commission’s rec­om­men­da­tions, Governor O’Malley not­ed that in 2008 the state was on course to sig­nif­i­cant­ly reduce homi­cides, even though it had not exe­cut­ed any­one since December 2006. Concluded O’Malley, The death penal­ty had absolute­ly noth­ing to do with that life­sav­ing and life-guard­ing process.” 30

Supporting the report, The Washington Post urged states law­mak­ers in Maryland to heed the march of his­to­ry’ and have the courage and the wis­dom to abol­ish this increas­ing­ly obso­lete and bar­bar­ic penalty.’31 A General Assembly vote on abo­li­tion is expect­ed in ear­ly 2009.


The Supreme Court And The Death Penalty

Though cost and the events in New Jersey, New York and Maryland high­light the pos­si­bil­i­ties for change at the state lev­el, for many the route to abo­li­tion still remains through the court sys­tem and, in par­tic­u­lar, the Supreme Court. Here, it is worth not­ing that the Supreme Court did sus­pend the death penal­ty in 1972, in the case of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The five to four vote in this case saw the Supreme Court rule that the death penal­ty con­sti­tut­ed a cru­el and unusu­al pun­ish­ment because states were impos­ing it in an arbi­trary or dis­crim­i­nate man­ner, with sev­er­al jus­tices express­ing the view that race appeared to be the sin­gle fac­tor deter­min­ing who was select­ed for cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment and who was not. As such, it con­tra­vened the Eighth Amendment. 32

Part of the argu­ment made by the Court was that state statutes failed to effec­tive­ly bal­ance the need to ensure con­sis­ten­cy in cap­i­tal sen­tenc­ing with the need to ensure fair­ness in indi­vid­ual cas­es. In response, states sought to address the imbal­ance, result­ing in the Supreme Court over­turn­ing Furman v. Georgia in 1976 with the case of Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), when it upheld the new death penal­ty statutes. 33 This was not, how­ev­er, the end of Supreme Court rul­ings on the death penal­ty.

Since 1976, the Court has grad­u­al­ly nar­rowed the cir­cum­stances in which cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment can be used. In par­tic­u­lar, in 2002, in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the Court held that it was uncon­sti­tu­tion­al to exe­cute defen­dants with men­tal retar­da­tion. The 6 – 3 rul­ing acknowl­edged a grow­ing nation­al con­sen­sus that had already seen a num­ber of states intro­duce leg­is­la­tion to pre­vent such exe­cu­tions. 34 Then, in 2005, in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), the Court struck down the death penal­ty for juve­niles (those who were under 18 when they com­mit­ted their crimes). Since 1976, 22 inmates had been exe­cut­ed for crimes com­mit­ted as juve­niles. This deci­sion affect­ed 71 inmates, and brought US law into com­pli­ance with inter­na­tion­al treaties and laws bar­ring this prac­tice. 35

In January 2008, how­ev­er, the Court began to hear oral argu­ments in the case of Ralph Baze and Thomas Bowling, Petitioners v John D. Rees, Commissioner, Kentucky Department of Corrections, et al., 533 U.S. _​(2008), which many hoped would fun­da­men­tal­ly change the way in which exe­cu­tions are car­ried out in the United States.

Since 1976, five meth­ods of exe­cu­tion have been used in America. The most com­mon is by lethal injec­tion, which has been used in 965 exe­cu­tions, with 155 by elec­tro­cu­tion, 11 in the Gas Chamber, 3 by hang­ing, and 2 by fir­ing squad. 36 Today, all but one of the death penal­ty states uses lethal injec­tion as their pri­ma­ry method of exe­cu­tion.

Until February, 2008, Nebraska was the only state that relied sole­ly on elec­tro­cu­tion. Then, on 8 February, 2008, the Nebraska Supreme Court ruled that elec­tro­cu­tion was a cru­el and unusu­al pun­ish­ment as the evi­dence showed that elec­tro­cu­tion inflect­ed intense and ago­niz­ing suf­fer­ing.’ Judge William Connolly wrote in the 6 – 1 opin­ion Condemned pris­on­ers must not be tor­tured to death, regard­less of their crimes.’ 37 However, though the Court argued elec­tro­cu­tion offend­ed rights under the state con­sti­tu­tion, it did not remove the death penal­ty, stat­ing that the state leg­is­la­ture could vote to have a death penal­ty, but not one that involved elec­tro­cu­tion. Legislators did so on 25 March, 2008, vot­ing in favour of retain­ing the death penal­ty by 28 – 20, but the state remains with­out a legal method of exe­cu­tion. When it decides, its most like­ly choice will be lethal injec­tion. 38

Under the pro­ce­dure fol­lowed by most states, lethal injec­tion involves the con­demned pris­on­er being strapped to a bed, sedat­ed with sodi­um thiopen­tal, inject­ed with pan­curo­ni­um bro­mide to col­lapse the lungs and diaphragm to stop breath­ing, and then giv­en potas­si­um chlo­ride to stop the heart. 39 This three-drug method of exe­cu­tion was devel­oped by an Oklahoma med­ical exam­in­er, Dr Jay Chapman, in 1977 who had lit­tle exper­tise in phar­ma­col­o­gy or anaes­the­sia (and who now oppos­es the use of the three drug pro­to­col). It was quick­ly adopt­ed by Texas, which became the first state to exe­cute an inmate by lethal injec­tion in 1982. Texas’s sequence was then copied by almost all the oth­er states that allow lethal injec­tion. 40

The method is con­tro­ver­sial. According to Sarah Tofte, of Human Rights Watch, there exists record­ed evi­dence of at least 40 botched exe­cu­tions, where pris­on­ers appear to have been poor­ly anes­thetised, expe­ri­enc­ing pain until the end but being unable to express it due to being paral­ysed. 41 Often executioner’s hands shake, and veins can be hard to find on inmates who were addict­ed to drugs. In one doc­u­ment­ed inci­dent, med­ical tech­ni­cians and a physi­cian took over an hour to find a suit­able vein for intra­venous access. 42 In Ohio one pris­on­er raised his head on the gur­ney to announce, It’s not work­ing’, whilst in Florida a pris­on­er sus­tained severe chem­i­cal burns on his arm whilst he strug­gled in pain for almost half an hour. 43

Since the intro­duc­tion of lethal injec­tion as a method of exe­cu­tion, lawyers for con­demned pris­on­ers, med­ical and even vet­eri­nary anaes­the­si­ol­o­gists have sug­gest­ed mod­i­fy­ing the pro­to­col to use a sin­gle lethal injec­tion of the bar­bi­tu­rate pen­to­bar­bi­tal. 44 They note that Oregon, which has legalised physi­cian-assist­ed sui­cides for humans, pre­scribes a sin­gle dose of pen­to­bar­bi­tal or a sim­i­lar bar­bi­tu­rate. Veterinary sur­geons also use a sin­gle, mas­sive dose of bar­bi­tu­rate to euth­a­nize an ani­mal. 45

Before 2007, over 40 cas­es had been sub­mit­ted to state and fed­er­al courts chal­leng­ing the con­sti­tu­tion­al­i­ty of lethal injec­tions. The Supreme Court final­ly agreed to con­sid­er the mat­ter in the case of Baze v Rees.

The case orig­i­nat­ed in Kentucky, cen­tred on two inmates, Ralph Baze and Thomas C. Bowling. Baze had been con­vict­ed of shoot­ing a sher­iff and a deputy sher­iff exe­cu­tion style when they tried to serve felony war­rants on him in 1992. Thomas C. Bowling fatal­ly shot a cou­ple and wound­ed their 2 year old son as they sat in their car in a park­ing lot after Bowling had crashed his vehi­cle into them. 46 Lawyers on their behalf argued the cock­tail of three drugs to numb, immo­bilise and kill did not con­sti­tute a pain­less death, there­by vio­lat­ing the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cru­el and unusu­al pun­ish­ment. Remarkably, the Kentucky inmates were not ask­ing to be spared exe­cu­tion or injec­tion, but rather they want­ed Kentucky to be forced to switch to the sin­gle, mas­sive dose of bar­bi­tu­rates favoured by the vet­eri­nary pro­fes­sion. 47

When the Supreme Court announced on 25 September 2007 that it would hear the case at the begin­ning of January 2008, it made it clear that it would be doing so with­in a nar­row frame­work, eval­u­at­ing whether the state’s lethal injec­tion pro­to­col car­ried an unnec­es­sary’ risk of pain. It would be the first time the Court has ruled on a method of exe­cu­tion since 1879, when it allowed Utah the right to use a fir­ing squad. 48

The impact of the Court’s deci­sion to review the case led to the intro­duc­tion of a de fac­to mora­to­ri­um on the death penal­ty as con­fu­sion sur­round­ing lethal injec­tions saw a num­ber of states sus­pend exe­cu­tions, notably California, Illinois, Florida, and three coun­ties in Texas, pend­ing the Supreme Court rul­ing. John Holdridge, Director of the American Civil Liberties Union’s Capital Punishment Project, opti­misti­cal­ly hoped that the mora­to­ri­um pre­sent­ed a rare oppor­tu­ni­ty to reflect on why we remain the only advanced Western democ­ra­cy to retain this pun­ish­ment.’ 49

The last exe­cu­tion to take place before the mora­to­ri­um was in Texas at 8.22pm on 25 September, 2007, when Michael Richard was exe­cut­ed by lethal injec­tion. His exe­cu­tion was extreme­ly con­tro­ver­sial. At 9 a.m. on that morn­ing, the Supreme Court had announced that it would hear the case of Baze v Rees. Richard’s lawyers rushed to file a new motion based on the high court’s rul­ing, but they expe­ri­enced com­put­er prob­lems and missed the 5pm dead­line. 50 His lawyers appealed to the Presiding Judge of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Sharon Keller, for 20 more min­utes to deliv­er their appeal because the courts did not accept com­put­er fil­ings, but were told We close at 5.’ Without a rul­ing from the state court, the lawyers could not prop­er­ly appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court to block the exe­cu­tion. 51 Richard’s was exe­cut­ed lat­er that evening.

October 2007 became the first month for three years dur­ing which no exe­cu­tions were car­ried out in the United States as the mora­to­ri­um rapid­ly spread through­out the remain­ing states in the US. 52 Roughly 40 cas­es involv­ing the death penal­ty were placed on hold as a result. 53

Considering events, Professor Semel, of the Death Penalty Clinic at Boalt Hall Law School, the University of California, Berkeley, argued that it would be inac­cu­rate and very pre­sump­tu­ous’ to call the sus­pen­sion a mora­to­ri­um, What we’re see­ing,’ he con­clud­ed, is a com­bi­na­tion of dif­fer­ent courts, and dif­fer­ent exec­u­tives, decid­ing to be pru­dent’ while wait­ing to see what the Supreme Court will do. 54 The Court did not offi­cial­ly sus­pend all cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment whilst it con­sid­ered Baze v. Rees – only the most com­mon method of apply­ing it. If any­thing, though the Court has nar­rowed the lim­its of cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment in recent years, it has con­tin­ued to reaf­firm its con­sti­tu­tion­al­i­ty. There was lit­tle to sug­gest it would not do the same in Baze v Rees.

To the dis­may of anti-cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment cam­paign­ers, on 16 April, 2008, two months ear­li­er than expect­ed, the Supreme Court upheld the con­sti­tu­tion­al­i­ty of exe­cu­tions by lethal injec­tion in Kentucky. By what the Los Angeles Times regard­ed as a sur­pris­ing­ly large 7 – 2 mar­gin’, the court ruled in Baze v Rees that the three-drug com­bi­na­tion used by Kentucky did not vio­late the Eighth Amendment. 55

In the opin­ion of Chief Justice John G. Roberts, the peti­tion­ers had not proved the risk of pain from mal­ad­min­is­tra­tion of a con­ced­ed­ly humane lethal injec­tion pro­to­col, and the fail­ure to adopt untried and untest­ed alter­na­tives, con­sti­tute cru­el and unusu­al pun­ish­ment.’ Roberts sug­gest­ed, Some risk of pain is inher­ent in any method of exe­cu­tion – no mat­ter how humane – if only from the prospect of error in fol­low­ing the required pro­ce­dure. It is clear, then, that the Constitution does not demand the avoid­ance of all risk of pain in car­ry­ing out exe­cu­tions.’ He also not­ed that the peti­tion­ers were not chal­leng­ing lethal injec­tion itself, but rather claim­ing the exis­tence of sig­nif­i­cant risk’ that the prop­er pro­ce­dures would not be fol­lowed result­ing in severe pain. This Roberts saw as a weak­ness in their appeal, argu­ing, Simply because an exe­cu­tion method may result in pain, either by acci­dent or as an inescapable con­se­quence of death, does not estab­lish the sort of objec­tive intol­er­a­ble risk of harm’ that qual­i­fies as cru­el and unusu­al.’ He added, a con­demned pris­on­er can­not suc­cess­ful­ly chal­lenge a state’s method of exe­cu­tion mere­ly by show­ing a slight­ly or mar­gin­al­ly safer alter­na­tive.’ Roberts feared that per­mit­ting such chal­lenges would threat­en to trans­form courts into boards of inquiry charged with deter­min­ing best prac­tices’ for exe­cu­tions, with each rul­ing sup­plant­ed by anoth­er round of lit­i­ga­tion tout­ing a new and improved method­ol­o­gy.’ 56

Though sev­en judges agreed with Roberts, six filed con­cur­ring opin­ions. Those agree­ing with Roberts and fil­ing an opin­ion were Samuel Alito, John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia, Stephen G. Breyer and Clarence Thomas. Justice Anthony Kennedy did not file an opin­ion, choos­ing to con­cur with Roberts. The two dis­sent­ing Justices were Ruth Bader Ginsberg and David Souter, the lat­ter con­cur­ring with the for­mer. In dis­sent­ing, Ginsberg was con­cerned that Kentucky’s lethal injec­tion pro­to­col lacked basic safe­guards used by oth­er states to con­firm that an inmate is uncon­scious before injec­tion of the sec­ond and third drugs.’ It could not guar­an­tee, she argued, that an inmate would die a pain­less death. Ginsberg rec­om­mend­ed send­ing the case back to Kentucky with instruc­tions to con­sid­er whether the omis­sion of these safe­guards pos­es an unto­ward, read­i­ly avoid­able risk of inflict­ing severe and unnec­es­sary pain.’ 57

Interestingly, though Stevens con­curred with the major­i­ty, he wrote for the first time that he con­sid­ered the death penal­ty to be uncon­sti­tu­tion­al. Quoting the late Justice Byron R. White, Stevens argued that impos­ing cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment rep­re­sent­ed the point­less and need­less extinc­tion of life with only mar­gin­al con­tri­bu­tions to any dis­cern­able social or pub­lic pur­pos­es.’ As a result, the death penal­ty was a patent­ly exces­sive and cru­el and unusu­al pun­ish­ment viola­tive of the Eighth Amendment.’ He con­curred with Roberts, how­ev­er, in order to uphold Supreme Court prece­dents that had upheld cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment and estab­lished a frame­work for eval­u­at­ing par­tic­u­lar exe­cu­tion meth­ods, and because, in his opin­ion, the Kentucky peti­tion­ers had failed to prove their case. 58

Reviewing the deci­sion, Linda Greenhouse of The New York Times believed that, While the 7‑to‑2 rul­ing did not shut the door on chal­lenges to the lethal injec­tion pro­to­cols in oth­er states, it set a stan­dard that will not be easy to meet.’ 59 Many legal schol­ars and attor­neys, how­ev­er, dis­agreed. In the imme­di­ate after­math of the deci­sion, some warned that the fact that the Court had pro­vid­ed six dif­fer­ent opin­ions could gen­er­ate more chal­lenges to lethal injec­tion as a method of exe­cu­tion. Warned Brent Westerfeld, an Attorney in Indiana who rep­re­sents death row inmates, Even though there obvi­ous­ly was a plu­ral­i­ty deci­sion, there’s no clear major­i­ty deci­sion as to the stan­dards. You’re going to end up with a lot of courts try­ing to inter­pret what the court was say­ing.’ 60 Elisabeth A. Semel, Director of the Death Penalty Clinic at the University of California, Berkeley, agreed that the frac­tured deci­sion, the sparse infor­ma­tion avail­able about prac­tices in Kentucky, and the new stan­dard announced by the court would lead to much more lit­i­ga­tion, par­tic­u­lar­ly in states were flaws in the admin­is­ter­ing of the three drug method were exposed. 61

According to the jour­nal­ist Adam Liptak, lawyers rep­re­sent­ing death row inmates now faced two chal­lenges: One is to dis­tin­guish their state’s pro­ce­dures from that used in Kentucky. The oth­er is to over­come the high evi­den­tiary bar Chief Justice John G. Roberts set for all chal­lenges to meth­ods of exe­cu­tion.’ Roberts had argued in the plu­ral­i­ty opin­ion that lethal injec­tion pro­to­cols sub­stan­tial­ly sim­i­lar’ to that used in Kentucky would be immune from chal­lenges under the court’s new stan­dards. But, Liptak not­ed, like Semel, that lit­tle was known about Kentucky’s pro­ce­dures for admin­is­ter­ing the chem­i­cals. Death row inmates would now be required to prove both a demon­strat­ed risk of severe pain and that the risk was sub­stan­tial when com­pared to avail­able alter­na­tives. However, as Deborah W. Denno, a law pro­fes­sor at Fordham University, com­ment­ed ‘“Substantially sim­i­lar?” I’m not sure what this is or what that would con­sti­tute.’ 62

Indeed, the Justices them­selves expressed their con­cerns that Robert’s opin­ion would lead to fur­ther lit­i­ga­tion. Justice Stevens observed The ques­tion of whether a sim­i­lar three-drug pro­to­col may be used in oth­er states remains open, and may well be answered dif­fer­ent­ly in a future case on the basis of a more com­plete record.’ Justice Thomas was blunter, warn­ing today’s deci­sion is sure to engen­der more lit­i­ga­tion,’ because, we have left the states with noth­ing resem­bling a bright-line rule.’ Whilst Stevens even urged states to con­sid­er aban­don­ing one of the three drugs – the paralysing drug that would leave an unse­dat­ed inmate con­scious but unable to move, breath or cry out. 63 Commenting on this divi­sion, Jordan M. Streiker, a law pro­fes­sor at the University of Texas, pre­dict­ed We will end up large­ly where we were before Baze. It has set us on a course in which there will be con­tin­u­ing chal­lenges, efforts to doc­u­ment botched exe­cu­tions and efforts to con­tin­ue to explore alter­na­tive pro­to­cols.’ 64

Three weeks after the deci­sion, at 7.51pm on 6 May, 2008, Georgia exe­cut­ed William Earl Lynd, aged 53, by lethal injec­tion. It was the first exe­cu­tion since 25 September, 2007. Lynd had shot his girl­friend Ginger Moore, in 1988 while the two were high on Valium, mar­i­jua­na and alco­hol. Both the US Supreme Court and Georgia Supreme Court reject­ed his appeal for a stay of exe­cu­tion. 65 Somewhat embar­rassed, the Governor of Georgia, Sonny Perdue, announced, It was not some­thing we want­ed to nec­es­sar­i­ly be first at. It was just the fact that this had been there.’ 66

If the anti-cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment lob­by was dis­ap­point­ed with the deci­sion in Baze v. Rees, they were quick­ly grant­ed some solace in the Supreme Court rul­ing that was made in the case of Patrick Kennedy, Petitioner v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. _​(2008) on 25 June, 2008.67 This case cen­tred on Patrick Kennedy who was sen­tenced to death in Louisiana in 1998 for the vio­lent rape of his eight year old step­daugh­ter, an attack so bru­tal that the child required exten­sive surgery. 68

Reflecting grow­ing pub­lic con­cern over sex offend­ers, Louisiana had intro­duced a law in 1995 that allowed the death penal­ty to be grant­ed for any­one who raped a child under the age of 12. By the begin­ning of 2008, six states in America autho­rised the death penal­ty for those con­vict­ed of rap­ing a child. 69 In a close 5 – 4 deci­sion, the Supreme Court ruled in Kennedy v. Louisiana that it was uncon­sti­tu­tion­al to exe­cute some­one who rapes a child. Had the deci­sion not favoured Kennedy, he would have become the first con­vict­ed rapist in the U.S. to be exe­cut­ed in a case in which the vic­tim was not killed since 1964. 70

Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote in the major­i­ty deci­sion there is a dis­tinc­tion between inten­tion­al first-degree mur­der on the one hand and non­homi­cide crimes against indi­vid­ual per­sons, even includ­ing child rape, on the oth­er.’ Though the lat­ter might be dev­as­tat­ing in their harm’, Kennedy wrote, they can­not be com­pared to mur­der in their sever­i­ty and irrev­o­ca­bil­i­ty.’ Kennedy then made a more sur­pris­ing point that both strength­ened the abo­li­tion­ist cause and also sug­gest­ed a pos­si­ble shift in the Court’s view of the death penal­ty. When deter­min­ing what pun­ish­ment the Eighth Amendment pro­hibits, he argued, evolv­ing stan­dards of decen­cy that mark the progress of a matur­ing soci­ety’ must be tak­en into account. It is this, he not­ed, that had led to the Court rul­ing that the men­tal­ly retard­ed and those who had com­mit­ted crimes as juve­niles could not be exe­cut­ed. As a result, this deci­sion was part of a process that was plac­ing increas­ing restric­tions on who could and could not be exe­cut­ed. This, he believed, reflect­ed pub­lic opin­ion. Kennedy, sup­port­ed by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, wrote, we con­clude there is a nation­al con­sen­sus against cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment for the crime of child rape.’ In short, the jus­tices wrote, such stan­dards for­bid the use of cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment for any crime against an indi­vid­ual oth­er than mur­der or those who com­mit crimes against the state. 71

The con­ser­v­a­tive wing of the Court strong­ly con­demned the major­i­ty deci­sion. 72 Responding to Kennedy’s com­ments, Justice Alito Jr. wrote, I have lit­tle doubt that, in the eyes of ordi­nary Americans, the very worst child rapist – preda­tors who seek out and inflict seri­ous phys­i­cal and emo­tion­al injury on defence­less young chil­dren — are the epit­o­me of moral deprav­i­ty.’ 73

Many child advo­cate groups, how­ev­er, sup­port­ed the out­come. Texas Association Against Sexual Assault, a non-prof­it vic­tim advo­ca­cy group rep­re­sent­ing 80 rape cri­sis cen­tres, not­ed, Most child sex­u­al abuse vic­tims are abused by a fam­i­ly mem­ber of close fam­i­ly friend. The real­i­ty is that child vic­tims and their fam­i­lies don’t want to be respon­si­ble for send­ing a grand­par­ent, cousin or long time fam­i­ly friend to death row.’ 74 Furthermore, vic­tims would most like­ly have had to tes­ti­fy repeat­ed­ly dur­ing the extend­ed appeals process that sur­rounds many cap­i­tal cas­es, pro­long­ing the trau­ma.

In addi­tion, as Kennedy point­ed out, in 2005 there were over 5,700 inci­dents of rape of chil­dren under the age of 12, more than twice the num­ber of inten­tion­al mur­der vic­tims of all ages. 75 It would be impos­si­ble for the legal sys­tem to cope with such num­bers even if the death penal­ty was called for in only a frac­tion of cas­es.

Politicians, how­ev­er, quick­ly made the issue a polit­i­cal foot­ball. The Republican Governor of Louisiana, Bobby Jindal, called the rul­ing incred­i­bly absurd’, adding that his offi­cials would eval­u­ate ways to amend our statute to main­tain death as a penal­ty for this hor­rif­ic crime.’ Alabama Attorney General Troy King announced, Anybody in the coun­try who cares about chil­dren should be out­raged’, dra­mat­i­cal­ly claim­ing that the Supreme Court was cre­at­ing a sit­u­a­tion where the coun­try is a less safe place to grow up.’ 76

Both pres­i­den­tial can­di­dates also quick­ly denounced the court’s action. Said John McCain, the pre­sump­tive Republican nom­i­nee, That there is a judge any­where in America who does not believe that the rape of a child rep­re­sents the most heinous of crimes, which is deserv­ing of the most seri­ous of pun­ish­ments, is pro­found­ly dis­turb­ing.’ The rul­ing was, in his view, an assault on law enforcement’s efforts to pun­ish these heinous felons for the most despi­ca­ble crime.’ 77 Barack Obama, the pre­sump­tive Democratic can­di­date, said, I think that the rape of a small child, 6 or 8 years old, is a heinous crime, and if a state makes a deci­sion that under nar­row, lim­it­ed, well-defined cir­cum­stances, the death penal­ty is at least poten­tial­ly applic­a­ble, that does not vio­late our Constitution.’ 78 McCain’s response was pre­dictable. Obama sur­prised many as he had once been a crit­ic of the death penal­ty, argu­ing in his mem­oirs that it was not a deter­rent to crime. He had even cit­ed the near-abol­ish­ment of the death penal­ty in Illinois as one of his leg­isla­tive accom­plish­ments. But even Obama had con­ced­ed in his mem­oirs that there were crimes so heinous, such as mass mur­der” and the rape and mur­der of a child … that the com­mu­ni­ty is jus­ti­fied in express­ing the full mea­sure of its out­rage by met­ing out the ulti­mate pun­ish­ment.” 79 Given that 2008 was also an elec­tion year, his announce­ment may have also reflect­ed a move towards the cen­tre as he attempt­ed to appeal to more tra­di­tion­al vot­ers on life-and-death issues.

It was assumed by most com­men­ta­tors that the pro-death lob­by would seek to over­turn the deci­sion by adopt­ing one of two strate­gies – wait­ing for a change in the make­up of the Supreme Court, or per­suad­ing leg­is­la­tures to redraw death penal­ty laws. Obama’s vic­to­ry may make the for­mer less like­ly as he may choose to appoint judges who take a more lib­er­al view of cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment (though this, in itself, is not cer­tain).

In actu­al­i­ty, the Kennedy deci­sion was chal­lenged very quick­ly on 21 July, 2008, when Louisiana pros­e­cu­tors, backed by a let­ter signed by 85 mem­bers of Congress, asked the Supreme Court to revis­it the Kennedy deci­sion. According to The Chicago Tribune, their request was based on the fail­ure’ of any­one in the case, includ­ing lawyers on both sides and the jus­tices them­selves, to take into account a change in fed­er­al law in 2006 that autho­rizes the death penal­ty for mem­bers of the mil­i­tary con­vict­ed of rape’ of a minor. 80 President Bush signed an Executive Order in September in 2007 to imple­ment the change made by Congress.

The Supreme Court refused to rehear the case in October in Patrick Kennedy, Petitioner v Louisiana, on Petition of Rehearing, 554 U.S. _​(2008). Writing the major­i­ty opin­ion, Justice Kennedy argued autho­riza­tion of the death penal­ty in the mil­i­tary sphere does not indi­cate that the penal­ty is con­sti­tu­tion­al in the civil­ian con­text.’ Furthermore, he con­clud­ed That the Manual for Courts-Martial retains the death penal­ty for rape of a child or an adult when com­mit­ted by a mem­ber of the mil­i­tary does not draw into ques­tion our con­clu­sions that there is a con­sen­sus against the death penal­ty for the crime in the civil­ian con­text and that the penal­ty here is uncon­sti­tu­tion­al.’ 81

Scathingly, Justice Scalia, attacked Kennedy, argu­ing there was no nation­al con­sen­sus that opposed the death penal­ty for child rape. He not­ed that the bill pro­vid­ing for the death penal­ty for child rape passed in the Senate 95 – 0 and in the House 374 – 41. It is dif­fi­cult to imag­ine’, he con­clud­ed, how rape of a child could some­times be deserv­ing of death for a sol­dier but nev­er for a civil­ian.’ 82 However, the Court’s deci­sion ensures the dis­tinc­tion remains.

The Supreme Court was involved in anoth­er con­tro­ver­sial case in 2008, which cen­tred on the plight of Jose Medellin, a Mexican who had lived in the USA since child­hood. In 1993 Medellin was found guilty of the bru­tal gang rape and mur­der of two girls in Texas. He chal­lenged his con­vic­tion, how­ev­er, because Texas law offi­cials had failed to inform him of his right under the 1963 Vienna Convention to request Consular Affairs to speak with the Mexican con­sulate on his behalf. The state admit­ted its error, lead­ing to an inter­na­tion­al dis­pute involv­ing the International Court of Justice — the United Nation’s high­est court — which ruled that Medellin and 4 oth­er Mexican nation­als on death row in the United States were enti­tled to review and recon­sid­er­a­tion (of their sen­tences)’ and that the US should take all mea­sures to ensure (they) are not exe­cut­ed pend­ing judgement’.83 President Bush ordered Texas to com­ply by exec­u­tive order in 2005, but the state refused, cit­ing the suprema­cy of state laws. The Supreme Court upheld Texas’s posi­tion in the case of Jose Ernesto Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. _​(2008), in a 6 – 3 vote, argu­ing that the ICJ rul­ing was not bind­ing domes­ti­cal­ly unless Congress had enact­ed statutes imple­ment­ing the law, or the treaty was self-exe­cut­ing, and that the President did not have the con­sti­tu­tion­al pow­er to enforce inter­na­tion­al treaties or deci­sions of the International Court of Justice. 84 The Court’s rul­ing effec­tive­ly allowed the exe­cu­tion to go ahead.


Conclusion

The de fac­to mora­to­ri­um on lethal injec­tions whilst Baze v. Rees was being con­sid­ered con­tributed to 2008 wit­ness­ing the low­est num­ber of exe­cu­tions in United States for 14 years. But, it is also the case that since 2001 the trend has been for the num­ber of exe­cu­tions, and the num­bers of those con­demned to death, to decline.

It is, how­ev­er, unlike­ly that the death penal­ty will be abol­ished in the USA in the near future. Public sup­port for its use is still in the major­i­ty. Furthermore, though the num­ber of exe­cu­tions has declined in recent years, 23 exe­cu­tions are sched­uled for the first five months of 2009, sug­gest­ing a pos­si­ble increase in the num­ber of death sen­tences car­ried out this year. Following recent pat­terns, almost all of the 23 are in the south, with half in Texas. 85

For now abo­li­tion­ists may have to accept that any changes that occur will be grad­ual. Though the Supreme Court con­tin­ues to sup­port the view that the death penal­ty is not a cru­el or unusu­al pun­ish­ment’, in 2008 it lim­it­ed con­sid­er­ably the offences for which it can now be applied, name­ly mur­der or offences against the State. With an appar­ent lib­er­al pres­i­dent tak­ing office this year, it is like­ly that any appoint­ments he makes to the Court may con­tin­ue this restrict­ed inter­pre­ta­tion of cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment.

Jurors and pros­e­cu­tors con­tin­ue to appear to be more appre­hen­sive about sen­tenc­ing pris­on­ers to death, fear­ing con­demn­ing the inno­cent, and there are a grow­ing num­ber of states that have intro­duced the option of life impris­on­ment with­out parole.86 Indeed, an increas­ing num­ber of states are begin­ning to express their unease at the prob­lems sur­round­ing the death penal­ty, not least the ever-grow­ing list of exon­er­a­tions, the ques­tions that still remain regard­ing the use of lethal injec­tion, the racial dis­par­i­ties, and the cost. This last point may be a sig­nif­i­cant tool for the abo­li­tion­ists as the country’s eco­nom­ic cri­sis deep­ens. If this is attached to the idea that con­vict­ed pris­on­ers will be giv­en life with­out the pos­si­bil­i­ty of parole, it may per­suade more to ques­tion the future legit­i­ma­cy of cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment, as the for­mer appears far more cost effec­tive than the lat­ter.

Ultimately, America remains unusu­al in the west­ern world in its use of the death penal­ty. Given the accu­sa­tions of human rights abus­es that the USA has suf­fered since 2003, inter­na­tion­al pub­lic opin­ion may be an addi­tion­al fac­tor that may be con­sid­ered by pol­i­cy­mak­ers, judges, and jurors, par­tic­u­lar­ly as the United States of America finds itself amongst an ever-dimin­ish­ing num­ber of coun­tries that prac­tise cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment.

On 18 December, 2007, the United Nations General Assembly vot­ed 104 – 54 in favour of a non-bind­ing res­o­lu­tion for a glob­al mora­to­ri­um on exe­cu­tions. There were 29 absten­tions. The res­o­lu­tion, co-spon­sored by the EU and 60 oth­er coun­tries, called on coun­tries to: pro­gres­sive­ly restrict the use of the death penal­ty, reduce the num­ber of offences for which it can be imposed, and estab­lish a mora­to­ri­um on exe­cu­tions with a view to abol­ish­ing the death penal­ty. The United States opposed the res­o­lu­tion, vot­ing against its European allies and Israel, and sid­ing with Iran, China and Syria. 87

As Anne Quindlen con­clud­ed in Newsweek, Hardly any oth­er civ­i­lized place does this any­more…. The ques­tion isn’t whether exe­cu­tions can be made pain­less: it’s whether they’re wrong. Everything else is just quib­bling.’ 88