Prof. Baldus Statement 

Date: June 112001 

To: The Honorable Russell D. Feingold
Committee on the Judiciary, U. S. Senate
716 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington D.C. 20510 – 4904

From: David C. Baldus
Joseph B. Tye Distinguished Professor of Law
College of Law, University of Iowa Re: DOJ report on the Federal Death Penalty System (June 62001)

I have read U.S. Department of Justice, The Federal Death Penalty System: Supplementary Data, Analysis and Revised Protocols for Capital Case Review (June 6, 2001) (“the report”), which sup­ple­ments the DOJ report of September 12, 2000. The fol­low­ing com­ments explain why in the face of the find­ings and data in the DOJ September 2000 report, the lat­est DOJ report utter­ly fails to con­vince me that there is no sig­nif­i­cant risk of racial unfair­ness and geo­graph­ic arbi­trari­ness in the admin­is­tra­tion of the fed­er­al death penal­ty. I believe there is still the just as much rea­son to be con­cerned about these issues as there was when the September 2000 report was issued. 

1. The report com­plete­ly over­looks the evi­dence of race-of-vic­tim dis­crim­i­na­tion doc­u­ment­ed in the September 122000 report.

A main theme of the lat­est report (p. 10) is that the death penal­ty autho­riza­tion rate is high­er for whites (.38) than it is for blacks (.25) and Hispanics (.20). These are the same fig­ures that appeared in the September 2000 report. The lat­est report’s empha­sis on these sta­tis­tics appears to sug­gest that white defen­dants are actu­al­ly treat­ed more puni­tive­ly than minority defendants.

A more plau­si­ble expla­na­tion for the high­er autho­riza­tion rates for the white defen­dants is plain­ly doc­u­ment­ed in the September report ? (1) white defen­dants are more like­ly to have killed whites1 and (2) the U.S. Attorney charg­ing and DOJ autho­riza­tion rates are much high­er in white-vic­tim cas­es than they are in minor­i­ty-vic­tim cas­es. For exam­ple, data in the September 2000 report indi­cate that the Attorney General (AG) autho­riza­tion rate for cap­i­tal pros­e­cu­tions is .37 (61/​167) in white-vic­tim cas­es and .21(81/383) in minor­i­ty-vic­tim cas­es — a 16 per­cent­age point dif­fer­ence that is sta­tis­ti­cal­ly sig­nif­i­cant at the .001 lev­el. The more puni­tive treat­ment of white-vic­tim cas­es is a plau­si­ble alter­na­tive expla­na­tion for the high­er autho­riza­tion rates in white-defen­dant cas­es that the new DOJ report does not even rec­og­nize, let alone dispel.

The September 2000 report also doc­u­ments race-of-vic­tim dis­par­i­ties in the actu­al impo­si­tion of death sen­tences in the fed­er­al sys­tem. Among all death-eli­gi­ble offend­ers, those data indi­cate that the death-sen­tenc­ing rate from 1995 to 2000 is twice as high in white vic­tim cas­es as it is in minor­i­ty vic­tim cas­es. Nationwide, the rates are .05 (10/​198) for the white-vic­tim cas­es ver­sus .02 (10/​446) for the minor­i­ty-vic­tim cas­es; in the eleven states in which death sen­tences were actu­al­ly imposed, the rate in the white-vic­tim cas­es was .17 (10/​59) ver­sus .08 (10/​119) in the minor­i­ty-vic­tim cas­es — a nine per­cent­age-point difference.2

These are the same kinds of race-of-vic­tim dis­par­i­ties doc­u­ment­ed in McCleskey v. Kemp .3 The lat­est report sim­ply ignores the data on race-of-vic­tim dis­par­i­ties in the charg­ing and autho­riza­tion process, and in the actu­al impo­si­tion of fed­er­al death sentences.

2. The report con­founds the issue of region­al dis­par­i­ties” in the admin­is­tra­tion of the fed­er­al death penal­ty with the issue of racial dis­par­i­ties in the dis­tri­b­u­tion of death eligible cases.

The report argues that we should not expect the pro­por­tions of black, white, and Hispanic offend­ers among death-eli­gi­ble cas­es that are accept­ed for fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tion to cor­re­spond to the racial and eth­nic pro­por­tions in the gen­er­al pop­u­la­tion.” (p.13) Perhaps, but that is not the ques­tion. The real issue in this regard is the racial com­po­si­tion of the pool of death-eli­gi­ble cas­es that are not accept­ed for fed­er­al pros­e­cu­tion. The report offers no data on that ques­tion. As a result, we do not know to what extent the death-eli­gi­ble cas­es that were pros­e­cut­ed in fed­er­al court are rep­re­sen­ta­tive of all homi­cides that could have been charged as fed­er­al cap­i­tal crimes, in the dis­tricts that are dis­cussed in the report (pp.14 – 18) and in the coun­try as a whole.

More impor­tant­ly, the report seeks to equate its argu­ments con­cern­ing geo­graph­ic dis­par­i­ties in the racial dis­tri­b­u­tion of death-eli­gi­ble cas­es with an expla­na­tion for clear­ly doc­u­ment­ed geo­graph­ic and region­al dis­par­i­ties in the admin­is­tra­tion of the death penal­ty. (Pp. 17 – 18) This is extreme­ly mis­lead­ing. The pat­terns that need to be stud­ied are dif­fer­ences between regions in the rates at which death sen­tences are (a) sought by United State’s Attorneys, (b) approved by the Attorney General, and (c) imposed by juries.

The September 2000 report clear­ly shows that in prac­tice the fed­er­al death sen­tenc­ing sys­tem is large­ly a Southern pro­gram. Twelve of the 19 men on fed­er­al death row as of September were sen­tenced in the South, includ­ing 6 from Texas and 4 from Virginia. The new report focus­es on region­al dif­fer­ences in the racial com­po­si­tion of the pools of poten­tial cap­i­tal cas­es that the dis­tricts have gen­er­at­ed (p. 17). This has noth­ing to do with region­al dis­par­i­ties in the rates at which death eli­gi­ble defen­dants in the sys­tem are cap­i­tal­ly charged and sen­tenced to death. 

3. The report presents no data or oth­er com­pelling rea­sons to dis­pel con­cerns about the exer­cise of dis­cre­tion by U.S. Attorneys in the post-autho­riza­tion stage of the process.

One the most strik­ing find­ings of the September 2000 report is that in the peri­od after the AG has approved a cap­i­tal pros­e­cu­tion, 48% of white defen­dants avoid the risk of a death penal­ty by enter­ing a plea agree­ment to a non-cap­i­tal charge, while the rates that blacks and Hispanics enter such agree­ments are 25% and 28% respec­tive­ly. (p.19) The depart­ment is obvi­ous­ly con­cerned about this issue because it plans to lim­it the pow­er of U.S. Attorneys to enter such agree­ments with­out AG approval. (p. 22)

The report seeks to dis­pel con­cerns cre­at­ed by these data by point­ing out first that it takes two to make a plea agree­ment” and the data do not reflect racial dif­fer­ences in the rates at which the gov­ern­ment offered post-autho­riza­tion plea agree­ments. This argu­ment rais­es an empir­i­cal ques­tion about the 62 cas­es (as of the September 2000 report) in which a post-autho­riza­tion plea agree­ment was not reached. Was a plea bar­gain offered by the pros­e­cu­tion in these cas­es and reject­ed by the defense, or was none offered? It would have been easy for the DOJ to ask its own pros­e­cu­tors whether they offered plea agree­ments in these cas­es. Apparently, it was not done.

The report fur­ther argues that even if dif­fer­en­tial accep­tance rates by white and minor­i­ty defen­dants did not explain the race dis­par­i­ties in the post-autho­riza­tion guilty pleas, the September 2000 report’s find­ings on this issue would not be sug­ges­tive of bias by the U.S. Attorney’s offices.” (p. 20) The argu­ment is that the detec­tion of dis­crim­i­na­tion by U.S. Attorneys must rest on an analy­sis of what hap­pens in the process as a whole” and that deci­sions tak­en at the final plea stage are unin­for­ma­tive as pos­si­ble indi­ca­tions of bias by the U.S. Attorney offices.” (p.20) Certainly it is impor­tant to view the sys­tem as a whole, but pri­or research demon­strates that race dis­par­i­ties may oper­ate at dis­crete stages in a deci­sion mak­ing process that over­all appears to be even­hand­ed. There is seri­ous cause for wor­ry here, and the report makes no attempt to address it.

The claim that no dif­fer­en­tial treat­ment exists in the post-autho­riza­tion plea stage is a mere asser­tion with no evi­dence what­ev­er to sup­port it. Without data on the com­par­a­tive cul­pa­bil­i­ty of the offend­ers (and the race of the vic­tims) in the cas­es affect­ed by these post-autho­riza­tion pleas bar­gain­ing deci­sions, one has no idea the extent to which sim­i­lar­ly sit­u­at­ed defen­dants were in fact treated comparably. 

4. The report pro­vides no com­pelling rea­son for the DOJ’s fail­ure to autho­rize a com­pre­hen­sive state of the art study of fair­ness in the admin­is­tra­tion of the fed­er­al death penalty system.

The report notes a meet­ing of researchers and prac­ti­tion­ers on January 10, 2001” in Washington D.C. to con­sid­er the fea­si­bil­i­ty of con­duct­ing a com­pre­hen­sive empir­i­cal study and eval­u­a­tion of fair­ness in the admin­is­tra­tion of the fed­er­al sys­tem. (p.11) I was one of the researchers at that meeting.

The report cor­rect­ly states that there was gen­er­al agree­ment at the January meet­ing that the con­duct of such a study would entail a mul­ti-year research ini­tia­tive.” Two years would be the like­ly time line. In the mean­time, half a year has passed since that meet­ing, and nine months since the release of the ini­tial report, and nei­ther the NIJ nor any oth­er agency of the Department of Justice has tak­en any vis­i­ble step to begin to make such a study pos­si­ble. Quite the oppo­site. Attorney General Ashcroft’s tes­ti­mo­ny last week sug­gest­ed that he believes that the idea should be aban­doned.
The report also states that dis­cus­sion” at the January 10 meet­ing indi­cat­ed,” that such a study could not be expect­ed to yield defin­i­tive answers con­cern­ing the rea­sons for dis­par­i­ties in fed­er­al death penal­ty cas­es.” This was cer­tain­ly not the con­sen­sus of the researchers at the January 10 meet­ing. On the con­trary, the con­sen­sus was that such a study would pro­vide the best pos­si­ble evi­dence on the ques­tion. Certainly the results of such a study would yield far more defin­i­tive answers to the issue of racial fair­ness in the sys­tem than the argu­ments pre­sent­ed in the department’s latest report.

The new report offers no rea­son at all why such a study should not be con­duct­ed even if it would require up to two years to com­plete. It also offers no rea­son why the DOJ appears unwill­ing to iden­ti­fy by defen­dant name and dock­et num­ber the more than 700 death-eli­gi­ble cas­es that make up the data­base for its lat­est study. With this infor­ma­tion inde­pen­dent researchers could col­lect data on the cas­es in the DOJ data­base and con­duct the kind of study that would pro­vide the best evi­dence avail­able on the ques­tion of fair­ness in the fed­er­al death sentencing system. 

5. The report mis­con­ceives the nature of race dis­crim­i­na­tion in the admin­is­tra­tion of the fed­er­al death penalty.

A main theme of the report is that the core issue of racial fair­ness is whether U.S. Attorneys are con­scious­ly engaged in favoritism towards White defen­dants.” (p. 11) In oth­er words, are their deci­sions based on invid­i­ous” racial rea­sons (p.12) or moti­vat­ed by bias” (p. 20) or a par­tic­u­lar desire to secure the death penal­ty for minor­i­ty defen­dants.” (p. 17) This states the issue far too crude­ly. No one with an under­stand­ing of the sys­tem sug­gests that it is dri­ven by such a con­scious and bla­tant ani­mus against minor­i­ty defen­dants or defen­dants whose vic­tims are white.

The con­cern about racial unfair­ness in the sys­tem is whether defen­dants with sim­i­lar lev­els of crim­i­nal cul­pa­bil­i­ty and death­wor­thi­ness are treat­ed com­pa­ra­bly or dif­fer­ent­ly because of their race or the race of their vic­tims. The rea­sons for dif­fer­en­tial treat­ment by U.S. Attorneys — and by agents of the FBI, the DEA and oth­er are fed­er­al law enforce­ment agen­cies — are almost cer­tain­ly non­con­scious. More impor­tant­ly, the rea­sons for the dif­fer­en­tial treat­ment of sim­i­lar­ly sit­u­at­ed offend­ers on the basis of their race or the race of the vic­tim are irrel­e­vant. It is the fact that dif­fer­en­tial treat­ment can­not be explained by legit­i­mate case char­ac­ter­is­tics that makes it moral­ly and legal­ly objec­tion­able, when it exists. Without a sys­tem­at­ic study based on full infor­ma­tion con­cern­ing the crim­i­nal cul­pa­bil­i­ty and the race of the vic­tims of all of the death eli­gi­ble offend­ers, we will remain in the dark about whether unex­plained dif­fer­en­tial treat­ment based on the race of the defen­dant and vic­tim exists in the fed­er­al death penal­ty sys­tem, and if so, what causes it. 

Endnotes:
1. For the cas­es for which both race-of-defen­dant and race-of-vic­tim data are avail­able, 92% (109/​119) of the white defen­dant cas­es involved a white victim.

2. The race-of-vic­tim dis­par­i­ty nation­wide is sig­nif­i­cant at the .06 lev­el while the dis­par­i­ty in the states in which death sen­tences have been imposed is sig­nif­i­cant at the .09 lev­el. The states in which death sen­tences were imposed between 1995 and 2000 are Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia.
Of par­tic­u­lar rel­e­vance are the race-of-vic­tim dis­par­i­ties in case involv­ing black defen­dants. Nationwide, in black defendant/​white vic­tim cas­es, the death-sen­tenc­ing rate was .11 (6/​55) while in the black defendant/​minority vic­tim cas­es, the rate was .03 (7/​253), an 8 per­cent­age-point dif­fer­ence sig­nif­i­cant at the .01 lev­el. In the eleven death-sen­tenc­ing states, the death-sen­tenc­ing rate in the black defendant/​white vic­tim cas­es was .24 (6/​25) while in the black defendant/​minority vic­tim cas­es, the rate was .07 (7/​95), a 17 per­cent­age-point dif­fer­ence sig­nif­i­cant at the .02 level.

3. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).

4. The report’s argu­ment also over­looks the fact that many of the post-autho­riza­tion plea agree­ments are made in cas­es in which the U.S. Attorney’s ini­tial rec­om­men­da­tion to waive the death penal­ty was over­ruled by the AG, a cir­cum­stance that needs to be fac­tored into any analy­sis of the post-authorization decisions.