U.S. Supreme Court: Abdur’Rahman v. Bell

The Case

On December 10, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court dis­missed with­out decid­ing the case of Abu-Ali Abdur’Rahman, who is on death row in Tennessee. The Court heard argu­ments in the case on November 6, 2002, but declined to issue a rul­ing. Justice Stevens dis­sent­ed from the order, stating:

He has argued that the evi­dence already pre­sent­ed to the court proves that the pros­e­cu­tor was guilty of seri­ous mis­con­duct; that affi­davits exe­cut­ed by eight mem­bers of the jury that sen­tenced him to death estab­lish that they would have not vot­ed in favor of the death penal­ty if they had known the facts that the pros­e­cu­tor improp­er­ly with­held or con­cealed from them; and that it is inequitable to allow an erro­neous pro­ce­dur­al rul­ing to deprive him of a rul­ing on the mer­its. In this Court, a brief filed by for­mer pros­e­cu­tors as ami­ci curae urges us to address the mis­con­duct claim, stress­ing the impor­tance of con­demn­ing the con­duct dis­closed by the record. Arguably it would be appro­pri­ate for us to do so .…

(Abdur’Rahman v. Bell, 537 U.S. 88 (2002) (Stevens, J., dis­sent­ing from dismissal),

Prior to the Courts grant of cer­tio­rari, a low­er court ruled that it was too late for Abdur’Rahman to present new evi­dence in fed­er­al court. Abdur’Rahman’s peti­tion for cer­tio­rari asked the court to con­sid­er: (1) whether the Sixth Circuit erred in hold­ing, in square con­flict with deci­sions of the Supreme Court and of oth­er cir­cuits, that every Rule 60(b) Motion con­sti­tutes a pro­hib­it­ed ​“sec­ond or suc­ces­sive” habeas peti­tion as a mat­ter of law, and (2) whether a court of appeals abus­es its dis­cre­tion in refus­ing to per­mit con­sid­er­a­tion of a vital inter­ven­ing legal devel­op­ment when the fail­ure to do so pre­cludes a habeas peti­tion­er from ever receiv­ing any adju­di­ca­tion of his claims on the mer­its. (Associated Press, 4/​22/​02)

On October 21, 2002, the Supreme Court grant­ed the motion of respon­dent and Alabama, as ami­cus curi­ae, for divid­ed argu­ment and for leave to par­tic­i­pate in the oral argu­ment as ami­cus curi­ae.

On October 24, the par­ties were direct­ed to file sup­ple­men­tal briefs address­ing the fol­low­ing ques­tions on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, October 31, 2002: ​“Did the Sixth Circuit have juris­dic­tion to review the dis­trict court’s order, dat­ed November 27, 2001, trans­fer­ring Petitioner’s Rule 60(b) Motion to the Sixth Circuit pur­suant to 28 U.S.C. 1631? Does this Court have juris­dic­tion to review the Sixth Circuit’s order, dat­ed February 11, 2002, deny­ing leave to file a sec­ond habeas corpus petition?”

Legal Links for More Information in this Case

UPDATE: (2011) The Sixth Circuit (2 – 1) denied Abdur’Rahman’s Brady claims includ­ed in his Rule 60(b) motion, hold­ing that any evi­dence that was with­held by the pros­e­cu­tion was not mate­r­i­al, i.e., it would not have under­mined con­fi­dence in the orig­i­nal sen­tenc­ing ver­dict. Abdur’Rahman v. Colson, No. 09 – 5307 (Aug. 17, 2011). The court upheld the District Court’s rul­ing. Judge Cole dis­sent­ed, con­clud­ing, ​“Whatever your take on the mer­its of Abdur’Rahman’s claims, one thing about this case is unde­ni­able: the pros­e­cu­tor des­e­crat­ed his noble role. He failed gross­ly in his duty to act as ​‘the rep­re­sen­ta­tive … of a sov­er­eign­ty … whose inter­est … in a crim­i­nal pros­e­cu­tion is not that it shall win a case, but that jus­tice shall be done.’ Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). Abdur’Rahman may face the ulti­mate penal­ty as a result; Justice will bear a scar.”

UPDATE: (2007) In 2004, the Sixth Circuit en banc court con­clud­ed that Abu-Ali Abdur’Rahman’s post-judg­ment motion should be treat­ed as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion rather than a sec­ond or suc­ces­sive habeas peti­tion. However, in 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court grant­ed cer­tio­rari, vacat­ed the Sixth Circuit’s judg­ment, and remand­ed in light of Gonzalez v. Crosby. Based on Gonzalez, Abdur’Rahman’s motion was treat­ed as a motion pur­suant to Rule 60(b), not a sec­ond or suc­ces­sive habeas peti­tion. However, on July 13, 2007, the Sixth Circuit (2 – 1) on remand dis­missed his motion as untime­ly. As of October 2010, Abdur’Rahman remained on Tennessee’s death row.

See In re Abdur’Rahman, 392 F.3d 174, 182 (6th Cir. 2004), vacat­ed by Bell v. Abdur’Rahman, 545 U.S. 1151 (2005).

UPDATE: (2005) The Tennessee Supreme Court held that the state’s lethal injec­tion process does not amount to cru­el and unusal pun­ish­ment. See Abu-Ali Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen et al. (Oct. 17, 2005) (The Chattanoogan, Oct. 17, 2005).

UPDATE: (2004) Abdur’Rahman v. Bell, No. 02 – 6547/​6548, On December 13, 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a Rule 60(b) motion does not auto­mat­i­cal­ly amount to a pro­hib­it­ed suc­ces­sive habeas peti­tion. Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pro­vides that in some instances an appli­cant may file a motion to recon­sid­er a pre­vi­ous rul­ing of the court. The Sixth Circuit ruled that a Rule 60(b) motion should only be barred when the motion con­sti­tutes a direct chal­lenge to the con­sti­tu­tion­al­i­ty of the under­ly­ing con­vic­tion. In this case, Abdur’Rahman’s Rule 60(b) motion attacks the man­ner in which the dis­trict court’s ear­li­er habeas judg­ment was reached. Because Abdur’Rahman’s motion does not con­sti­tute a direct chal­lenge to the con­sti­tu­tion­al­i­ty of his con­vic­tion, the Sixth Circuit ruled it is not a suc­ces­sive habeas peti­tion. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dis­trict court’s denial of Abdur’Rahman’s motion for relief from the dis­trict court’s ear­li­er judg­ment deny­ing his peti­tion for a writ of habeas cor­pus, and remand­ed the case for con­sid­er­a­tion of Abdur’Rahman’s claim chal­leng­ing the pro­ce­dur­al basis on which the dis­trict court denied his orig­i­nal habeas petition.

Summary of the Issues Before the Supreme Court

By William Redick, Attorney for Abu-Ali Abdur’Rahman

A fed­er­al dis­trict court set aside Mr. Abdur’Rahman’s death sen­tence due to the inef­fec­tive­ness of tri­al coun­sel. See, Abdur’Rahman v Bell, 999 F.Supp. at 1073 – 1101 (M.D. Tenn. 1998). The proof pre­sent­ed in the fed­er­al court of the prej­u­dice to Mr. Abdur’Rahman caused by the fail­ures of coun­sel was so sub­stan­tial that the state did not even appeal the dis­trict court’s deci­sion in that regard. Two of the judges on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, how­ev­er, sua sponte rein­stat­ed the death sen­tence with­out the issue ever being raised, briefed, or argued to that court. A third judge of the Sixth Circuit, filed a very strong dis­sent to this deci­sion to rein­state the death sen­tence. See, Abdur’Rahman v Bell, 226 F.3d at 720 – 724 (6th Cir. 2000).

Not only did defense coun­sel total­ly fail to inves­ti­gate, pre­pare, and present any of Mr. Abdur’Rahman’s sub­stan­tial defens­es at both the guilt and sen­tenc­ing stage of his tri­al, the pros­e­cu­tor in this case with­held favor­able evi­dence and mis­rep­re­sent­ed crit­i­cal infor­ma­tion about vir­tu­al­ly every aspect of the case (the iden­ti­ty of the true assailant, Mr. Abdur’Rahman’s his­to­ry, men­tal ill­ness, motive and lev­el of par­tic­i­pa­tion in the com­mis­sion of this offense) to every sig­nif­i­cant par­tic­i­pant in the tri­al (Mr. Abdur’Rahman’s psy­cho­log­i­cal eval­u­a­tors, defense coun­sel, the court, and the jury).

When the evi­dence of this pros­e­cu­to­r­i­al mis­con­duct was pre­sent­ed to the fed­er­al dis­trict court, that court refused to review the claims on the mer­its, though no state or fed­er­al court had ever dis­cussed the claims. That court refused to review these claims based on its deter­mi­na­tion that the claims had not been prop­er­ly pre­sent­ed to the state courts. Shortly after this deci­sion by the fed­er­al dis­trict court, the Tennessee Supreme Court clar­i­fied the law in this regard, mak­ing it clear that the pros­e­cu­to­r­i­al mis­con­duct claims in this case had prop­er­ly been pre­sent­ed to the state courts. The issues before the United States Supreme Court that are set for argu­ment on November 6, 2002, con­cern whether Mr. Abdur’Rahman will ever have an oppor­tu­ni­ty to have these claims of pros­e­cu­to­r­i­al mis­con­duct heard on the mer­its of the sub­stance of the
claims.

Additional Materials and Information

Molly Secours, writ­ing in The Tennessean, not­ed that the jury was nev­er informed about a foren­sic report estab­lish­ing that no blood was on Abu-Ali’s cloth­ing after the crime, despite the bloody nature of the mur­der, or about Abu-Ali’s long his­to­ry of being phys­i­cal­ly and sex­u­al­ly abused. She further noted:

Since the facts of this case sur­faced, eight of the twelve jurors signed sworn affi­davits stat­ing they should have known all the infor­ma­tion in Abu-Ali’s case before deliv­er­ing a ver­dict. Some expressed anger, and sev­er­al said it was dev­as­tat­ing to have unjust­ly sen­tenced a man to death. (The Tennessean, 2/​10/​02)

A press release from Tennessee Coalition Against State Killing (TCASK) states:
During the nine months that [Abu-Ali’s defense attor­ney Lionel] Barrett rep­re­sent­ed Abu-Ali before his Capital Murder tri­al, no work was done on Abu-Ali’s behalf until approx­i­mate­ly two weeks before his tri­al. Barrett nev­er talked to [Abu-Ali’s for­mer attor­ney] Neil McAlpin about Abu-Ali’s case, and was unaware of the crime lab reports that no blood was on Abu-Ali’s clothes, which indi­cat­ed that Abu-Ali was not the assailant.

See also, the TCASK Web site and Amnesty International’s Web site

Click Here to vis­it the Abu-Ali advo­ca­cy page at http://​www​.abu​-ali​.org