FRONTLINE Online

By NED WALPIN

There are many legal and cul­tur­al expla­na­tions for why Texas exe­cutes far more peo­ple than any oth­er state and is doing so at a pace that has no par­al­lel in the mod­ern era of the death penal­ty in the U.S. What fol­lows is a sum­ma­ry of the analyses.

Texas has become ground zero for cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment. Between 1976 (when the Supreme Court lift­ed its pro­hi­bi­tion on the death penal­ty) and 1998 Texas exe­cut­ed 167 peo­ple. Next in rank was Virginia which exe­cut­ed 60 dur­ing the same period.

(**my note** as of today, Texas has exe­cut­ed 237 indi­vid­u­als, and Virginia has executed 80)

Why do cap­i­tal mur­der cas­es pro­ceed through the Texas state court sys­tem with a speed unimag­in­able in oth­er parts of the coun­try? Brent Newton, in an arti­cle enti­tled Capital Punishment: Texas Could Learn a Lot from Florida,” [1] argues that there are three pro­ce­dures unique to the state’s judi­cial sys­tem that enable it to exe­cute con­vict­ed mur­der­ers with astonishing frequency:

1. Texas’ appel­late judges are elect­ed to office and hence serve accord­ing to the plea­sure of the pub­lic. Not sur­pris­ing­ly, they require a record of tough­ness on crim­i­nals in order to win re-elec­tion. Also, there are many indi­ca­tions that elect­ed appel­late judges gen­er­al­ly are of a less­er qual­i­ty than their appoint­ed coun­ter­parts in oth­er states. Newton even claims that these elect­ed judges do not care­ful­ly con­sid­er the com­plex­i­ties of each spe­cif­ic death penal­ty case. As evi­dence, Newton argues that “[e]specially dur­ing the past few years…the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has refused to pub­lish most of its deci­sions in death penal­ty cas­es, includ­ing many cas­es that dis­cuss impor­tant issues of 1st impres­sion. Often these opin­ions take posi­tions entire­ly incon­sis­tent with pri­or deci­sions by the court and fail to men­tion the con­flict. Generally speak­ing, there is a hit-and-most­ly-miss qual­i­ty in the Court of Criminal Appeals’ death penal­ty deci­sions. Only a few judges dur­ing the past decade have been capa­ble of or will­ing to write thought­ful, schol­ar­ly deci­sions, whether grant­i­ng or denying relief.”

Additionally, Newton notes that these judges tend to dis­miss habeas cor­pus appeals even in cas­es where there appears to be glar­ing unan­swered ques­tions about the defendant’s guilt.

2. Texas does not have a pub­lic defend­er sys­tem for indi­gent defen­dants, and instead relies upon court-appoint­ed lawyers who like­ly do not have expe­ri­ence in cap­i­tal mur­der defens­es or appeals. Newton notes that incom­pe­tent defens­es in cap­i­tal mur­der cas­es are legion in Texas, and that, even in a death penal­ty appeal, bad lawyer­ing is hard to prove. One deci­sion, which turned down a defen­dan­t’s habeas appeal due to bad lawyer­ing, con­clud­ed that “[t]he Constitution does not say that the lawyer has to be awake” dur­ing tri­al pro­ceed­ings. Furthermore, Texas was not oblig­ed to pro­vide lawyers free of charge to post-con­vic­tion habeas appeals until September 1, 1995, and the amount the state is will­ing to pay lawyers for these appeals is suf­fi­cient­ly low that most defen­dants still do not receive coun­sel for their appeals.

3. Until the ear­ly 1990s, Texas did not per­mit jurors to ade­quate­ly con­sid­er mit­i­gat­ing evi­dence in the sen­tenc­ing phase of a tri­al. Thus, there are a num­ber of peo­ple cur­rent­ly on death row that may well not be there had infor­ma­tion about their men­tal ill­ness or youth been weighed.

In addi­tion, some oth­er fea­tures of the Texas judi­cial sys­tem stream­line the process between con­vic­tion and exe­cu­tion for death row inmates.

Texas gives the bulk of clemen­cy pow­er to its Board of Pardons and Paroles and not to the gov­er­nor. Indeed, the Board must vote to rec­om­mend com­mu­ta­tion in order for the gov­er­nor to grant clemen­cy. Stephen E. Silverman exam­ined the impact of this pro­ce­dure on the fre­quen­cy of exe­cu­tions. In a law review note, enti­tled There is Nothing Certain Like Death in Texas: State Executive Clemency Boards Turn a Deaf Ear to Death Inmates’ Last Appeals,” [2] Silverman argues that the Supreme Court appears to affirm the con­sti­tu­tion­al­i­ty of cur­tail­ing repeat­ed habeas appeals in part because of the exis­tence of exec­u­tive clemen­cy. However, the Governor of Texas’ inabil­i­ty to grant clemen­cy him­self is an uncon­sid­ered loop­hole in the pro­ce­dur­al safe­guards that the Court cit­ed in its argu­ment. In oth­er words, Texas – as well as eleven oth­er states – can exe­cute inmates who might have been grant­ed exec­u­tive clemen­cy had the gov­er­nor had the pow­er to do so. Silverman thus con­cludes that “[t]he asser­tion by three Justices of the United States Supreme Court that state clemen­cy pro­ce­dures ade­quate­ly pro­tect against exe­cut­ing those lat­er able to make con­vinc­ing claims of inno­cence may not be accu­rate. Even though only twelve states that pro­vide for the death penal­ty require some sort of pan­el deci­sion to grant clemen­cy, these tend to be states with the most aggres­sive­ly enforced cap­i­tal mur­der laws. The dilu­tion of respon­si­bil­i­ty that oper­ates as a con­se­quence of giv­ing no sin­gle per­son the pow­er to com­mute a death sen­tence could tend to reduce the chances for the con­demned to have an oppor­tu­ni­ty to have his clemen­cy appeal receive meaningful consideration.”

Moreover, Jordan Steiker, of the University of Texas Law School, notes that exe­cu­tion dates in Texas are set by the tri­al judge, not by the gov­er­nor, thus remov­ing an infor­mal pow­er of clemen­cy. The gov­er­nor is unable sim­ply to not assign an exe­cu­tion date. Many gov­er­nors in oth­er states have that power.

More gen­er­al­ly, Steiker points out that Texas, unlike many oth­er states, has worked out the statu­to­ry and pro­ce­dur­al kinks” in death penal­ty cas­es and appeals. In par­tic­u­lar, Texas’ 1995 law expe­dit­ing state appeals has suc­cess­ful­ly cut down the time between con­vic­tion and exe­cu­tion. [3] He argues that Texas does­n’t sen­tence more peo­ple to death than a num­ber of oth­er states, but it exe­cutes a high­er per­cent­age because many oth­er states’ pro­ce­dures have not been ful­ly test­ed and affirmed. Steiker believes that oth­er states will soon catch up with Texas’ exe­cu­tion rate. Indeed, Virginia came rel­a­tive­ly close to match­ing Texas’ rate in 1998: Texas exe­cut­ed 20 indi­vid­u­als, and Virginia executed 13.

Finally, it bears not­ing that the 5th Circuit of the Federal Court of Appeals is strong­ly pro-death penal­ty, and hence places extreme­ly few road­blocks to exe­cu­tions in the states over which it has juris­dic­tion. In com­par­ing the Fifth Circuit with the neigh­bor­ing Ninth Circuit (which has juris­dic­tion over California and oth­er Western states), Michael Sharlot, dean of the University of Texas Law School, states that The Fifth Circuit is a much more con­ser­v­a­tive cir­cuit. It is more def­er­en­tial to the pop­u­lar will.” [4]

Some have spec­u­lat­ed that the Texas exe­cu­tion rate also reflects a her­itage of fron­tier jus­tice cou­pled with mod­ern urban crime.

However, James W. Marquart, Sheldon Ekland-Olson, and Jonathan R. Sorensen offer a more com­plex the­sis. In their book, The Rope, the Chair, and the Needle: Capital Punishment in Texas, 1923 – 1990, [5] they argue that Texas’ exe­cu­tion rate reflects the Southern cul­tur­al tra­di­tion of exclu­sion,” and that “[s]uch exclu­sion was a basic ele­ment of the lega­cy of slavery.”

In oth­er words, the South has a cul­tur­al tra­di­tion of dehu­man­iz­ing cer­tain groups of peo­ple, which has made it eas­i­er for Southerners to sep­a­rate them­selves from those who do not adhere to the nor­mal social (and in this case, legal) code. The authors argue that this cul­tur­al ten­den­cy accounts for the fact that, in 1992, the states in the for­mer Confederacy account­ed for approx­i­mate­ly 90 % of the total exe­cu­tions in the 1st 2 decades fol­low­ing Furman [v. Georgia].” [6] The authors argue that Texas pro­vides the clear­est case study to help explain this larg­er Southern phenomenon.

One way they show how Texas’ cur­rent exe­cu­tion rate con­tin­ues cer­tain social norms of the for­mer Confederacy is by explor­ing the his­tor­i­cal rela­tion­ship between state-sanc­tioned exe­cu­tions and ille­gal lynch­ings. Lynching, in their inter­pre­ta­tion, did not rep­re­sent jus­tice but rather the clear­est way to exclude some­one (or, implic­it­ly, a whole group) from soci­ety. A mem­ber of a soci­ety who breaks the law expe­ri­ences the force of jus­tice; the rep­re­sen­ta­tive indi­vid­ual who is forcibly reject­ed by, or exclud­ed from, soci­ety is lynched. Based on this under­stand­ing of lynch­ing, their find­ings are com­pelling: there is a direct, inverse rela­tion­ship between exe­cu­tions and lynch­ings over the course of the twen­ti­eth cen­tu­ry. Executions sim­ply replaced lynch­ings as the accept­ed way to sate the pop­u­lar (white) need to dehu­man­ize” or exclude” cer­tain groups from nor­mal soci­ety. If lynch­ings remind­ed white folk and black folk alike who was an insid­er” and who was an out­sider” – who was us” and who was them” – then exe­cu­tions were imple­ment­ed to serve the exact same purpose.

How could the cold­ly bureau­crat­ic and legal­is­tic exe­cu­tion serve the same socio-cul­tur­al pur­pose as the heat­ed, vio­lent and car­ni­val-like lynch­ing? The authors’ argu­ment is quite com­plex. The end of the Civil War under­mined the dis­en­fran­chise­ment of blacks that had char­ac­ter­ized the ante-bel­lum South. Lynchings had been a tool white Southerners used to com­bat their inse­cu­ri­ty about the sta­tus of blacks. However, white inse­cu­ri­ty dimin­ished as the Southern states enforced seg­re­ga­tion and so it was only nat­ur­al that local mobs gave way to cen­tral­ized state-sanc­tioned exe­cu­tions.” The authors thus claim that lynch­ings in Texas (and across the South) declined in the ear­ly twen­ti­eth cen­tu­ry because the enact­ment of Jim Crow and relat­ed dis­en­fran­chis­ing leg­is­la­tion, but­tressed by the Supreme Court’s Plessy v. Ferguson deci­sion in 1896,” cod­i­fied and enforced the social and cul­tur­al demands that had often cul­mi­nat­ed in lynchings.

Of course, Texas now exe­cutes a far wider racial and eth­nic mix of indi­vid­u­als than African-Americans. How, then, could it be that Texans and Southerners in gen­er­al con­tin­ue to approach soci­ety in such a provin­cial and exclu­sivist way? Indeed, the authors rec­og­nize that we can no longer sim­ply regard the Southern pre­dis­po­si­tion toward the death penal­ty as a con­tin­u­a­tion of the ideals of the Confederacy. The authors claim that the shift to state-sanc­tioned exe­cu­tions and away from lynch­ings now also reflect the suc­cess of the civ­il rights move­ment to rede­fine the bound­aries of place’ in a more inclu­sive fash­ion.” Thus, the authors con­clude, Texas’ sup­port for state-sanc­tioned exe­cu­tions both reflects the con­tin­u­ing lega­cy of slav­ery on cul­tur­al beliefs, as well as the trans­for­ma­tion of Southern cul­tur­al beliefs due to the civ­il rights move­ment. They por­tray this para­dox­i­cal devel­op­ment in the fol­low­ing way: Texas (and Southern states gen­er­al­ly) still exe­cutes a lot of peo­ple, but there now is a greater regard for the defen­dan­t’s rights. They argue that this broad­er atten­tion to the pro­tec­tion of rights, along with the asso­ci­at­ed hes­i­tan­cy to exclude indi­vid­u­als from the life-pro­tect­ing bound­aries of the com­mu­ni­ty, are specif­i­cal­ly evi­denced in the three trends [of] in the post-Furman years: decreased sen­tenc­ing dis­par­i­ties, nar­rowed locus of dis­crim­i­na­tion, and length­ened time from con­vic­tion to execution.”

Texas’ cur­rent exe­cu­tion pol­i­cy, then, reflects the con­tin­ued strug­gle between the Old and New South. And, need­less to say, that cul­tur­al strug­gle will con­tin­ue for the foreseeable future. 

****
1. Texas Lawyer, February 261996

2. 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 375 

3. This law sets sig­nif­i­cant time con­straints on appli­ca­tions of habeas appeals, and it lim­its the num­ber of appeals a 
defen­dant can make.

4. As quot­ed in Robert Bryce, Why Texas is Execution Capital,” The Christian Science Monitor, December 141998.

5. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998. The per­cent­age declines slight­ly when one tal­lies all exe­cu­tions from 1976-Jan 1999

6. Emphasis added. 

Ned Walpin is research asso­ciate for FRONTLINE ONLINE)