In this month’s episode of Discussions with DPIC, Managing Director Anne Holsinger speaks with Elisabeth Semel, Clinical Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley (pic­tured). Professor Semel joined Berkeley Law in 2001 as the first direc­tor of the school’s death penal­ty clin­ic and remains the clinic’s co-direc­tor, where stu­dents have rep­re­sent­ed indi­vid­u­als fac­ing cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment and writ­ten ami­cus briefs in death penal­ty cas­es before the United States Supreme Court. In recog­ni­tion of 38th year anniver­sary of the land­mark U.S. Supreme Court rul­ing in Batson v. Kentucky (1986), Professor Semel dis­cuss­es the impli­ca­tions of the Court’s rul­ing and recent efforts in California to elim­i­nate racial dis­crim­i­na­tion in cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment and jury selection.

In Batson v. Kentucky, the U.S. Supreme Court held that it is uncon­sti­tu­tion­al to use peremp­to­ry strikes to exclude poten­tial jurors based on race. Professor Semel explains that there are two types of strikes dur­ing jury selec­tion – cause chal­lenges and peremp­to­ry strikes. A chal­lenge for cause requires the pros­e­cu­tion to give a rea­son why a poten­tial juror could not be fair in a case, while peremp­to­ry chal­lenges do not require the pros­e­cu­tion to give a rea­son for strik­ing the juror. Professor Semel explains that in post-Reconstruction United States, pros­e­cu­tors exclud­ed Black Americans from jury ser­vice by ensur­ing that they were not qual­i­fied by virtue of rules that made it impos­si­ble for them to get on the list of eli­gi­ble jurors.” As laws were passed pro­tect­ing Black Americans and enforc­ing their rights, peremp­to­ry chal­lenges became the alter­na­tive way of exclud­ing” these indi­vid­u­als from jury ser­vice, as pros­e­cu­tors were not required to explain their rea­son­ing. In the Batson deci­sion, the Court out­lined a three-part test: the defen­dant must make pri­ma facie show­ing of dis­crim­i­na­tion regard­ing the use of a peremp­to­ry strike, the pros­e­cu­tion must then artic­u­late a race-neu­tral rea­son for the strike(s), and then the defense must then prove that the rea­son was pretextual.

Professor Semel says that research shows that pros­e­cu­tors con­tin­ue to dis­pro­por­tion­ate­ly use these peremp­to­ry chal­lenges to remove Black jurors.” In a report pub­lished by Professor Semel’s clin­ic, the find­ings show that over the course of three decades, the California Supreme Court heard 140 cas­es with Batson claims but reversed just three of them. The clinic’s report also found, con­sis­tent with oth­er aca­d­e­m­ic stud­ies, that implic­it or uncon­scious bias plays a role in a prosecutor’s use of peremp­to­ry chal­lenges. Professor Semel explains that implic­it bias is the reliance on racial or eth­nic stereo­types that exploit the his­tor­i­cal and present-day dif­fer­ences between the expe­ri­ences of most white jurors and jurors of col­or.” In efforts to sub­vert this dis­crim­i­na­tion, legal schol­ars and judges have pro­posed alter­na­tive tests. In 2020, the California leg­is­la­ture passed AB 3070, which altered the test estab­lished in Batson and imple­ment­ed an alter­na­tive test that went into effect in January 2023. During the same ses­sion, the California leg­is­la­ture passed the Racial Justice Act, which allows peo­ple charged with or con­vict­ed or a crime to raise issues of bias or dis­crim­i­na­tion based on race, eth­nic­i­ty, or nation­al ori­gin. In the time since AB 3070 was cod­i­fied, Professor Semel says we are see­ing more jurors of col­or, espe­cial­ly more Black jurors, or Latinx jurors [and] we are see­ing pros­e­cu­tors be much more hes­i­tant and reflec­tive about rely­ing” on historical stereotypes.

In dis­cussing more recent efforts in California, Professor Semel prais­es an April 2024 fil­ing sub­mit­ted by the California Office of the State Public Defender and sev­er­al civ­il rights groups which argues that California’s cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment scheme vio­lates the state constitution’s Equal Protection Clause. The California Supreme Court has reject­ed the idea that only inten­tion­al dis­crim­i­na­tion denies equal pro­tec­tion under the law, allow­ing attor­neys to argue in the fil­ing that the racial­ly dis­pro­por­tion­ate impact of the admin­is­tra­tion of a law can give rise to an equal pro­tec­tion vio­la­tion.” In sup­port of the claim, the fil­ings offer 15 empir­i­cal stud­ies cov­er­ing var­i­ous time­frames and regions of California, which con­clude that Black defen­dants are as much as 8.7 times more like­ly to be sen­tenced to death than all oth­er defen­dants” and Latinx defen­dants are as much as 6.2 times more like­ly to be sen­tenced to death in California than all oth­er defen­dants.” Professor Semel explains that these find­ings are con­sis­tent with stud­ies across the United States and when we look across the admin­is­tra­tion of the death penal­ty, there are any num­ber of stages or parts of the process in which race becomes an insid­i­ous and prac­ti­cal­ly influential circumstance.”

Professor Semel also addressed local­ized efforts in California to redress the sys­temic racial dis­crim­i­na­tion in cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment. Santa Clara County District Attorney Jeff Rosen’s deci­sion to resen­tence 15 indi­vid­u­als from his coun­ty on death row reflects his loss of faith in the fair­ness of cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment, cit­ing racial bias and exor­bi­tant costs. In Alameda County, rev­e­la­tions of pros­e­cu­tors’ dis­crim­i­na­to­ry jury selec­tion notes in Ernest Dykes’ case is prompt­ing a review of 35 oth­er cap­i­tal cas­es, high­light­ing sys­temic flaws. Professor Semel believes that these efforts empha­size the neces­si­ty for the California Supreme Court to take the case filed by the Office of the State Public Defender, and oth­er civ­il rights orga­ni­za­tions and lead­ers, and scru­ti­nize at the lev­el that this par­tic­u­lar claim deserves, and this over­whelm­ing evi­dence of a vio­la­tion of the state’s equal protection guarantee.”