In a dis­sent­ing opin­ion filed in the cap­i­tal case of Moore v. Parker, Judge Boyce Martin of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit wrote that the death penal­ty in this coun­try is arbi­trary, biased, and so fun­da­men­tal­ly flawed at its very core that it is beyond repair.” Among his many crit­i­cisms of the way cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment is applied in the U.S., Martin specif­i­cal­ly not­ed his con­cerns about the issues of inno­cence, inad­e­quate defense coun­sel, and the over­all arbi­trari­ness of the sys­tem. He wrote:

I have been a judge on this Court for more than twen­ty-five years. In that time I have seen many death penal­ty cas­es and I have applied the law as instruct­ed by the Supreme Court and I will con­tin­ue to do so for as long as I remain on this Court. This my oath requires. After all these years, how­ev­er, only one con­clu­sion is pos­si­ble: the death penal­ty in this coun­try is arbi­trary, biased, and so fun­da­men­tal­ly flawed at its very core that it is beyond repair.

The flaws are numer­ous and the com­men­ta­tors have doc­u­ment­ed them well. There have been numer­ous death row exon­er­a­tions. In fact, in some states the pace of exon­er­a­tions com­petes with the pace of exe­cu­tions. See e.g., Death Penalty Information Center Searchable Database, http://​www​.death​penal​ty​in​fo​.org/​e​x​e​c​u​t​i​o​n​s.php, last accessed September 6, 2005 (indi­cat­ing that since 2000, Louisiana has exe­cut­ed two indi­vid­u­als while five indi­vid­u­als have been exon­er­at­ed from death row). Blatant racial prej­u­dice con­tin­ues to infest the sys­tem. See, e.g. Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317 (2005). Peremptory chal­lenges tilt the bal­ance from the out­set in favor of death. Id. at 2340 (Breyer, J., con­cur­ring). The elec­tion of state judges cre­ates anoth­er sub­tle bias toward death. Justice John Paul Stevens, Address to the American Bar Association Thurgood Marshall Awards Dinner Honoring Abner Mikva (Aug. 6, 2005), avail­able at https://​www​.supre​me​court​.gov/​p​u​b​l​i​c​i​n​f​o​/​s​p​e​e​c​h​e​s​/​s​p​_​08-06 – 05.html. Crime labs are unre­li­able, see Ralph Blumenthal, Officials Ignore Houston Lab’s Troubles, Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES, A10 (July 1, 2005); The Innocence Project, DNA News (doc­u­ment­ing sus­pen­sion of DNA test­ing in Houston, Texas as a result of lab incom­pe­tence); see also House v. Bell, 386 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. grant­ed 125 S. Ct. 2991 (2005), wit­ness iden­ti­fi­ca­tions con­tin­ue to prove faulty, and false tes­ti­mo­ny and false con­fes­sions plague the sys­tem, see e.g., The Innocence Project, http://​www​.inno​cen​ce​pro​ject​.org/​c​a​s​e​/​d​i​s​p​l​a​y​_​p​r​o​f​i​l​e​.​p​h​p​?​id=07 (case of Rolando Cruz). The death penal­ty has proved to be an inef­fec­tive cure for society’s ills, pub­lic sup­port con­tin­ues to erode, and we share the dubi­ous dis­tinc­tion of being the only west­ern democ­ra­cy that con­tin­ues to put its own cit­i­zens to death. Of par­tic­u­lar rel­e­vance to this case, the bad lawyer­ing and incom­pre­hen­si­ble arbi­trari­ness that per­me­ate the sys­tem should dis­gust any per­son con­cerned with the fair admin­is­tra­tion of crim­i­nal jus­tice. Many of these flaws are right­ful­ly brought to the atten­tion of the nation’s polit­i­cal lead­ers. Notwithstanding, many of these flaws are legal­ly rel­e­vant to the Eighth Amendment ques­tion — name­ly, under evolv­ing stan­dards of decen­cy,” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 – 01 (1958) (plu­ral­i­ty opin­ion), whether peo­ple who were ful­ly informed as to the pur­pos­es of the penal­ty and its lia­bil­i­ties would find the penal­ty shock­ing, unjust, and unac­cept­able.” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 360 (1972) (Marshall, J., con­cur­ring).

An even bet­ter argu­ment, in my opin­ion, is that the death penal­ty vio­lates the Fourteenth Amendment because it is so trans­par­ent­ly arbi­trary that the sys­tem in its entire­ty fails to sat­is­fy due process. More than ten years have passed since Justice Blackmun’s state­ments in Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dis­sent­ing from denial of cer­tio­rari), regard­ing the fail­ure of the death penal­ty sys­tem due to the absence of con­sis­ten­cy, ratio­nal­i­ty, and fair­ness in its admin­is­tra­tion. It has only got­ten worse. Justice Stevens’s recent address to the American Bar Association thought­ful­ly makes the case that there are spe­cial risks of unfair­ness” in the admin­is­tra­tion of the death penal­ty. Justice John Paul Stevens, Address to the American Bar Association Thurgood Marshall Awards Dinner Honoring Abner Mikva (Aug. 6, 2005) (“[W]ith the ben­e­fit of DNA evi­dence, we have learned that a sub­stan­tial num­ber of death sen­tences have been imposed erro­neous­ly. That evi­dence is pro­found­ly sig­nif­i­cant — not only because of its rel­e­vance to the debate about the wis­dom of con­tin­u­ing to admin­is­ter cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment, but also because it indi­cates that there must be seri­ous flaws in our admin­is­tra­tion of crim­i­nal jus­tice … My review of many tri­al records dur­ing recent years has, how­ev­er, per­suad­ed me that there are oth­er fea­tures of death penal­ty lit­i­ga­tion [aside from inef­fec­tive assis­tance of coun­sel] that cre­ate spe­cial risks of unfair­ness.”).

As not­ed above, while the sys­tem suf­fers from many flaws, much of the arbi­trary impo­si­tion of the death penal­ty stems from the exceed­ing­ly dis­tress­ing fact that dur­ing all my years on the bench, the qual­i­ty of lawyer­ing that cap­i­tal defen­dants receive has not sub­stan­tial­ly improved. In many cas­es it has dete­ri­o­rat­ed. In fact, one of the most clear exam­ples of the arbi­trari­ness of the death penal­ty is the com­mon knowl­edge that those defen­dants with decent lawyers rarely get sen­tenced to death. Death has more to do with extra-judi­cial fac­tors like race and socio-eco­nom­ic sta­tus than with whether death is deserved. A sys­tem, whose basic jus­ti­fi­ca­tion is the inter­est in ret­ri­bu­tion and gen­er­al deter­rence, is not served when guid­ed by such irrel­e­vant fac­tors. Nor should a sys­tem of life and death hinge on the pro­fi­cien­cy of coun­sel.

I have no delu­sions of grandeur and I know my place in the judi­cia­ry. My oath requires me to apply the law as inter­pret­ed by the Supreme Court of the United States. I will con­tin­ue to do as I am told until the Supreme Court con­cludes that the death penal­ty can­not be admin­is­tered in a con­sti­tu­tion­al man­ner or our leg­is­la­tures abol­ish the penal­ty. But lest there be any doubt, the idea that the death penal­ty is fair­ly and ratio­nal­ly imposed in this coun­try is a farce.

(Moore v. Parker, No. 03 – 6105 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, October 4, 2005) (Martin, J., dis­sent­ing) (empha­sis added)). See Arbitrariness and New Voices.

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