June 29, 2012 (Friday) is the 40th anniver­sary of the U.S. Supreme Courts deci­sion in Furman v. Georgia, in which the Court found that the lack of stan­dards for impos­ing the death penal­ty enabled the penal­ty to be applied arbi­trar­i­ly, thus vio­lat­ing the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cru­el and unusu­al pun­ish­ments. In nine sep­a­rate opin­ions, and by a vote of 5 to 4, the Court void­ed every state’s exist­ing death penal­ty statute, com­mut­ed the sen­tences of death row inmates around the coun­try, and sus­pend­ed the death penal­ty. In his con­cur­rence, Justice Douglas wrote, “[W]e deal with a sys­tem of law and of jus­tice that leaves to the uncon­trolled dis­cre­tion of judges or juries the deter­mi­na­tion whether defen­dants com­mit­ting these crimes should die or be impris­oned. Under these laws no stan­dards gov­ern the selec­tion of the penal­ty. People live or die, depen­dent on the whim of one man or of 12.” Justice Marshall fur­ther under­scored the death penalty’s arbi­trari­ness in his con­cur­rence: It also is evi­dent that the bur­den of cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment falls upon the poor, the igno­rant, and the under­priv­i­leged mem­bers of soci­ety. It is the poor, and the mem­bers of minor­i­ty groups who are least able to voice their com­plaints against cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment. Their impo­tence leaves them vic­tims of a sanc­tion that the wealth­i­er, bet­ter-rep­re­sent­ed, just-as-guilty per­son can escape.”

The death penal­ty was rein­stat­ed four years lat­er in Gregg v. Georgia, when the Court approved new sen­tenc­ing schemes intend­ed to make the death penal­ty less arbi­trary. However, some law offi­cials and legal experts claim that the death penal­ty con­tin­ues to be arbi­trar­i­ly applied despite these new sen­tenc­ing schemes. Justice Harry Blackmun, one of the jus­tices in the Gregg major­i­ty, lat­er changed his mind and con­clud­ed the the­o­ry he upheld in 1976 had not worked in prac­tice: For more than 20 years I have endeav­ored — indeed, I have strug­gled — along with a major­i­ty of this Court, to devel­op pro­ce­dur­al and sub­stan­tive rules that would lend more than the mere appear­ance of fair­ness to the death penal­ty endeav­or. Rather than con­tin­ue to cod­dle the Court’s delu­sion that the desired lev­el of fair­ness has been achieved and the need for reg­u­la­tion evis­cer­at­ed, I feel moral­ly and intel­lec­tu­al­ly oblig­at­ed to con­cede that the death penal­ty exper­i­ment has failed. It is vir­tu­al­ly self evi­dent to me now that no com­bi­na­tion of pro­ce­dur­al rules or sub­stan­tive reg­u­la­tions ever can save the death penal­ty from its inher­ent con­sti­tu­tion­al defi­cien­cies” (Callins v. Collins, 1994).

(DPIC Posted, June 26, 2012). Read full text of Furman v. Georgia and Gregg v. Georgia. Read DPIC’s report, Struck by Lightning: The Continuing Arbitrariness of the Death Penalty Thirty-Five Years After Its Reinstatement in 1976.” See U.S. Supreme Court. Listen to our pod­cast on Arbitrariness.

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