A coali­tion of dis­abil­i­ty rights groups, legal experts, and con­ser­v­a­tive advo­cates are urg­ing the U.S. Supreme Court to strike down the unique­ly harsh bur­den of proof Georgia has imposed upon defen­dants seek­ing to estab­lish their inel­i­gi­bil­i­ty for the death penal­ty because of intellectual disability. 

In four friend-of-the-court briefs filed in late December 2021, two for­mer U.S. solic­i­tors gen­er­al, eight for­mer pros­e­cu­tors and judges, sev­en lead­ing dis­abil­i­ty rights orga­ni­za­tions, schol­ars, and experts in intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty, and a group of con­ser­v­a­tive legal reform advo­cates all urged the Court to declare uncon­sti­tu­tion­al Georgia’s require­ment that cap­i­tal defen­dants and death-row pris­on­ers prove beyond a rea­son­able doubt” that they are intel­lec­tu­al­ly dis­abled. The fil­ings came in the case of Rodney Young, a Georgia death-row pris­on­er long clas­si­fied in school records as men­tal­ly retard­ed” (the pre­vi­ous name for intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty), who is chal­leng­ing the requirement.

Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2002 rul­ing in Atkins v. Virginia, the exe­cu­tion of some­one with intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty vio­lates the Eighth Amendment ban on cru­el and unusu­al pun­ish­ment. No oth­er state requires cap­i­tal defen­dants to prove intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty beyond a rea­son­able doubt, and even Georgia does not impose a com­pa­ra­bly high bur­den in assess­ing the eli­gi­bil­i­ty of intel­lec­tu­al­ly dis­abled indi­vid­u­als for social ser­vices. Since Georgia adopt­ed the stan­dard in 1988, nei­ther Young nor any oth­er defen­dant tried for inten­tion­al mur­der has ever been able to satisfy it. 

Young’s lawyers and the friend-of-the-court briefs argue that Georgia’s law vio­lates both the Court’s rul­ing in Atkins and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Noting that the beyond a rea­son­able doubt” stan­dard is not imposed on the defen­dant in any oth­er con­sti­tu­tion­al rights claim, Young argues that Georgia is an extreme out­lier … not only with respect to Atkins claims, but with respect to all of constitutional law.”

Georgia was the first state to pass a law exempt­ing peo­ple with intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty from the death penal­ty, and the author of the law says the high bur­den of proof was a draft­ing error. Jack Martin, one of the leg­is­la­tors respon­si­ble for draft­ing the bill, said in 2013, I dropped the ball.… It was slop­py drafts­man­ship, pure and sim­ple.” The bill was not intend­ed to cre­ate a beyond a rea­son­able doubt” stan­dard but, Martin said, a key clause was put in the wrong place. I don’t think any­body intend­ed that to happen.”

The Amicus (Friend-of-the-Court) Briefs

In their ami­cus brief, filed on December 23, 2021, Charles Fried, U.S. Solicitor General under President Ronald Reagan, and Seth Waxman, U.S. Solicitor General under President Bill Clinton, wrote that the out­come of Young’s case has impor­tant impli­ca­tions for the rule of law. Invalidating Georgia’s rule would not only elim­i­nate an extreme and uncon­sti­tu­tion­al out­lier but would also reaf­firm sev­er­al prin­ci­ples vital to the rule of law,” they wrote, includ­ing that low­er courts are oblig­at­ed to fol­low this Court’s prece­dents irre­spec­tive of whether they think those prece­dents are cor­rect or might be recon­sid­ered and that pro­ce­dur­al rules may not sub­vert sub­stan­tive pro­tec­tions.” They point out that the con­se­quence of a wrong­ful exe­cu­tion is as grave and irre­versible as can be,” while the con­se­quence of impos­ing the avail­able non-cap­i­tal sen­tence — usu­al­ly a sen­tence of life with­out parole — on some­one who is almost but not quite inel­i­gi­ble to be sen­tenced to death is modest.”

A group of eight for­mer judges and pros­e­cu­tors, in an ami­cus brief also filed on December 23, empha­sized the his­tor­i­cal pur­pose of the beyond-a-rea­son­able-doubt stan­dard: to pre­serve human life and lib­er­ty.” Georgia’s unprece­dent­ed rule jar­ring­ly sub­verts the pur­pos­es the beyond-a-rea­son­able-doubt stan­dard has served through­out its his­to­ry,” they con­tin­ue. Rather than err on the side of pro­tect­ing indi­vid­ual life and lib­er­ty, the Georgia rule errs on the side of death and vir­tu­al­ly guar­an­tees the exe­cu­tion of intel­lec­tu­al­ly dis­abled indi­vid­u­als. Indeed, in the more than thir­ty years since the rule was cre­at­ed, not one cap­i­tal defen­dant has per­suad­ed a jury of his intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty in a case of intentional murder.”

The indi­vid­ual sign­ers of the brief includ­ed for­mer Texas Court of Criminal Judge Elsa Alcala, whose rea­son­ing was adopt­ed by the Supreme Court in Moore v. Texas to strike down sci­en­tif­i­cal­ly unjus­ti­fi­able lim­i­ta­tions on proof of intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty imposed by Texas; for­mer Florida Supreme Court Justice James E.C. Perry, whose rea­son­ing was adopt­ed by the Supreme Court in Hall v. Florida to strike down Florida’s use of a clin­i­cal­ly invalid strict IQ cut­off of 70 to lim­it the indi­vid­u­als who qual­i­fied for a deter­mi­na­tion of intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty; and for­mer Georgia Supreme Court Justice Norman S. Fletcher, who dis­sent­ed from the state’s pre-Atkins rul­ing in Jenkins v. State that ini­tial­ly upheld Georgia’s proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement.

A third ami­cus brief, filed on December 27, 2021 by a group of dis­abil­i­ty rights orga­ni­za­tions and experts, includ­ing the Disability Rights Legal Center and the National Disability Rights Network, described both the risk of jurors rely­ing on unsci­en­tif­ic assess­ments of intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty and the dis­par­i­ty between Georgia’s bur­den of proof and the treat­ment of intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty in oth­er aspects of law. On the issue of juror under­stand­ing of intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty, the brief explains, that Georgia judges instruct[ ] jurors that a rea­son­able doubt is a doubt based upon com­mon sense and rea­son,’ [which] all but invites jurors to rely on lay per­cep­tions of intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty and lay stereo­types” such as those the Court already struck down in Moore to reject a defendant’s mer­i­to­ri­ous intel­lec­tu­al disability claim. 

Georgia allows jurors to find rea­son­able doubt by rely­ing on one or more stereo­types about intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty or on seem­ing­ly incon­sis­tent diag­nos­tic evi­dence, even though, under accept­ed clin­i­cal stan­dards, such evi­dence could well sup­port a diag­no­sis of intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty,” the rights advo­cates wrote. Their brief also con­trasts Georgia’s treat­ment of intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty in death-penal­ty cas­es with its treat­ment in oth­er sit­u­a­tions. Georgia does not require that intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty be proven beyond a rea­son­able doubt in areas rang­ing from pro­vid­ing ser­vices for peo­ple with intel­lec­tu­al dis­abil­i­ty to deter­min­ing lim­i­ta­tions peri­ods for med­ical-mal­prac­tice suits,” the experts say. Only here — when a person’s life is at stake — has Georgia cho­sen to place almost the entire risk of error’ on the per­son in need of the law’s protection.”

The fourth brief, filed by the Rutherford Institute, a con­ser­v­a­tive non-prof­it legal ser­vices orga­ni­za­tion ded­i­cat­ed to civ­il lib­er­ties and human rights, Conservatives Concerned About the Death Penalty, and Brett Harrell, a for­mer Republican state leg­is­la­tor rep­re­sent­ing Georgia Conservatives Concerned About the Death Penalty, high­lights the gov­ern­ment over­reach inher­ent in the Georgia law. Burdens of proof, they write, is one way our legal sys­tem pro­tects indi­vid­ual rights and lib­er­ties” and serve to allo­cate the risk of error between the par­ties involved, … reflect[ing] a soci­etal judge­ment about which par­ty should bear that risk.” In crim­i­nal cas­es, they write, the gov­ern­ment typ­i­cal­ly bears the risk of error.” 

In a cap­i­tal case, their brief argues, a wrong­ful exe­cu­tion is irre­versible.” In such cas­es, risk of error can­not be placed on the indi­vid­ual assert­ing his con­sti­tu­tion­al right not to be exe­cut­ed.” Without any com­pelling rea­son, and alone among the states, they con­ser­v­a­tive advo­cates write, Georgia has depart­ed from this allo­ca­tion of risk. … This Court should wel­come the oppor­tu­ni­ty to cor­rect Georgia’s deeply consequential overreach.”

Citation Guide
Sources

Adam Liptak, Language Mistake in Georgia Death Penalty Law Creates a Daunting Hurdle, New York Times, January 32022.

Read the briefs filed in the U.S. Supreme Court in Young v. Georgia.