A recent arti­cle in the Western New England Law Review exam­ines ways in which the rules of evi­dence and pro­ce­dures at cap­i­tal sen­tenc­ing tri­als are less rig­or­ous than those applied at the guilt-phase of the tri­al. In cap­i­tal sen­tenc­ing hear­ings, evi­dence is per­mit­ted that would not be admis­si­ble to prove guilt. The defen­dant does not receive tra­di­tion­al tri­al pro­tec­tions at the sen­tenc­ing tri­al. For exam­ple, hearsay may be received by the jury dur­ing sen­tenc­ing, but is gen­er­al­ly inad­mis­si­ble at the guilt phase of the tri­al because it is con­sid­ered unre­li­able. In his arti­cle, ​“When Trial and Punishment Intersect: New Defects in the Death Penalty,” Alexander Bunin, the Federal Public Defender of the Districts of Northern New York & Vermont and Adjunct Professor at Albany Law School, con­cludes that recent Supreme Court deci­sions, such as Ring v. Arizona, which iden­ti­fies part of the cap­i­tal sen­tenc­ing process as prop­er­ly belong­ing to the guilt-or-inno­cence process, cast doubt upon the reli­a­bil­i­ty and con­sti­tu­tion­al­i­ty of cur­rent cap­i­tal sen­tenc­ing pro­ce­dures. (26 Western New England Law Review 2 (2004)). See Supreme Court and Resources.

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