U.S. Supreme Court: Ring v. Arizona

Supreme Court Declares Defendants Have a Right to Jury Determination of Eligibility for Death Sentence

In a 7 – 2 deci­sion in the case of Ring v. Arizona, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a defen­dant has the right to have a jury, rather than a judge, decide on the exis­tence of an aggra­vat­ing fac­tor that makes the defen­dant eli­gi­ble for the death penal­ty. The Court based its judg­ment on the broad­er con­sti­tu­tion­al prin­ci­ple that the Sixth Amendment right to tri­al by jury encom­pass­es the right to a jury find­ing of all facts that are nec­es­sary to put a defen­dant to death. In its deci­sion, the Court held that Arizona’s sen­tenc­ing statute, under which the judge deter­mined the pres­ence or absence of aggra­vat­ing fac­tors nec­es­sary to make a defen­dant eli­gi­ble for the death penal­ty vio­lat­ed this Sixth Amendment guar­an­tee. (Associated Press, June 24, 2002). Read the opin­ion. See also, DPIC Press Release.

Click this link to find post-Ring devel­op­ments by state.

Notes on Judge Sentencing

Arizona (for­mer­ly judge sen­tenc­ing. New: jury to deter­mine whether aggra­vat­ing and mit­i­gat­ing cir­cum­stances exist and if the death penal­ty will be imposed)

Idaho (for­mer­ly judge sen­tenc­ing. New: In February 2003, Idaho Governor Dirk Kempthorne signed into law a bill that pro­vides for jury sen­tenc­ing in capital cases.)

Montana (Jury to unan­i­mous­ly deter­mine aggra­vat­ing fac­tors [as of May 1, 2001])

Delaware (abol­ished the death penal­ty in 2016) — A 1991 change in Delaware’s law empow­ered the judge to over­rule a jury’s sen­tenc­ing rec­om­men­da­tion. However, only one judge, John E. Babiarz Jr. over­ruled a jury’s rec­om­men­da­tion of life (10 – 2) to impose a death sen­tence (and that sen­tence was over­turned). (S. O’Sullivan, ​“Delaware jury’s votes in cap­i­tal cas­es don’t always sway judges,” DelawareOnline, Feb. 25, 2011). After the U.S. Supreme Court decid­ed Hurst v. Florida, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled in 2016 in Rauf v. State that the Delaware statute giv­ing judges sole author­i­ty to deter­mine whether aggra­vat­ing cir­cum­stances out­weigh mit­i­gat­ing cir­cum­stances vio­lat­ed Ring and Hurst.

Colorado (abol­ished the death penal­ty in 2020. Formerly 3‑judge pan­el. Later: sen­tence deter­mined by a unanimous jury)

Nebraska (A jury must find beyond a rea­son­able doubt that a crime meets one of the state’s nine aggra­vat­ing cir­cum­stances before a death sen­tence is imposed; unan­i­mous 3‑judge deci­sion nec­es­sary for death)

Nevada (New: sen­tence deter­mined by unanimous jury)

Alabama (Repealed judge sen­tenc­ing in 2017)

Florida In Hurst v. Florida, No. 14 – 7505, decid­ed Jan. 12, 2016, the Supreme Court found that Florida’s cap­i­tal sen­tenc­ing scheme vio­lat­ed the 6^th Amendment right to tri­al by jury. ​“The Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact nec­es­sary to impose a sen­tence of death,” Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote in the opin­ion of the Court. In March 2016, the Florida leg­is­la­ture nar­row­ly addressed Hurst by requir­ing that jurors unan­i­mous­ly find any aggra­vat­ing cir­cum­stances that the pros­e­cu­tion seeks to prove to make the defen­dant eli­gi­ble for the death penal­ty. It also mod­i­fied Florida’s sen­tenc­ing prac­tice by requir­ing that at least ten jurors rec­om­mend death before the judge may impose a death sen­tence. On October 14, 2016, the Florida Supreme Court ruled in Hurst v. State that a jury’s cap­i­tal sen­tenc­ing rec­om­men­da­tion con­sti­tut­ed a ver­dict and that, con­se­quent­ly, a judi­cial­ly imposed death sen­tence based on a non-unan­i­mous jury rec­om­men­da­tion of death vio­lat­ed the Sixth Amendment and the Florida state con­sti­tu­tion. That same day, in Perry v. State, the court ruled that March 2016 amend­ment per­mit­ting non-unan­i­mous jury rec­om­men­da­tions of death was unconstitutional. 

Exceptions:

Post-Ring Developments

Supreme Court Decides Florida’s Sentencing Scheme is Unconstitutional under Ring

HURST V. FLORIDA, No. 14 – 7505
Cert. grant­ed Mar. 9, 2015
Decided Jan. 12, 2016

In an 8 – 1 deci­sion in Hurst v. Florida released on January 12, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court found Florida’s cap­i­tal sen­tenc­ing scheme in vio­la­tion of the 6^th Amendment, which guar­an­tees the right to tri­al by jury. ​“The Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact nec­es­sary to impose a sen­tence of death,” Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote in the opin­ion of the Court. The jury and judge in Hurst’s case fol­lowed Florida’s statu­to­ry sen­tenc­ing pro­ce­dure, which requires only an ​“advi­so­ry sen­tence” from a jury. Florida does not require the jury to spec­i­fy the fac­tu­al basis of its sen­tenc­ing rec­om­men­da­tion. The sen­tenc­ing judge must give ​“great weight” to the jury’s rec­om­men­da­tion, but only the judge ever pro­vides writ­ten rea­sons why a case is eli­gi­ble for a death sen­tence. The Court based its deci­sion large­ly on Ring v. Arizona, a 2002 deci­sion in which it struck down Arizona’s sen­tenc­ing scheme because a judge, rather than a jury, deter­mined the facts nec­es­sary to impose a death sen­tence. While Florida’s pro­ce­dure adds the advi­so­ry rec­om­men­da­tion that Arizona’s lacked, the Court found the dis­tinc­tion, ​“imma­te­r­i­al.” ​“As with Timothy Ring, the max­i­mum pun­ish­ment Timothy Hurst could have received with­out any judge-made find­ings was life in prison with­out parole. As with Ring, a judge increased Hurst’s autho­rized pun­ish­ment based on her own factfind­ing. In light of Ring, we hold that Hurst’s sen­tence vio­lates the Sixth Amendment.” 

Justice Alito dis­sent­ed, cit­ing past deci­sions uphold­ing Florida’s death penal­ty statute. Justice Breyer con­curred with the Court’s deci­sion, but would find that the Eighth Amendment requires that a jury deter­mine the actu­al sen­tence, not just the facts that make a per­son eli­gi­ble for death.

(R. Barnes, ​“Supreme Court finds Florida’s cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment process uncon­sti­tu­tion­al,” Washington Post, January 12, 2016). Read the Court’s deci­sion in Hurst v. Florida.

In March 2016, the Florida leg­is­la­ture direct­ly addressed Hurst by requir­ing that jurors unan­i­mous­ly find any aggra­vat­ing cir­cum­stances that the pros­e­cu­tion seeks to prove to make the defen­dant eli­gi­ble for the death penal­ty. It also mod­i­fied Florida’s sen­tenc­ing prac­tice by requir­ing that at least ten jurors rec­om­mend death before the judge may impose a death sentence.

Supreme Court Declares Ring Not Retroactive

SCHRIRO V. SUMMERLIN, No. 03 – 526

In a 5 – 4 deci­sion on June 24, 2004, the Supreme Court deter­mined that its 2002 deci­sion in Ring v. Arizona was not retroac­tive, there­by deny­ing new sen­tenc­ing hear­ings for dozens of death row inmates in Arizona, Idaho, Montana and Nebraska whose sen­tences were orig­i­nal­ly hand­ed down by judges, but whose cas­es are old­er and not in the first stages of their appeals. In Ring, the Court decid­ed that sen­tenc­ing laws must pro­tect the right to a jury deter­mi­na­tion of eli­gi­bil­i­ty for the death penal­ty. With their deci­sion in Summerlin, the Justices decid­ed that their orig­i­nal 7 – 2 deci­sion in Ring was a pro­ce­dur­al rule and thus was not retroac­tive. Dissenting in Summerlin were Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. Discussing the dif­fer­ences between the death row inmates grant­ed new sen­tenc­ing hear­ings and the death row inmates denied new sen­tenc­ing hear­ings because they are in a lat­er stage of appeals, Justice Breyer stat­ed: ​“Certainly the ordi­nary cit­i­zen will not under­stand the dif­fer­ence. That cit­i­zen will sim­ply wit­ness two indi­vid­u­als, both sen­tenced through the use of uncon­sti­tu­tion­al pro­ce­dures, one indi­vid­ual going to his death, the oth­er saved, all through an acci­dent of tim­ing. How can the Court square this spec­ta­cle with what it has called the ​‘vital impor­tance to the defen­dant and to the com­mu­ni­ty that any deci­sion to impose the death sen­tence be, and appear to be, based on reason’?”

• Read DPIC’s Press Release on Schriro v. Summerlin (PDF)
• Read the Supreme Court’s decision

Earlier:

Supreme Court to Clarify Ring Ruling The Supreme Court agreed to clar­i­fy the impact of its 2002 Ring v. Arizona rul­ing that held that jurors, rather than a judge, must be allowed to deter­mine whether a defen­dant is eli­gi­ble for a death sen­tence. The Justices will decide whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9^th Circuit was cor­rect when it over­turned Warren Summerlin’s death sen­tence, hold­ing that Ring should apply retroac­tive­ly to inmates who had exhaust­ed their direct appeal. While the Supreme Court’s Ring rul­ing inval­i­dat­ed the death sen­tenc­ing laws of Arizona, Montana, Idaho, Nebraska and Colorado, it did not make clear if its rul­ing should apply retroac­tive­ly to every­one on those states’ death rows. Since the deci­sion, courts have issued dif­fer­ing inter­pre­ta­tions on the retroac­tiv­i­ty ques­tion. (Associated Press, December 1, 2003) See Supreme Court.

The United States Supreme Court has grant­ed cer­tio­rari on two ques­tions in the case of Schriro v. Summerlin, No. 03 – 526 (for­mer­ly Summerlin v. Stewart). The two questions are:

• Did the Ninth Circuit err by hold­ing that the new rule announced in Ring is sub­stan­tive, rather than pro­ce­dur­al, and there­fore exempt from the retroac­tiv­i­ty analy­sis of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plu­ral­i­ty)?
• Did the Ninth Circuit err by hold­ing that the new rule announced in Ring applies retroac­tive­ly to cas­es on col­lat­er­al review under Teague’s excep­tion for water­shed rules of crim­i­nal pro­ce­dure that alter bedrock pro­ce­dur­al prin­ci­ples and seri­ous­ly enhance the accu­ra­cy of the proceedings?

Following the 9^th Circuit Court of Appeals deci­sion in Summerlin v. Stewart on September 2, 2003, numer­ous press accounts report­ed on the effect of the deci­sions hold­ing Ring v. Arizona to be retroac­tive. A series of excerpts from these arti­cles is avail­able by click­ing here. Excerpts from the Summerlin v. Stewart deci­sion are avail­able by click­ing here. To read the com­plete Summerlin v. Stewart deci­sion, vis­it http://​www​.ca9​.uscourts​.gov.

Pre-Ring Developments

U.S. Supreme Court Grants Stay of Execution for Alabama Inmate Gary Leon Brown was grant­ed a stay of exe­cu­tion by the U.S. Supreme Court just hours before he was sched­uled to be exe­cut­ed in Alabama. Brown has raised two issues before the Court: he claims that (1) Alabama’s use of the elec­tric chair vio­lates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cru­el and unusu­al pun­ish­ment. Alabama is one of only two states that use elec­tro­cu­tion as their sole method of exe­cu­tion. (Subsequent leg­is­la­tion changed Alabama’s method of exe­cu­tion to lethal injec­tion). (2) Brown also con­tends that the Court should halt his exe­cu­tion until it decides Ring v. Arizona, a case it will hear lat­er this year to deter­mine the con­sti­tu­tion­al­i­ty of hav­ing a judge, rather than a jury, decide sen­tenc­ing in death penal­ty cas­es. In Alabama, the jury makes a sen­tenc­ing rec­om­men­da­tion, but the judge is not bound by it. (Associated Press, 4/​4/​02).

Florida Execution Halted by Governor Bush Two hours after the U.S. Supreme Court grant­ed a stay to Linroy Bottoson, Florida Governor Jeb Bush announced that he would issue an exec­u­tive order halt­ing the exe­cu­tion of Robert Trease, who was sched­uled for exe­cu­tion on February 7, 2002. Citing the Supreme Court’s deci­sions to stay Bottoson’s and Amos King’s exe­cu­tions, Bush stayed Trease’s exe­cu­tion ​“until fur­ther action is tak­en by the [C]ourt.” (Associated Press, 2/​6/​02).

U.S. Supreme Court Stays Two Florida Executions Florida death row inmates Amos King, who was sched­uled for exe­cu­tion on January 24, and Linroy Bottoson, sched­uled for February 5, were grant­ed stays of exe­cu­tion by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court appears to have grant­ed the reprieves in light of its deci­sion to hear Ring v. Arizona. (Associated Press, 1/​23/​02)

Indiana Gives Jury Sentencing Power Effective July 1, 2002, unan­i­mous jury votes for death or life with­out parole are bind­ing on the judge, who impos­es the for­mal sen­tence. This new law, signed by the gov­er­nor on March 26, 2002, allows the judge to decide the sen­tence only if the jury can­not agree unan­i­mous­ly. The jury must find at least one aggra­vat­ing fac­tor beyond a reasonable doubt.

Montana: Jury must decide death eli­gi­bil­i­ty As of May 1, 2001, a judge may not impose the death penal­ty with­out the jury’s unan­i­mous find­ing of aggra­vat­ing fac­tors beyond a rea­son­able doubt. The 6 cur­rent death row inmates were all sen­tenced pri­or to this change.

Maryland Court of Appeals Stays Execution Until Ring Decided In December 2001, the Maryland Court of Appeals decid­ed a chal­lenge to its death penal­ty based on Apprendi (Borchardt v. State, 786 A.2^d 631 (Md. 2001)). Death row inmate Lawrence Borchardt chal­lenged his death sen­tence, argu­ing that Maryland’s statute allows jurors to use the less­er stan­dard of pre­pon­der­ance of the evi­dence when decid­ing on death sen­tences. In a 4 – 3 hold­ing, the Maryland Court reject­ed the argu­ment, stat­ing that the Supreme Court did not intend for Apprendi to apply in death penal­ty cas­es. ​“If Apprendi ren­ders the Maryland law uncon­sti­tu­tion­al, then… it like­ly ren­ders most of the cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment laws in the coun­try uncon­sti­tu­tion­al,” wrote the major­i­ty. (Borchardt, 786 A.2^d at 649). However, the four dis­sent­ing jus­tices, which includ­ed Chief Judge Robert M. Bell, argued that the stan­dard of proof in decid­ing the death penal­ty should be the high­est avail­able. ​“I would hold that, based on Apprendi … the sen­tenc­ing author­i­ty must find that aggra­vat­ing fac­tors out­weigh mit­i­gat­ing fac­tors beyond a rea­son­able doubt, and not by a mere pre­pon­der­ance of evi­dence,” wrote dis­sent­ing Judge Irma Raker. (Borchardt, 786 A.2^d at 665) (Raker, J., dis­sent­ing). Although the Maryland Court of Appeals held that Apprendi did not apply to Maryland’s death penal­ty, they did grant a stay of exe­cu­tion to Stephen Oken after the Supreme Court’s deci­sion to hear Ring. Oken, who was sched­uled for exe­cu­tion in ear­ly March, chal­lenged his death sen­tenced based on Apprendi.

Background

Overview

On January 11, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Ring v. Arizona (No. 01 – 488) to decide the con­sti­tu­tion­al­i­ty of hav­ing a judge, rather than a jury, decide the crit­i­cal sen­tenc­ing issues in a death penal­ty case. The case will apply an ear­li­er U.S. Supreme Court deci­sion, Apprendi v. New Jersey, in which the Court held that ​“any fact (oth­er than pri­or con­vic­tion) that increas­es the max­i­mum penal­ty for a crime must be … sub­mit­ted to a jury, and proven beyond a rea­son­able doubt.” (500 U.S. 466, 476 (2000)) (empha­sis added). In Arizona and eight oth­er states, judges decid­ed whether to impose the death penal­ty after a jury had determined guilt.

The pur­pose of this page is to offer infor­ma­tion regard­ing Ring v. Arizona. The page pro­vides back­ground infor­ma­tion on cas­es such as Apprendi that have bear­ing on Ring, as well as recent guber­na­to­r­i­al and judi­cial devel­op­ments relat­ed to the Court’s deci­sion in Ring. The page also lists which states allow judge sen­tenc­ing, and there­fore may be affect­ed by the Supreme Court’s decision.

In the U.S. Supreme Court

In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Walton v. Arizona (497 U.S. 639 (1990)) that the Arizona cap­i­tal sen­tenc­ing law, which pro­vid­ed that a judge, not a jury, was the ulti­mate find­er of fact with respect to the exis­tence of aggra­vat­ing cir­cum­stances, was con­sti­tu­tion­al. However, the Court recent­ly held in Apprendi v. New Jersey (500 U.S. 466 (2000)) that a judge could not make find­ings that would increase a defen­dan­t’s sen­tence beyond the max­i­mum, since that was com­pa­ra­ble to an addi­tion­al con­vic­tion. Such a deci­sion should be sub­mit­ted to a jury and requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

With regard to the death penal­ty, the four jus­tice plu­ral­i­ty in Apprendi stat­ed that the Court’s deci­sion should not affect death penal­ty cas­es: “[The Court] pre­vi­ous­ly con­sid­ered and reject­ed the argu­ment that the prin­ci­ples guid­ing our deci­sion today ren­der invalid state cap­i­tal sen­tenc­ing schemes requir­ing judges, after a jury ver­dict hold­ing a defen­dant guilty of a cap­i­tal crime, to find spe­cif­ic aggra­vat­ing fac­tors before impos­ing a sen­tence of death.” However, Justice Thomas in a con­cur­ring opin­ion, addressed whether Apprendi could be rec­on­ciled with Walton, and thus be applied in capital cases:

Walton did approve a scheme by which a judge, rather than a jury, deter­mines an aggra­vat­ing fact that makes a con­vict eli­gi­ble for the death penal­ty, and thus eli­gi­ble for a greater pun­ish­ment. In this sense, that fact is an ele­ment. But that scheme exists in a unique con­text, for in the area of cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment, unlike any oth­er area, we have imposed spe­cial con­straints on a leg­is­la­ture’s abil­i­ty to deter­mine what facts shall lead to what pun­ish­ment — we have restrict­ed the leg­is­la­ture’s abil­i­ty to define crimes. Under our recent cap­i­tal-pun­ish­ment jurispru­dence, nei­ther Arizona nor any oth­er juris­dic­tion could pro­vide — as, pre­vi­ous­ly, it freely could and did — that a per­son shall be death eli­gi­ble auto­mat­i­cal­ly upon con­vic­tion for cer­tain crimes. We have inter­posed a bar­ri­er between a jury find­ing of a cap­i­tal crime and a court’s abil­i­ty to impose cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment. Whether this dis­tinc­tion between cap­i­tal crimes and all oth­ers, or some oth­er dis­tinc­tion, is suf­fi­cient to put the for­mer out­side the rule that I have stat­ed is a ques­tion for another day.

Thomas, J., con­cur­ring (cita­tions omitted)). 

Possible Retroactivity

On June 24, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court decid­ed Ring v. Arizona, end­ing the prac­tice of hav­ing a judge, rather than a jury, decide the crit­i­cal sen­tenc­ing issues in a death penal­ty case. It is unclear, how­ev­er, if the rul­ing will apply to all the defen­dants in all states with judge sen­tenc­ing. Affected defen­dants will either have their sen­tences reduced to life sen­tences — as hap­pened after Furman v. Georgia in 1972 — or they will receive new sen­tenc­ing tri­als with a new jury.

Retroactivity of the Court’s Decision

Ring clear­ly applies to all future cas­es and to defen­dants whose con­vic­tions were not final when Ring was decid­ed. An open ques­tion is whether Schriro v. Summerlin, No. 03 – 526 (for­mer­ly Summerlin v. Stewart) that will deter­mine the retroac­tiv­i­ty of Ring. The Ninth Circuit ruled that Ring should be retroac­tive for at least some defen­dants on death row. The Supreme Court will con­sid­er: should retroac­tive­ly apply to every­one on death row regard­less of the stage of their appeal in the affect­ed states. The United States Supreme Court has grant­ed cer­tio­rari in the case of

• Did the Ninth Circuit err by hold­ing that the new rule announced in Ring is sub­stan­tive, rather than pro­ce­dur­al, and there­fore exempt from the retroac­tiv­i­ty analy­sis of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plu­ral­i­ty)?
• Did the Ninth Circuit err by hold­ing that the new rule announced in Ring applies retroac­tive­ly to cas­es on col­lat­er­al review under Teague​’s excep­tion for water­shed rules of crim­i­nal pro­ce­dure that alter bedrock pro­ce­dur­al prin­ci­ples and seri­ous­ly enhance the accu­ra­cy of the proceedings?

Retroactivity of New Laws Passed Since Ring

A sec­ond retroac­tiv­i­ty issue is whether defen­dants sen­tenced under the old sys­tem involv­ing a judge’s find­ing of aggra­vat­ing fac­tors can now be resen­tenced under a new law employ­ing juries. There is a gen­er­al rule that new laws can’t be applied retroac­tive­ly (ex post fac­to), but there are excep­tions. The Court might exam­ine whether the new law is a real sub­stan­tive change, or just a pro­ce­dur­al change, and whether it pro­vides an addi­tion­al bur­den on the defen­dant, or is actu­al­ly pro­vid­ing a ben­e­fit to the defen­dant. For exam­ple, when states have changed their method of exe­cu­tion, they haven’t had to pro­vide new sen­tenc­ing hear­ings. States might argue that if they are required to pro­vide juries for death sen­tenc­ing, that is just a pro­ce­dur­al change which imparts a ben­e­fit to the defen­dant, and hence their new law can be applied to the old cas­es. Defendants might argue that chang­ing from judges to juries is a fun­da­men­tal, sub­stan­tive change in the law.

There have been cas­es of peo­ple who com­mit­ted a cap­i­tal crime before Furman v. Georgia (1972) (over­turn­ing death penal­ty laws), but who were not cap­tured and tried until after the new laws rein­stat­ing the death penal­ty went into effect. At least one such per­son, Ernest Dobbert in Florida, was giv­en the death penal­ty under the new law (which was deemed to have more pro­tec­tions than the old law struck down in Furman) and was even­tu­al­ly exe­cut­ed in 1984. See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977). The dis­sent in Dobbert, how­ev­er, cit­ed Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (1937), which artic­u­lat­ed a ​“fair warn­ing” test for the appli­ca­tion of ex post fac­to laws. The dis­sent not­ed that Lindsey held, ​“in lan­guage that might have been writ­ten with the present case in mind: ​‘The Constitution for­bids the appli­ca­tion of any new puni­tive mea­sure to a crime already con­sum­mat­ed, to the detri­ment or mate­r­i­al dis­ad­van­tage to the wrong­do­er.’ ” (Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).

Additional Information

In the U.S. Supreme Court

Read the tran­script of the oral argu­ment in Ring
Read the opinion

Articles

• Mary P. Gallagher, ​“Public Defender, Attorney General Seek Statewide Freeze of Capital Cases,” New Jersey Law Journal, 9/​16/​02
• Adam Liptak, ​“A Supreme Court Ruling Roils Death Penalty Cases” New York Times, 9/​16/​02
• Stan Bailey, ​“Effects of Arizona case stirs debate: Could case there inval­i­date death sen­tences here?” Birmingham News, 2/​13/​02
• Lesley Clark, ​“Ruling could force Florida to com­mute exe­cu­tion,” Miami Herald, 2/​12/​02
• Susan Clary, ​“Justices’ review of death penal­ty met with shock,” Orlando Sentinel, 2/​7/​02
• Jay Weaver, ​“Appeal imper­ils Florida death penal­ty,” Miami Herald, 2/​7/​02
• “Supreme Court Intervenes in Death Penalty Cases,” Miami Herald (edi­to­r­i­al), 2/​7/​02
• Linda Greenhouse, ​“Major Death Penalty Appeal Accepted,” New York Times, 1/​12/​02
• Charles Lane, ​“Supreme Court to Review Death Sentencing,” Washington Post, 1/​12/​02
• Karen Abbott, ​“Justices to Review Death Penalty,” Rocky Mountain News, 1/​13/​02
• David Lane, ​“Colorado Death Penalty Misguided,” Denver Post (op-ed), 1/​25/​02

Law Reviews

• Margery Koosed, ​“Averting Mistaken Executions by Adopting the Model Penal Code’s Exclusion of Death in the Presence of Lingering Doubt,” 21 Northern Illinois University Law Review 41 (2001) — The arti­cle con­sid­ers the effects that the Supreme Court’s deci­sion in Apprendi v. New Jersey will have on cap­i­tal judge-sentencing schemes.
• Mark Vilaboy, Comment, ​“Playing the Apprendi Card: Revisiting Judicial Fact-Finding in Arizona’s Death Penalty Scheme,” 33 Arizona State Law Journal 363 (2001).
  Joseph L. Hoffmann, ​“Apprendi v. New Jersey: Back to the Future? (Symposium)” 38 American Criminal Law Review 255 (2001)