U.S. Supreme Court: Ring v. Arizona

Supreme Court Declares Defendants Have a Right to Jury Determination of Eligibility for Death Sentence

In a 7-2 decision in the case of Ring v. Arizona, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a defendant has the right to have a jury, rather than a judge, decide on the existence of an aggravating factor that makes the defendant eligible for the death penalty. The Court based its judgment on the broader constitutional principle that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury encompasses the right to a jury finding of all facts that are necessary to put a defendant to death. In its decision, the Court held that Arizona’s sentencing statute, under which the judge determined the presence or absence of aggravating factors necessary to make a defendant eligible for the death penalty violated this Sixth Amendment guarantee. (Associated Press, June 24, 2002). Read the opinion. See also, DPIC Press Release.

Click this link to find post-Ring developments by state.

Notes on Judge Sentencing

Arizona (formerly judge sentencing. New: jury to determine whether aggravating and mitigating circumstances exist and if the death penalty will be imposed)

Idaho (formerly judge sentencing. New: In February 2003, Idaho Governor Dirk Kempthorne signed into law a bill that provides for jury sentencing in capital cases.)

Montana (Jury to unanimously determine aggravating factors [as of May 1, 2001])

Delaware (abolished the death penalty in 2016) — A 1991 change in Delaware’s law empowered the judge to overrule a jury’s sentencing recommendation. However, only one judge, John E. Babiarz Jr. overruled a jury’s recommendation of life (10-2) to impose a death sentence (and that sentence was overturned). (S. O’Sullivan, “Delaware jury’s votes in capital cases don’t always sway judges,” DelawareOnline, Feb. 25, 2011). After the U.S. Supreme Court decided Hurst v. Florida, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled in 2016 in Rauf v. State that the Delaware statute giving judges sole authority to determine whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances violated Ring and Hurst.

Colorado (abolished the death penalty in 2020. Formerly 3-judge panel. Later: sentence determined by a unanimous jury)

Nebraska (A jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime meets one of the state’s nine aggravating circumstances before a death sentence is imposed; unanimous 3-judge decision necessary for death)

Nevada (New: sentence determined by unanimous jury)

Alabama (Repealed judge sentencing in 2017)

Florida In Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505, decided Jan. 12, 2016, the Supreme Court found that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violated the 6th Amendment right to trial by jury. “The Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death,” Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote in the opinion of the Court. In March 2016, the Florida legislature narrowly addressed Hurst by requiring that jurors unanimously find any aggravating circumstances that the prosecution seeks to prove to make the defendant eligible for the death penalty. It also modified Florida’s sentencing practice by requiring that at least ten jurors recommend death before the judge may impose a death sentence. On October 14, 2016, the Florida Supreme Court ruled in Hurst v. State that a jury’s capital sentencing recommendation constituted a verdict and that, consequently, a judicially imposed death sentence based on a non-unanimous jury recommendation of death violated the Sixth Amendment and the Florida state constitution. That same day, in Perry v. State, the court ruled that March 2016 amendment permitting non-unanimous jury recommendations of death was unconstitutional.

Exceptions:

Post-Ring Developments

Supreme Court Decides Florida’s Sentencing Scheme is Unconstitutional under Ring

HURST V. FLORIDA, No. 14-7505
Cert. granted Mar. 9, 2015
Decided Jan. 12, 2016

In an 8-1 decision in Hurst v. Florida released on January 12, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court found Florida’s capital sentencing scheme in violation of the 6th Amendment, which guarantees the right to trial by jury. “The Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death,” Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote in the opinion of the Court. The jury and judge in Hurst’s case followed Florida’s statutory sentencing procedure, which requires only an “advisory sentence” from a jury. Florida does not require the jury to specify the factual basis of its sentencing recommendation. The sentencing judge must give “great weight” to the jury’s recommendation, but only the judge ever provides written reasons why a case is eligible for a death sentence. The Court based its decision largely on Ring v. Arizona, a 2002 decision in which it struck down Arizona’s sentencing scheme because a judge, rather than a jury, determined the facts necessary to impose a death sentence. While Florida’s procedure adds the advisory recommendation that Arizona’s lacked, the Court found the distinction, “immaterial.” “As with Timothy Ring, the maximum punishment Timothy Hurst could have received without any judge-made findings was life in prison without parole. As with Ring, a judge increased Hurst’s authorized punishment based on her own factfinding. In light of Ring, we hold that Hurst’s sentence violates the Sixth Amendment.”

Justice Alito dissented, citing past decisions upholding Florida’s death penalty statute. Justice Breyer concurred with the Court’s decision, but would find that the Eighth Amendment requires that a jury determine the actual sentence, not just the facts that make a person eligible for death.

(R. Barnes, “Supreme Court finds Florida’s capital punishment process unconstitutional,” Washington Post, January 12, 2016). Read the Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida.

In March 2016, the Florida legislature directly addressed Hurst by requiring that jurors unanimously find any aggravating circumstances that the prosecution seeks to prove to make the defendant eligible for the death penalty. It also modified Florida’s sentencing practice by requiring that at least ten jurors recommend death before the judge may impose a death sentence.

Supreme Court Declares Ring Not Retroactive

SCHRIRO V. SUMMERLIN, No. 03-526

In a 5-4 decision on June 24, 2004, the Supreme Court determined that its 2002 decision in Ring v. Arizona was not retroactive, thereby denying new sentencing hearings for dozens of death row inmates in Arizona, Idaho, Montana and Nebraska whose sentences were originally handed down by judges, but whose cases are older and not in the first stages of their appeals. In Ring, the Court decided that sentencing laws must protect the right to a jury determination of eligibility for the death penalty. With their decision in Summerlin, the Justices decided that their original 7-2 decision in Ring was a procedural rule and thus was not retroactive. Dissenting in Summerlin were Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. Discussing the differences between the death row inmates granted new sentencing hearings and the death row inmates denied new sentencing hearings because they are in a later stage of appeals, Justice Breyer stated: “Certainly the ordinary citizen will not understand the difference. That citizen will simply witness two individuals, both sentenced through the use of unconstitutional procedures, one individual going to his death, the other saved, all through an accident of timing. How can the Court square this spectacle with what it has called the ‘vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason’?”

• Read DPIC’s Press Release on Schriro v. Summerlin (PDF)
• Read the Supreme Court’s decision

Earlier:

Supreme Court to Clarify Ring Ruling The Supreme Court agreed to clarify the impact of its 2002 Ring v. Arizona ruling that held that jurors, rather than a judge, must be allowed to determine whether a defendant is eligible for a death sentence. The Justices will decide whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit was correct when it overturned Warren Summerlin’s death sentence, holding that Ring should apply retroactively to inmates who had exhausted their direct appeal. While the Supreme Court’s Ring ruling invalidated the death sentencing laws of Arizona, Montana, Idaho, Nebraska and Colorado, it did not make clear if its ruling should apply retroactively to everyone on those states’ death rows. Since the decision, courts have issued differing interpretations on the retroactivity question. (Associated Press, December 1, 2003) See Supreme Court.

The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari on two questions in the case of Schriro v. Summerlin, No. 03-526 (formerly Summerlin v. Stewart). The two questions are:

• Did the Ninth Circuit err by holding that the new rule announced in Ring is substantive, rather than procedural, and therefore exempt from the retroactivity analysis of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality)?
• Did the Ninth Circuit err by holding that the new rule announced in Ring applies retroactively to cases on collateral review under Teague’s exception for watershed rules of criminal procedure that alter bedrock procedural principles and seriously enhance the accuracy of the proceedings?

Following the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Summerlin v. Stewart on September 2, 2003, numerous press accounts reported on the effect of the decisions holding Ring v. Arizona to be retroactive. A series of excerpts from these articles is available by clicking here. Excerpts from the Summerlin v. Stewart decision are available by clicking here. To read the complete Summerlin v. Stewart decision, visit http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov.

Pre-Ring Developments

U.S. Supreme Court Grants Stay of Execution for Alabama Inmate Gary Leon Brown was granted a stay of execution by the U.S. Supreme Court just hours before he was scheduled to be executed in Alabama. Brown has raised two issues before the Court: he claims that (1) Alabama’s use of the electric chair violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Alabama is one of only two states that use electrocution as their sole method of execution. (Subsequent legislation changed Alabama’s method of execution to lethal injection). (2) Brown also contends that the Court should halt his execution until it decides Ring v. Arizona, a case it will hear later this year to determine the constitutionality of having a judge, rather than a jury, decide sentencing in death penalty cases. In Alabama, the jury makes a sentencing recommendation, but the judge is not bound by it. (Associated Press, 4/4/02).

Florida Execution Halted by Governor Bush Two hours after the U.S. Supreme Court granted a stay to Linroy Bottoson, Florida Governor Jeb Bush announced that he would issue an executive order halting the execution of Robert Trease, who was scheduled for execution on February 7, 2002. Citing the Supreme Court’s decisions to stay Bottoson’s and Amos King’s executions, Bush stayed Trease’s execution “until further action is taken by the [C]ourt.” (Associated Press, 2/6/02).

U.S. Supreme Court Stays Two Florida Executions Florida death row inmates Amos King, who was scheduled for execution on January 24, and Linroy Bottoson, scheduled for February 5, were granted stays of execution by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court appears to have granted the reprieves in light of its decision to hear Ring v. Arizona. (Associated Press, 1/23/02)

Indiana Gives Jury Sentencing Power Effective July 1, 2002, unanimous jury votes for death or life without parole are binding on the judge, who imposes the formal sentence. This new law, signed by the governor on March 26, 2002, allows the judge to decide the sentence only if the jury cannot agree unanimously. The jury must find at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt.

Montana: Jury must decide death eligibility As of May 1, 2001, a judge may not impose the death penalty without the jury’s unanimous finding of aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. The 6 current death row inmates were all sentenced prior to this change.

Maryland Court of Appeals Stays Execution Until Ring Decided In December 2001, the Maryland Court of Appeals decided a challenge to its death penalty based on Apprendi (Borchardt v. State, 786 A.2d 631 (Md. 2001)). Death row inmate Lawrence Borchardt challenged his death sentence, arguing that Maryland’s statute allows jurors to use the lesser standard of preponderance of the evidence when deciding on death sentences. In a 4-3 holding, the Maryland Court rejected the argument, stating that the Supreme Court did not intend for Apprendi to apply in death penalty cases. “If Apprendi renders the Maryland law unconstitutional, then… it likely renders most of the capital punishment laws in the country unconstitutional,” wrote the majority. (Borchardt, 786 A.2d at 649). However, the four dissenting justices, which included Chief Judge Robert M. Bell, argued that the standard of proof in deciding the death penalty should be the highest available. “I would hold that, based on Apprendi … the sentencing authority must find that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, and not by a mere preponderance of evidence,” wrote dissenting Judge Irma Raker. (Borchardt, 786 A.2d at 665) (Raker, J., dissenting). Although the Maryland Court of Appeals held that Apprendi did not apply to Maryland’s death penalty, they did grant a stay of execution to Stephen Oken after the Supreme Court’s decision to hear Ring. Oken, who was scheduled for execution in early March, challenged his death sentenced based on Apprendi.

Background

Overview

On January 11, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Ring v. Arizona (No. 01-488) to decide the constitutionality of having a judge, rather than a jury, decide the critical sentencing issues in a death penalty case. The case will apply an earlier U.S. Supreme Court decision, Apprendi v. New Jersey, in which the Court held that “any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be … submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” (500 U.S. 466, 476 (2000)) (emphasis added). In Arizona and eight other states, judges decided whether to impose the death penalty after a jury had determined guilt.

The purpose of this page is to offer information regarding Ring v. Arizona. The page provides background information on cases such as Apprendi that have bearing on Ring, as well as recent gubernatorial and judicial developments related to the Court’s decision in Ring. The page also lists which states allow judge sentencing, and therefore may be affected by the Supreme Court’s decision.

In the U.S. Supreme Court

In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Walton v. Arizona (497 U.S. 639 (1990)) that the Arizona capital sentencing law, which provided that a judge, not a jury, was the ultimate finder of fact with respect to the existence of aggravating circumstances, was constitutional. However, the Court recently held in Apprendi v. New Jersey (500 U.S. 466 (2000)) that a judge could not make findings that would increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the maximum, since that was comparable to an additional conviction. Such a decision should be submitted to a jury and requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

With regard to the death penalty, the four justice plurality in Apprendi stated that the Court’s decision should not affect death penalty cases: “[The Court] previously considered and rejected the argument that the principles guiding our decision today render invalid state capital sentencing schemes requiring judges, after a jury verdict holding a defendant guilty of a capital crime, to find specific aggravating factors before imposing a sentence of death.” However, Justice Thomas in a concurring opinion, addressed whether Apprendi could be reconciled with Walton, and thus be applied in capital cases:

Walton did approve a scheme by which a judge, rather than a jury, determines an aggravating fact that makes a convict eligible for the death penalty, and thus eligible for a greater punishment. In this sense, that fact is an element. But that scheme exists in a unique context, for in the area of capital punishment, unlike any other area, we have imposed special constraints on a legislature’s ability to determine what facts shall lead to what punishment - we have restricted the legislature’s ability to define crimes. Under our recent capital-punishment jurisprudence, neither Arizona nor any other jurisdiction could provide - as, previously, it freely could and did - that a person shall be death eligible automatically upon conviction for certain crimes. We have interposed a barrier between a jury finding of a capital crime and a court’s ability to impose capital punishment. Whether this distinction between capital crimes and all others, or some other distinction, is sufficient to put the former outside the rule that I have stated is a question for another day.

Thomas, J., concurring (citations omitted)).

Possible Retroactivity

On June 24, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, ending the practice of having a judge, rather than a jury, decide the critical sentencing issues in a death penalty case. It is unclear, however, if the ruling will apply to all the defendants in all states with judge sentencing. Affected defendants will either have their sentences reduced to life sentences - as happened after Furman v. Georgia in 1972 - or they will receive new sentencing trials with a new jury.

Retroactivity of the Court’s Decision

Ring clearly applies to all future cases and to defendants whose convictions were not final when Ring was decided. An open question is whether Schriro v. Summerlin, No. 03-526 (formerly Summerlin v. Stewart) that will determine the retroactivity of Ring. The Ninth Circuit ruled that Ring should be retroactive for at least some defendants on death row. The Supreme Court will consider: should retroactively apply to everyone on death row regardless of the stage of their appeal in the affected states. The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the case of

• Did the Ninth Circuit err by holding that the new rule announced in Ring is substantive, rather than procedural, and therefore exempt from the retroactivity analysis of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality)?
• Did the Ninth Circuit err by holding that the new rule announced in Ring applies retroactively to cases on collateral review under Teague’s exception for watershed rules of criminal procedure that alter bedrock procedural principles and seriously enhance the accuracy of the proceedings?

Retroactivity of New Laws Passed Since Ring

A second retroactivity issue is whether defendants sentenced under the old system involving a judge’s finding of aggravating factors can now be resentenced under a new law employing juries. There is a general rule that new laws can’t be applied retroactively (ex post facto), but there are exceptions. The Court might examine whether the new law is a real substantive change, or just a procedural change, and whether it provides an additional burden on the defendant, or is actually providing a benefit to the defendant. For example, when states have changed their method of execution, they haven’t had to provide new sentencing hearings. States might argue that if they are required to provide juries for death sentencing, that is just a procedural change which imparts a benefit to the defendant, and hence their new law can be applied to the old cases. Defendants might argue that changing from judges to juries is a fundamental, substantive change in the law.

There have been cases of people who committed a capital crime before Furman v. Georgia (1972) (overturning death penalty laws), but who were not captured and tried until after the new laws reinstating the death penalty went into effect. At least one such person, Ernest Dobbert in Florida, was given the death penalty under the new law (which was deemed to have more protections than the old law struck down in Furman) and was eventually executed in 1984. See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977). The dissent in Dobbert, however, cited Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (1937), which articulated a “fair warning” test for the application of ex post facto laws. The dissent noted that Lindsey held, “in language that might have been written with the present case in mind: ‘The Constitution forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated, to the detriment or material disadvantage to the wrongdoer.’” (Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).

Additional Information

In the U.S. Supreme Court

Read the transcript of the oral argument in Ring
Read the opinion

Articles

• Mary P. Gallagher, “Public Defender, Attorney General Seek Statewide Freeze of Capital Cases,” New Jersey Law Journal, 9/16/02
• Adam Liptak, “A Supreme Court Ruling Roils Death Penalty Cases” New York Times, 9/16/02
• Stan Bailey, “Effects of Arizona case stirs debate: Could case there invalidate death sentences here?” Birmingham News, 2/13/02
• Lesley Clark, “Ruling could force Florida to commute execution,” Miami Herald, 2/12/02
• Susan Clary, “Justices’ review of death penalty met with shock,” Orlando Sentinel, 2/7/02
• Jay Weaver, “Appeal imperils Florida death penalty,” Miami Herald, 2/7/02
• ”Supreme Court Intervenes in Death Penalty Cases,” Miami Herald (editorial), 2/7/02
• Linda Greenhouse, “Major Death Penalty Appeal Accepted,” New York Times, 1/12/02
• Charles Lane, “Supreme Court to Review Death Sentencing,” Washington Post, 1/12/02
• Karen Abbott, “Justices to Review Death Penalty,” Rocky Mountain News, 1/13/02
• David Lane, “Colorado Death Penalty Misguided,” Denver Post (op-ed), 1/25/02

Law Reviews

• Margery Koosed, “Averting Mistaken Executions by Adopting the Model Penal Code’s Exclusion of Death in the Presence of Lingering Doubt,” 21 Northern Illinois University Law Review 41 (2001) - The article considers the effects that the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey will have on capital judge-sentencing schemes.
• Mark Vilaboy, Comment, “Playing the Apprendi Card: Revisiting Judicial Fact-Finding in Arizona’s Death Penalty Scheme,” 33 Arizona State Law Journal 363 (2001).
  Joseph L. Hoffmann, “Apprendi v. New Jersey: Back to the Future? (Symposium)” 38 American Criminal Law Review 255 (2001)